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ABSTRACT
A METHOD OF SCHEDULE AND ROUTE PLANNING IN URBAN MASS TRANSIT
by
ALEX EFREM FRIEDLANDER
Submitted to the Department of City and Regional Planning on-
September 25, 1968, in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in City and Regional
Planning
Continued arbitrary reductions in service are not a
panacea for the financially stricken urban public transport-
ation industry. In seeking to reduce costs, "it is not
always realized by management that a cut in mileage during
a period of fall-off in revenue will result in a reduction
in patronage much beyond the normal or average fall-off."
(Robert T. Pollock, former head of the Department of Sched-
ules, Cleveland Transit System, chapter 2 footnote 35).
More attention must be paid to making urban mass
transit service more attractive in such a way that the cost
of doing so will be equal to or less than the additional
revenue encouraged. To do this, new methods of data collec-
tion and analysis, and new approaches to service decisions,
based on a better understanding of the costs of such decis-
ions and of why the urban traveler chooses to make (or not
make) his trips as he does, must be developed.
This thesis develops such new methods and approaches.
The proposed method of Schedule and Route Planning is:
1. Market oriented, focusing on the sensitivity of
demand as well as cost to changes in service, and on the
potentially profitable demand for new or improved transit
service. Relationships are found to exist between level
of service and transit usage (chapter 5). These relation-
ships can be measured, and applied to decisions on level of
service in a manner that will enable the determination of
an "loptimum," or at least better, level of service for the
desired objectives (maximum profit, maximum number of pass-
engers, etc.).
2. Based on incremental analysis, making use of
marginal cost analysis (chapter 6). The marginal (added)
cost of a service increment is found to vary from route to
route and change to change, depending on a number of factors;
it is always less than the average accounted cost.
3. Systematic (as defined in chapter 3), drawing on
the discipline of Systems Analysis to make what is now an
essentially disorganized, inconsistent art (chapter 2) into
a systematic, consistent science capable of being programmed
for the computer.
It is hoped that the new approaches and findings
in this thesis will inspire further efforts along similar
lines in and out of the transit industry. In particular,
the effect of service changes on demand; the adaptation
of the model to the computer; and the improvement of data
collection procedures in the industry are suggested as
fruitful areas for research.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I
In the past, changes in schedules and routes on
many United States urban transit systems have been con-
servative, random and piecemeal. Typically, decisions as
to whether or not there are enough riders to "Justify"
existing or new service are made on the basis of peak load
point surveys and average cost techniques. Information on
distribution, origins and destinations of passengers; re-
sponses over time to changing service; as well as inform-
ation on marginal variations in operating costs are not
used as input to these decisions. What data is used and
gathered from year to year is seldom compared for the
purpose of finding out what effect changes have had on
revenues and costs. Past experience is rarely used as a
guide to future decisions.
Two interrelated deficiencies are involved. One
is in the scheduling process itself. Because it has been
production oriented (as opposed to market oriented, hence
concerned primarily with costs) it has focused on the
costs of the service provided, and even then only on an
average cost per vehicle mile. This has restricted the
range of alternative solutions evaluated for a given prob-
lem, and indeed the identification of problem areas them-
selves. Emphasis has been on one problem: cost of service
(often equivalent to deficit from operations). The schedul-
ing process has been primarily one of controlling costs within
boundaries acceptable to management and the communities which
/1
must pay them, subject to certain arbitrary and incon-
sistently applied standards of passenger comfort, frequency
of service, etc. The second deficiency is that at the same
time, because demand was thought to be too inelastic with
respect to service to affect the economics of operating
decisions, estimated changes in revenue with respect to
service were not calculated. To the author's knowledge,
no urban transit system in this country has yet applied a
formalized method of evaluating the optimum levels of ser-
vice for various passenger markets based on data on elast-
icity of demand. Yet there is indeed a "market" for transit
service, in thbat transit is competing with other "product
lines," principally the automobile, and choices are made by
the urban traveler.
The urban tripmaker incurs monetary, temporal and
psychological costs each time he takes a trip. These
costs, actually the total price of the trip to the travel-
er, are the basis for his choosing how he travels, and
whether he makes a trip at all. A small increase in the
trip price of a given mode or route will result in a few
less travelers using the service. Since eachtraveler has
his own sets of values and priorities, the difference will
represent those travelers who were incurring a trip price
on the given service only slightly lower than on some other
mode or route. The marginal increase in trip price was
enough to drive these people out of the market for transit
service entirely. The price via the given service being
higher than the trip price via a competing mode or route,
these travelers switched to the mode or service with the
lower total trip price (or, if no mode offered a suf-
ficiently low trip price, they stopped making the trip).
Since World War II, the total trip price via mass
transit in many areas of the United States has risen, while
the total trip price via automobile (particularly for non-
work trips) has fallen. This has been a function of several
factors, including rising incomes (and hence rising value of
time to the traveler), more dispersed origin-destination
patterns, and the construction of interstate highways. It
has also been abetted by the decline in transit service
quality (frequency, speed, route coverage, etc.). Not sur-
prisingly, this has gradually diverted passengers from
transit to automobile for many trip purposes.
The nature of this travel market with which urban
mass transit management is dealing, and the implications
for policy making, are discussed by Lewis M. Schneider.
In an article on"A Marketing Strategy for Transit Management"92
he notes that "The key variable may be the quality of transit
management itself." This thesis offers a market-oriented
approach to schedule and route planning which is designed
to improve the quality of transit management (that is, of
the decision-making process).
The thesis offers a systematic approach to determin-
ing the impact on costs and probable benefits to passengers
and operator of alternative marginal investments by the
operator (community) in schedule and route planning changes.
"Systematic" means, in this context:
1. Breaking down the process of scheduling into the
smallest units of the planner-analyst's decision.
2., Making these units of decision explicit.
3. Codifying these units of decision in a manner
conducive to computer manipulation.
4. Specifying the data necessary for these de-
cision units.
5. Quantifying, as much as possible, the measures
used as input into the units of decision.
"Marginal" investments are changes affecting only
the short-run variable costs of a transit system. They are
changes in schedules and routes made within a fixed physic-
al plant (the purchase of new buses falls into a shadow area,
and could be considered as semi-variable).
The costs and benefits of such changes to the oper-
ator are the changes in cost of operation (computed on a
marginal cost basis, not an average cost basis), and the
changes in revenue. The costs and benefits to the com-
munity are the increases or decreases in total trip prices
(monetary and non-monetary) - i.e. in mobility - resulting
from the various changes, or the change in peak hour or peak
corridor automobile trips.
The resources available to the author do not allow
the precise determination of the elasticity of demand, A
framework for systematic schedule and route planning can be
provided without defining such data. It is important,' how-
ever, that examples be developed of the kind of work that
should be done on this subject by people with enough re-
sources. The omission of any consideration of demand can
lead and has led to schedule and route changes whose ap-
parent cost reductions are obliterated by even larger
revenue reductions,.as will be documented in the course
of this thesis.
Therefore, the proposed method will evaluate some
hypotheses about changes in demand, as examples of work
that can be done to estimate demand elasticity, using
statistical tools appropriate to the data. At some future
date the probability of these hypotheses may be determined,
but this will not be a part of this thesis. The hypotheses,
although statistically valid as estimates of future response
of demand to changes in service, will not be assumed to have
provable predictive validity. They will not, however, be
meaningless: they are the best available measures to date,
and can be used in actual practice with success, as their
use in demonstrating the method will show.
The urban traveler is today highly demanding of pre-
cision in the product (public urban transit) design, both in
time and location, due to the competitive flexibility of priv-
ate and pedestrian means of transportation. Hence costs
(prices) and benefits to both traveler and travel agent are
more sensitive to relatively small changes in schedules and
routes. At the same time, public transit management has
continuous control over a wide range of alternative changes
in schedules and routes. Such incremental changes form the
bulk of the decisions affecting modal split (outside of
plans for expansion of rapid transit lines) made by a trans-
it system. For these reasons the method developed in this
thesis addresses itself to the analysis of marginal changes
in transit schedules and routes, rather than to such ques-
tions as the location or fixed investments such as rapid
transit lines and stations. However, many elements of the
method are applicable to the latter sort of analysis.
The method of schedule and route planning develop-
ed in this thesis provides a more exact and more inclusive
tool for decision making in urban mass transit than is cur-
rently available. It is a tool which the author hopes will
be easily understood and applied; which introduces modern
planning and systems engineering methods into an area of
urban planning and management sorely in need of such methods
and which the author feels can lead to the viable orovision
of better transit service, thus improving the quality of
urban life by improving what the author sees as a present
imbalance in the relative use of private and public trans-
portation in our larger cities.
The thesis will begin by describing, in chapter two,
the scheduling process of three major transit systems: New
York, Boston, and Cleveland. Present procedures are discus-
sed and omissions highlighted. Published efforts at system-
atic or tptiona scheduling methods are then briefly discus-
sed and their relevance to the thesis indicated.
Having identified the lack of systematic organization
in the present methods of schedule and route analysis in chap-
ter two, chapter three defines "Systems Analysis" and its ap-
plication to Schedule and Route Planning. Proceeding from
this groundwork, chapter four presents a model of mass trans-
it scheduling and route planning. The model is in two parts:
the first defining the elements of transit service (schedules
and routes) in measurable terms, their relationship to each
I I
other, and to the environment; the second outlines the
proposed method of generating and evaluating alternatives.
The second, or decision-making, part of the model
is described and illustrated in more detail in chapter
seven. In order to do this, it is first necessary to
develop hypotheses and present data on the effects of
changes in schedules and routes on revenues (chapter five)
and cost (chapter six). Chapter five also reviews previous
modal split research and mass transit demonstrations,
presents a theory of modal choice, and discusses the
variability and uncertainty of the data used in the
hypotheses or otherwise available. Chapter six develops
variable cost functions for New York in detail, and
briefly looks at costs in Boston.
After applying this data to the applications of
the model illustrated in chapter seven, a cohesive view
of the model in practice is given in chapter eight. Each
step in the proposed method of Schedule and Route Planning
is illustrated using the B-3 bus route in Brooklyn as an
example. Alternatives are proposed and evaluated using
the data developed in chapters five and six.
NNW
Footnotes
1. Marketing Urban Mass Transit
2. In Traffic Quarterly (April,
(Boston, 1965).
1968), 283-294.
CHAPTER II
SCHEDULE PLANNING IN THREE CITIES
CHAPTER II
Schedule Planning in Three Cities
In this chapter, the scheduling process of three
major transit systems is described. Omissions from a sys-
tems analysis point of view are described (see chapter 3
for a discussion of systems analysis). Published efforts
at systematic or optimal scheduling methods are then dis-
cussed, and their relevance to the thesis indicated.
Table 1 gives a summary comparison of the schedul-
ing process in the three cities.
A schedule specifies the route(s), times at which
vehicles arrive and.leave specified points along the route(s),
times at which vehicles arrive and leave terminals, the num-
ber of cars in a train if a rapid transit schedule; the
routes and departure times to and from specified points of
storage, the assignment of operators to these various trips,
and their places and times of report and completion, fringe
benefits, payments, etc.
The number of persons using a transit service varies
from hour to hour, day to day, week to week. The most ob-
vious example of this variation is the great peaking of
riding in the rush hour periods (see fig.2 and exhibit 1,
Appendix I). There are many other factors however which
cause riding to fluctuate: changes in store closing times,
factory shift times; sports events, school schedules. Num-
erous factors can affect riding on individual lines - for
example, visiting hours at a hospital or local school events.
The extent of variation of system aggregate usage alone is
evident in figure 1.
The primary purpose of the schedule for most transit
systems then,.is to serve these varying demands, according
to a set of objectives or constraints on acceptable load
factors, service frequencies, etc. at minimum cost to the
company or municipality. Two basic controls over costs are
used: the amount of service provided, and the way in which
trips are allocated to operators (subject to the work rules
set forth in the contract(s)).
Throughout this chapter, three major urban transit
systems will be used to illustrate the present method of
schedulemaking.in the industry. These cities were chosen,
the first two because the author has done most of his re-
search in their methods (New York and Boston); the third
(Cleveland) because of its reputation as having, along with
Toronto, the "best" schedulemaking procedures in North America.
New York and Boston are in many ways considered, among
professionals in the industry, to be typical of the other old
and large systems in the country; however, the author did not
have at his disposal the kind of detailed information for such
places as Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, St. Louis, and so on; thus the similarity cannot
be documented here.
In certain respects Boston is not considered typical
of the other cities, however; it is considered sub-standard.
Boston has the reputation throughout the world transit in-
dustry of having least efficient utilization, maintenance
and scheduling procedures and the worst maintenance proced-
ures. In addition to the data presented in footnote 13, it
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is worth noting in this regard that the cost per mile in
Boston is the highest in the nation (in 1963, it was $1.98
for rapid transit - next highest being $0.86 in Chicago,
lowest being $0.484 in Cleveland; in Boston $1.22 for bus,
compared to $1.07 in New York, about $0.70 in cities the
size of Boston).
The Traffic Check or Survey
The most common, and often the only, source of
data which determines the service to be provided is the
traffic check. This is a count of the number of people on
board vehicles passing or stopping at a given point. It
is taken byaman standing standing in the street whose ex-
perience in estimating vehicle loads keeps the error of
such estimates, according to the transit industry, within
5% + or -. The checker either spends all his time doing
this, or part of his time in the schedule department of-
fices. As an aid to accurate estimation he knows the seat-
ing capacity of the various types of vehicles; the total
capacity; the number of people that can cluster near a
door; etc. He knows that when there are still a few seats
left, some people will stand; he can count groups of 5, or
7, or 10 people; and so on. It is not difficult to do with
some practice.
,Most transit systems consider headcounts by operat-
ors (drivers or conductors) to be less reliable, because of
inexperience, a tendency to over-estimate small loads and
the difficulty of estimating crowds (a conductor, of course,
has no time to walk through a crowded train between stops).
Most operators don't want to make such counts, and demand
extra time for them. Thusaseparate checking force is
used. The checkers are often unionized, sometimes not.
The checker records each vehicle's number, the
time it passes, and the number cf people on board. When
more than one line passes a given point, the checker notes
the destinations or records in separate columns. This will
sometimes lead to confusion, particularly when separate
lines are bound for the same destination; the checker may
lista vehicle under the wrong line. Cleveland, in order to
reduce such error and to better identify schedule adherence
also has their checkers record the block numbers which
operators place in their windows. All systems will use
more than one checker if more than a few lines pass a
given point. A typical Boston survey is shown in Ap-
pendix I, Exhibit 2.
Checks are usually taken at the point on each line
where maximum loading occurs, as this determines the maximum
needed service. The maximum load point, or peak point, is
a location determined -either through an on-off count (de-
scribed below) or subjectively. Once determined, rarely
changed, it is used as the peak point throughout the day.
Other points on the line are not checked in Boston, and
only irregularly checked in New York, regardless of its
length. Lines with several peaks may be checked at more
than one point. In general, the location and time of
traffic checks is not very flexible. Cleveland is an ex-
ception to this generalization.2
Checks are most frequently taken during rush hours,
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as the maximum vehicle and manpower commitment is at these
times, but will often extend from about 6:30 A.M. to 10 or
11:00 P.M. The timing and frequency of checks varies wide-
ly from system to system. Boston takes 16 hour checks
regularly one or more times each season for nearly all its
lines. New York focuses on frequent rush hour checks, and
regularly takes a 24 hour "cordon count" on all its major
subway lines, while taking 95% of its bus checks from 6:00
A.M. to 10:00 P.M. Both Boston and New York pay very little
attention to weekend traffic, or to the differences between
evenings when stores are open or closed. Cleveland has a
less ordered but more diverse coverage, concentrating on
trouble spots or special situations (as opposed to Boston
and New York, Cleveland has separate schedules for late
store opening nights) and depending more on other types
of checks and reports than do most other systems. On
most systems, checks will be taken at special times or
locations in contemplation of major changes in service.
The information obtained in these surveys is
usually tabulated and summarized by 15, 20 or 30 minute
periods by the schedule department, listing for each
period the number of seats, the number of passengers, and
number of vehicles. Schedules are normally built on the
summary.information. In Cleveland, such summaries have
been abandoned as a waste of time and resources; schedules
are built on individual vehicle observations, which results
in less regular scheduled rush hour headways on some lines,
but in more eienly distributed loads.
The ratio of checkers to revenue passengers varies
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widely. Cleveland has 18, or one per 6,000,000 annual pas-
sengers; while New York has 12, or one per 36,000,000 annual
passengers.
Other Tyes of Passenger Counts
New York and Boston do not use other data on pas-
senger movements, although such data does exist in one form
or another, and is sometimes collected by the transit agency
itself. As an example of other kinds of data that a progres-
sive transit management will use, consider Cleveland.C.T.S.
uses three other kinds of data: 1) On-off counts, 2) Post-
card surveys, and 3) Population data.
On-off-counts are accomplished by putting a checker
on a bus and having him count the number of people boarding
and alighting at each stop. The purpose of this is several-
fold: it establishes the location of one or more maximum
load (peak) points, provides information on the turnover of
riders along the length of a route (thus showing what the
number of passengers surveyed at the peak point is as a per-
centage of the total boarding passengers), reveals especially
heavy load points or transfer points, reveals dissimilar route
sections, and so. on. These counts are usually made on all
buses in operation on a route in non-rush hours, or, in the
rush hours on several. In 1967, for example, Cleveland
stationed, checkers on all its Owl trips (1:00 A.M. to 5:00
A.M.), one line at a time, to find out exactly how many riders
they were getting and at what locations. (In contrast, halving
of owl service on New York bus lines is based only on the sub-
jective reports of a supervisor).
Postcard surveys are made by handing out cards to all
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passengers boarding the vehicles, and riders are requested
to fill in information concerning origin, destination, mode
and route to and from the bus or train, etc. The cards are
either handed back to the checker, or, more commonly, mail-
ed in. Boston amassed such information back in 1963 under
the aegis of Wilbur Smith & Co. for the Boston Regional
Planning Project. The data contains a great deal of coding
error, although it does prove fruitful through hand analysis.3
4It has, however, not been used by. the MBTA. New York just
recently conducted such a survey on new routes established
in November 1967 with the opening of the Chrystie Street
Connection, but it is not normal practice there either.
(see Appendix I, Exhibits 3 and 4).
Population data would include Census reports, data
on new construction, Aerial Maps, etc. Subjective perusal
of this material is employed extensively in considering new
routes in Cleveland. No models for projecting the number of
new riders on the basis of this data are used, however. St.
Louis developed some empirical rules for estimating riding
on new routes based on various population factors in con-
nection with the Federal Demonstration Experiments there.5
In general, when this material is used in the industry, it
is used subjectively, as in Cleveland.
Cleveland stopped making occasional tabulations of
24 hour revenue by line about 2} years ago, because the
proliferation of multiple fares, transfers and passes made
the accuracy of the counts dubious and the effort excessive.
Further, the scheduling of one bus on more than one route
often mixed reported revenues from several routes, making
allocation to one route an arbitrary procedure. Boston
tabulates line-by-line daily revenue figures which, al-
though not confused by transfer and pass arrangements,
do have the same problem of extracting revenue collected
from several lines and assigning it to one line (see Ap-
pendix I, Exhibit 5). New York publishes yearly revenue
figures, thoroughly audited, by line (see Appendix I,
Exhibits 6 and 7).6 Little use is made of any of this
revenue data, however. 7
The most accurate form of revenue counts, readings
from the farebox and the counting of transfers collected
at the end of each half-trip (i.e., one-way trip), has
been employed in rare cases in scattered cities; in
Boston, the most recent case was in March of 1966, when
for purposes of deficit assessment it was necessary to
know the number of passengers boarding in each city or
town, and a fare-box reading and transfer count was made
on those lines operating intwo or more towns each time the
bus crossed the border. Such counts, however, are often
resisted by the unionized drivers without additional time
and pay allowances, and are therefore not employed on a
regular basis.
Turnstile counts are made in all cities with rapid
transit lines; these are made daily for auditing purposes,
with each change in shift. Hourly readings- of the turn-
stiles at each station are generally made - usually by the
station booth clerk (collecting agent) - for a 24 hour
period one or more times a year. (See Appendix I, Ex-
hibit 8). Other special counts may be taken; for example,
New York was tabulating turnstile counts from 8:00 P.M. to
midnight and from midnight to 4:00 A.M. daily for many
months after the placement of policemen in all the trains
and stations during these hours to see what effect such
security measures may have had on riding. These are not
done, however, as a regular practice nor were they used
in this case for scheduling but were rather done at the
request of and for the perusal of the Authority Commis-
sioners.
Home Interview Origin and Destination Surveys have
not been employed, in those cities where they have been
taken, by transit systems for schedule construction. 0 & D
Surveys are sometimes used in the planning of rapid transit
extensions, but usually to measure the loading on a pre-
determined route, rather than to determine the route it-
self (which has in the past been determined primarily by
political considerations, available railroad rights of way,
plans that have been in existence for 20 or 40 years, and
needs or volumes too apparent to the naked eye to be first
unearthed from 0 & D data). The transit systems themselves
take no 0 & D surveys in home interviews; the previously
described postcard surveys do, however, contain informa-
tion on origins and destinations.
Mechanical devices installed underneath the steps
of a few buses were tried as automatic on-off counters by
Cleveland several years ago. They were found to be too
expensive for the data provided.8
A new attempt at such a device is now being made as
part of a Federal demonstration project.9 Dr. Samy- Elias
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is overseeing the project, and the devices are expected to
be tested in New York in 1969.
Running Time Counts
Both street conditions and passenger loading vary
through the day and over different lines. On surface (bus
or streetcar) operations, the scheduled running time is a
close measure of the actual running time - in theory - on
a normal day. In addition, time at the terminal in excess
of the minimum allowed by the contracts is sometimes sched-
uled to absorb lateness due to abnormal congestion. While
it is important to the transit system to schedule suffici-
ent time on the street and in the terminal to allow on-time
performance and to avoid excessive overtime payments to the
operators, it is also important to schedule no more than is
necessary (particularly in the peak hours) so as not to
waste men and equipment. In order to determine these run-
ning times and terminal (layover) times, as well as to check
the performance of individual operators and to check on ex-
cessive delays, most transit systems conduct running time
counts.
The most common method of observing running time is
to station checkers at pre-determined points on the street
and to compare their notations, following the progress of
each vehicle on paper. This method has an important draw-
back, as Robert Pollock, until recently head of the Schedule
Department in Cleveland, 'points out: "It is very important
to know how the operator handles his vehicle, i.e., if he
wastes time in slow starts or slow stops, if he deliberately
misses traffic lights, and if he loafs along to "kill" time,
'V
Sudden surges in loading, or street congestion between
observation points, would also go unnoticed. Thus some
systems, as Cleveland, use a variation of the previously
described on-off count instead, having the checker ride
the bus for the length of the route.
The manner of determining and controlling adherence
to the running time is, in fact, markedly different in the
three systems focused on in this study. Cleveland, as
might be expected from the above quotation, takes on-
board running time counts. There is no regular pattern
to these counts, and once a series of running times is es-
tablished no further checks may be made for years unless
reports are made by passengers, employees or street super-
visory personnel of deficiencies, or a traffic checker
notices excessive lateness. The running time counts are
studied to derive an average time corresponding to that
taken by the majority of drivers. A unique and severe
penalty is meted to any driver found running ahead of
time: for each minute he is observed ahead of time, he
is docked one day's pay. This method is very effective:
the only schedule deviation problem is lateness due to
traffic.
Terminal times in Cleveland are consistently suf-
ficient to absorb the day to day variation in delays due to
street congestion, weather, etc. On lines most affected,
such as the Clifton Express, 20 minutes and longer terminal
layovers are permitted (this is not so in Boston and New
York), and any reports of vehicles arriving too late at a
terminal to make the next trip out on time are promptly
checked and ameliorative measures taken. The one ex-
ception is that layover times are generally not scheduled
for bus lines terminating in downtown Cleveland's Public
Square, because of the City's consternation at the large
numbers of buses there already in rush hours. Sometimes
this results in late departures from downtown on these
lines.
When a bus is reported excessively late headed for
his outer terminal, Cleveland will attempt one of two rem-
edial moves: either a bus will be sent to the terminal
from the garage to make the scheduled interval, and, when
the substitute bus meets the outbound late bus, the drivers
will change buses; or, if supervisory personnel are on the
street and riding is not too heavy, a bus (perhaps the late
one, perhaps one behind him) will be turned to fill the gap.
There are no penalties in New York for running
ahead of time, and remedial measures are employed only in
rare cases'where delays are extensive.
In New York, running time counts are made on the
street, and in the subways, on the platforms. Operators
usually know when these checks are being made, and on lines
or at times when scheduled running time is loose, operate
more slowly than they would normally. At other times, when
no checkers or supervisory personnel are on the street, many
operators run ahead of time and gain additional terminal time
to relax. In the subways, they are simply held to their sched-
uled time at each dispatching point,
Most bus lines in New York operating on congested
streets and handling large passenger loads are given too
little running time in rush hours, and, in case of more
than average traffic delays, too little terminal time
at both ends as well. The Authority has several lines
in Manhattan with 40% of their buses not being able to
leave their terminals on time.12 As a result of this,
and of some drivers running ahead of time, the deviations
from schedule are further aggravated by distorted headways,
as in the following examples:
a) -An example of distorted headways resulting
from traffic congestion and heavy loading, coupled with
inadequate terminal time, in a Boston setting.
Suppose a traffic queue begins to build up on Mas-
sachusetts Avenue, south of Boylston Street. At the same
time, several huge trailer trucks enter the queue, further
backing up traffic. The result could easily be that while
the 4:15 P.M. bus from Dudley reaches M.I.T. at 4:35, the
4:20 from Dudley reaches M.I.T. at 4:50, being then fur-
ther held up by heavy loading and crowds at M.I.T. and
from the factories. Meanwhile, the 4:15 from Dudley has
left Harvard Square on time at 4:55 P.M., while the 4:20
from Dudley meets a new queue at Lafayette Square, the re-
sult of traffic from Prospect Street backing up across
Central Square. The driver of the 4:20 bus, having bat-
tled traffic and crowds for almost an hour, must unload
and load and leave immediately at Harvard Square at about
5:15 P.M. with no rest, and on a 20 minute (instead of
scheduled 5 minute) headway.
It is, in addition, not at all uncommon for this
situation to be further complicated by crowds at M.I.T.
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headed for Boston and a queue over the Harvard Bridge, so
that by the time he reaches Auditorium station, the driver
of this besieged bus is due to be leaving Dudley on his
next trip - and finds 150 people waiting for him at Audit-
orium station. He is also apt to find himself at the head
of a queue of three or four buses.
b) An example of distorted headways resulting
from poor schedule control alone, with no traffic con-
gestion and evenly distributed passenger arrivals.
Driver 1 proceeds slowly in order to stay within
the scheduled running time. Driver 2 proceeds at the nor-
mal speed of the automobile traffic on the street, and
soon catches up to, or gets closer to, driver 1. Driver
3 finds his headway slowly increasing, as driver 2 gets
ahead of schedule, along with the crowds in his bus, at
the bus stops, and the time spent at each stop loading
and unloading passengers.
This slows driver 3 down and further increases
the gap between bus 2 and 3, so that eventually bus four
and perhaps bus 5 catch up to bus 3. There are now three
buses operating in tandem, etcetera. The problem is com-
plicated by the tendency of many drivers at the head of
queues to continue to stop at each bus stop, and the re-
luctance of drivers behind him to pass him and arrive out
of place at the terminal.
The end result is the massive bunching of buses
(queueing or tandem operation) which frequently produces
letters to the editors of New York's leading daily news-
papers.
G. F. Newell and R. B. Potts have developed a model
which simulates the bunching of buses.1 3 Based on queuing
theory, it requires parameters which, with certain modifica-
tion of the equations, are readily available as data in transit
system files; although the method as it stands requires the
measurement of arrival and departure rates at each bus stop.
A simplified version did, however, achieve the result of a
two-bus bunch at M.I.T. as the result of a two minute de-
lay on the first bus leaving Auditorium, with a scheduled
five minute headway.
On the subways, excessive lateness will result
when equipment, signal or human failure causes delays.
One such delay on a trunk line in the rush hour can hold
up dozens of trains and make on-time departure from the
terminal impossible. Headways are thus spaced until ar-
rivals approach scheduled time once more. The Schedule
Department views this problem as one of maintenance or
supervisory failure, and'claims no responsibility. No
accurate count of the extent of this lateness problem is
possible, since terminal sheets listing train arrivals,
departures and car numbers are often hopelessly garbled
during such delays, and wayside dispatching sheets - all
of which are turned in to the executive offices daily and
stored for months at a time but rarely referred to - often
bear little comparison from one station to another. 4
In non-rush hours, scheduled running times on the
rapid transit system are generally loose, but there is no
regular pattern. Running time counts are not often taken,
and times on "terminal" or "gap" (wayside) dispatch sheets
are unreliable because of a tendency to check the scheduled
times, even when trains arrive early and are held to time.
Whereas New York and Cleveland both list from two
(New York) to five or six (Cleveland) different sets of
running times, depending on time of day, at timepoints
along each route, Boston prefers a simpler approach. It
has no timepoints. Drivers generally operate at good speed
from one end of the line to the other without looking at
their watch. There do exist theoretical end to end run-
ning times which do not appear on the MBTA's schedules or
work programs, and they are generally greater than those
observed. Actual Terminal layover times, however, are
ample -sometimes approaching 40% of total end to end
scheduled time.15 There is no consistency to this, how-
ever: there are cases, primarily the most congested and
most heavily used routes, where the combined running and
terminal times are inadequate in the rush hour.lG Terminal
layover time is generally not provided on feeder bus lines
at the rapid transit terminals, or on the streetcar subway
at downtown terminals. Timepoints of reasonable accuracy
do exist on the rapid transit lines. It should be noted
that the average length of the MBTA's bus lines is shorter
than that of New York or Cleveland.17
Other methods for measuring and determining run-
ning time are used in scattered systes. Worthy of mention
is the mechanical device affixed to a few buses at a time
in Stockholm, which records distance traveled and running
speed simultaneously along with time in seconds on a roll,
similar to a cardiograph. Overlays for each line are then
used to determine actual running time between specified
points; any excessively slow or fast running, congestion,
etc., can be seen on the roll, just as if an observer were
on board taking notes.
The information is transcribed onto data sheets and
then into bar graphs showing the amount over or under sched-
uled running time which each vehicle actually consumes. These
data sheets and graphs show 8 that Stockholm's schedules have
the same characteristic of those in Boston and New York:
drivers operate ahead of schedule in non-rush hours, particu-
larly in the evenings.
Reports from Supervisors, Dispatchers, Inspectors
Cleveland relies to an important degree- on reports
from their personnel in the field (as well as on reports
from the operators and passengers) to catch discrepancies,
over-loads, delay situations, and other schedule inefficien-
cies. In a great many, though not all, cases, this works
well. The viability of this method in Cleveland is.due to
several factors: foremost is the practice of immediate
schedule correction ("patches") without waiting three or
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six months for the next schedule pick. Thus such reports
are acted on at once and not filed. In addition, as alluded
to in previous descriptions (see pages 39 and 37), Cleveland
has a genTerally stricter control system, not only in numbers
of men (there are only 31 supervisors and inspectors on the
street in peak hours)20 but in the emphasis laid upon ef-
ficient schedule performance.
In New York and Boston, while there are personnel
on the streets for ostensibly the same purpose, as well as
the records kept by dispatchers on New York's subway (de-
scribed above), there is neither the emphasis on schedule
efficiency nor the practice of feedback from the super-
visory personnel to the schedulemakers. The dispatchers
and street supervisors handle overloads, delays and so on
- when they notice them - on the spot, and it ends there.
Schedule Specifications
With the relevant surveys (or checks or load counts)
and running time counts gathered, the headway (frequency in
minutes between vehicles or trains) and, in the case of rapid
transit service, the number of cars per train, is determined
for the 24 hour day at the peak point in each direction. This
set of scheduled headways is built, based on a set of object-
ives for load standards and on constraints of maximum allow-
able headway (both inconsistently applied in New York and
Boston).21 In New York, the Rapid Transit load ratio (ratio
of passengers to seats, usually expressed as a percentage)
at peak load points above which service adjustments would
be made is 150% at all times, Of course, in the rush hours,
the limitations of capacity produce much higher ratios. At
other times, there is a wide variation in load factors, from
50% to the stipulated 150%. On the Bus lines, the schedule
load factor is, in theory, 150% for the rush and 115% for
the non-rush.
In Boston, the theoretical load factor for the rush
hour is 150% and for the remainder of the day 100% (seated
load) or less, for the bus lines. In actual fact, rush hour
load ratios vary from 100% to 200%, and many lines run with
empty seats in non-rush hours (see reason for this in
description of run-cutting). Standees in non-rush hours
occur only as a result of abnormal loads, due to late
store closings, special events or weather.
Both New York and Boston apply these criteria on
an average basis, to time periods of from 15 to 30 minutes,
and over the length of rapid transit trains, not to in-
dividual cars in the train. In Cleveland, where load fact-
ors on the bus lines are 130% rush hour and 100% or less at
other times, the.factors are applied to smaller periods or
individual buses. It is thus extremely rare to see a 53
seat bus in Cleveland with more than 70 people aboard,22
and the general load factor on most lines is nearer 110%
in the rush hour. The actual load factor on the rapid
transit lines is also, with possibly the exception of an
occasional train at the height of the rush hour, about 110%
(compared to about 325% in Boston and-400% in New York).2 3
Thus in Cleveland, unlike most cities its size, nearly every-
one using transit to or from the downtown area gets a seat
for the full ingth of his trip. This is true of non-rush
hour small peaks, as on late store closing nights, as well.
New York and Boston appear to tolerate an average 150% load
factor on these evenings on many lines, while Cleveland runs
a separate schedule and provides seats for all riders.
New York runs a maximum headway on all its subway
lines of 20 minutes, even in the "owl" or "hawk" hours (1:00
to 5:00 A.M.); some bus routes in New York go to 40 or 60
minute headways in the owl hours and most continue to run;
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all subway lines, with one or two stations excepted, run
24 hours. In Boston, a maximum headway of 30 minutes, with
45 to 60 minutes on marginal bus routes, is maintained; on
the subways, 15 minutes is the maximum There is no owl
service at all; it was discontinued in 1959 as an economy
move. Cleveland's maximum headways are similar to Bostorls;
they do run Owl service on 15 lines, with 30 or 60 minute
headwaya
The headway table is then built into a schedule by
progressing outwards to both terminals, using the running
times determined in the manner previously described. This
gives the arrival and departure times through the day at
each terminal. The next task is to link the individual
end-to-end trips so as to build "blocks." A block is a
series of half - (one-way) or round trips performed by a
single vehicle and by one or more driver. In order to do
this, each departure and arrival time at the terminal must
be matched, allowing the terminal layover time determined
through minimum contract requirements (10% of running time
in Cleveland, 3 minutes on bus and 15 on rapid transit in
New York) and through previously described procedures to
allow recovery from possible delays enroute. Where more
trips are leaving a terminal in a given period than are
arriving, "put-ins" or "pull-outs", usually from the garage
but sometimes from other lines, will be indicated. Similar-
ly, when there are more arrivals than departures (as at the
end of the rush hour), unneeded vehicles will be "laid-up",
or "pulled off" to the garage. The arrival and departure
times at the garage and the running times to and from the
terminal are usually indicated on the schedule.
Not all trips may be built out from the peak load
point to the end terminals of a line. Where traffic checks
show that all,-vehicles are not needed for the length of the
lines, and where it is accepted practice (it is not in
Boston), :some will be scheduled to terminate short of
the end(s) of the line either to run off (i.e. Lay up) to
the garage or to return in the opposite direction. Such
scheduled turnbacks at a point short of the end terminal
are known as "shortlines." A variant of this procedure is
to branch a mainline at an intermediate point, operating to
two end terminals. With either procedure, the headway beyond
this intermediate turning or branching point is less (usually
half) than the peak load point headway. Sometimes the veh-
icles operating from the end terminal will be scheduled to
operate express once they pass the intermediate shortline
terminal. In this case, few passengers on the line actually
experience the combined'headway shown at the peak load point.
Boston operates very few such express services presently
(a number of others were eliminated during the years 1959-62)
and New York operates none at all.
Cleveland, however, operates an extensive series of
such express services. Donald Hyde, for many years the
General Manager in Cleveland, as well as his associates in
the schedule department, believed that such express service,
more than the frequency of service or the fare, was instru-
mental in attracting additional riders to the system.24
When the rapid transit line was opened in 1954-58, most ex-
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press routes to downtown were retained. On those which pas-
sed through a feeder terminal, nearly all the passengers re-
mained on the bus rather than transfer.2 5
Thus an important element of the schedule specific-
ations is the route description for each major route, short-
line, branchline, express line, etc. One line may have a
dozen different such route specifications.
Not all schedule specifications are based on match-
ing predetermined objectives and constraints with traffic
checks and running time counts. Sometimes management will
direct a change for either political or economic reasons.
An example of the former is the resistance of the Downtown
Brooklyn Merchant's Association to reductions in Lexington
Avenue subway service in non-rush hours to Brooklyn, al-
though the trains run with only about 50% or less of the
seats filled past the peak load point. An example of the
latter is a 1966 directive to New York's rapid transit
schedule department to increase headways on certain lines
from 8 to 10, 10 to 12, 12 to 15, etc., to free more cars
outside the rush hours for badly needed maintenance. With
the route and schedule revisions of November, 1967, this
change was extended to additional lines. Load factors and
other such data did not enter into this decision.
All of the systems studied either treat their object-
ives inconsistently, sometimes conforming to them, sometimes
not; or do not have criteria that they can explicitly state.
Cleveland is more conscientious than New York and Boston
about both establishing and consistently adhering to such
criteria as guides for schedule efficiency. Where other,
arbitrary considerations are imposed by higher levels of
management, the results are not always in the best inter-
est of the company; and the initiative and morale of the
schedulemakers is visibly sapped, reducing them for the
most part to the role of clerks. This is evident, among
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other places, in New York.
Run Splitting
The schedule forms the basis for public timetables
and for effective street supervision and control. In order
to distribute the trips scheduled by each vehicle amongst
the operators, it is necessary to cut or split the blocks
and assemble pieces of work or whole blocks into eight hour
workdays for the drivers, conductors and motormen.
Because of the larger number of vehicles on the
road in the two morning and two evening rush hours, a
practice long established in the transit industry has been
to schedule a certain percentage of runs (a run is a day's
work for an operator) as "swing" runs. These runs contain
a few hour's work in the morning rush hour, and a few more
in the evening. The total time the operator is on the prop-
erty can be as much as thirteen hours; this is known as the
"spread." In general the man is not paid for the first few
hours of.spread; beyond that there are spread "penalties",
or allowances, or guarantees: extra pay for hanging around
the property. The pay usually increases from part of the
full wage rate to the full hourly wage as the spread increas-
es.
Runs which the driver works more or less continuously
for eight hours (or less, but for which he is paid eight hours)
are called "straight" runs. Runs for which he works only
four or six hours and is not paid the full eight hours are
called "trippers", or "extras."
In recent years the trend in labor contracts has
been to reduce the allowable percentage of swing and trip-
per runs. This is a costly trend, as it means that in at
least some cases, some runs which were accomplished by one
man must be split into two straight runs, each with less
than eight hour's work; or that a tripper run must be paid
for eight hours. In New York, in exchange for the ability
to use road motormen as yard motormen (to prepare trains
and bring them in from yards to the terminal), management
has eliminated swing runs on certain subway divisions. The
diseconomy is not so apparent in this case because it is
masked by assigning all employees to preparing and trans-
ferring cars (whether needed or not) and lengthening lunch
27hours to fill out the eight hours. But the effect is
clearly seen in Cleveland, where a change last year from
45% to 50% straight runs required fifty additional drivers
to give the same service.2 8
The objectives of efficient run splitting are first,
to use a minimum number of men to provide the specified serv-
ice, and second to minimize the overtime, guarantee (differ-
ence between eight hour's pay and less than eight hour's
work), spread penalty, and other such costs. In dividing
the blocks amongst various employees, the usual practice is
to start from both ends of the schedule (first A.M. runs and
last night runs)and work inwards building straight runs from
the various possible combinations of pieces of work (a piece
is that part of a block extending from one relief point to
the next relief point; a relief point is any pre-determined
point on a route where a driver can be relieved by another
or can run off to a garage), using swing runs to absorb the
remaining pieces of rush hour blocks.
Additional constraints must be incorporated into
the runs as they are built, such as lunch hour and report
and sign-off time. The latter is provided for the operator
to exchange any fare reports, transfers, tools, etc. that
he may have. Lunch relief as such is no longer required on
the Cleveland system; requirements for lunch are generally
minimal - the longest contract lunch hour is 35 minutes in
New York. It may, of course, be convenient to schedule long-
er lunch hours in combining pieces of work to form a run.
A good run-cutter enjoys and is adept at juggling a
set of runs to reduce overtime and spread penalties, and at
fitting remaining pieces of work in without creating new runs29
The process of run splitting as described above is
considered by many in the industry to be of key importance in
the efficient operation of the system; often more emphasis is
placed on it than on evaluation of traffic and running time
counts in seeking an economic operation. A number of at-
tempts have been made in the last decade to computerize the
run-splitting procedure, sometimes by electronic data proces-
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sing companies such as I.B.M., sometimes by consulting
firms or individuals. Most have met with failure because of
the large number of variables involved and the lack of un-
derstanding of the intricacies of run-splitting on the part
of the programmers. The most successful effort has been
made by Samy E. G. Elias and is described in several
Demonstration Project reports.31 Mr. Elias' work has been
extended by several others in application to the schedules
of the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating
Authority subsidiary of the New York City Transit Authority
(now part of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority) and
has successfully reduced overtime and penalty costs on
their work programs through computerized run-splitting.32
In 1967, Mr. John O'Dougherty of the Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority traveled across the country to
find out about the current state of computerized run-
splitting. In addition to the progress made by Dr. Elias,
he found3 3 the Philadelphia transit management optimistic
over their results and in the process of installing Honeywell
electronic data processing equipment to improve their capa-
bilities. In Cleveland, as the author also found,34 the
attitude was very pessimistic; it was felt that the costs
of computerization exceeded what marginal gains were to be
had. This may in part be because of the high efficiency of
Cleveland's present run-splitting procedure.25 Research done
at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh for
the Pittsburgh transit system was also not encouraging to
the parties involved, according to Mr. O'Dougherty.
Measures of Schedule Efficiency
There are three ways of looking at how efficient
a schedule is currently. One is the employee's criteria:
he wants a maximum of straight runs, as little work as pos-
sible for his eight hour's pay, adequate running time and
terminal layover time to obviate his working overtime due
to delays, ample meal allowances, and so on. This is cer-
tainly quite reasonable from his point of view.
The passenZ-Ler judges a schedule by how frequent
and fast it is; how reliable it is; his chance of getting
a seat.
The transit management is interested in providing
a given level of service for the lowest cost. Unfortunately,
they often will be more interested in lowering cost at the
expense of adequate service from the passenger's (or employ-
ee's) viewpoint. As Mr. Pollock points out, "In attaining
this end, though, it is not always realized by management
that a cut in mileage during a period of fall-off in revenue
will result in a reduction in patronage much beyond the nor-
mal or average fall-off." 3 5  Statistical evidence of this
fact will be presented later in the thesis (see Chapter 5).
Omissions of Method
The foregoing description of the present method of
schedulemaking in the transit industry presents a number of
shortcomings and omissions. Filling these holes while making
the method more consistent and systematic is the goal of this
thesis. Therefore, the major omissions and inconsistencies
are highlighted below:
1. No system, Cleveland included, takes into
account the changes in usage resulting from changes in
schedules and routes; there is no method being used or
developed which can predict this phenomenon for changes
in existing service or route patterns. Indeed, the major-
ity of the industry feels that they are dealing with a more
or less service-inelastic demand for their product. While
they recognize that declines in riding do occur following
a fare increase, they do not believe that riding will
either increase or decrease because of changes in service.
Those in the transit industry who think it does believe
there is no way of predicting such changes.
Data in Boston and New York's files, collected
through traffic checks, revenue audits and other observa-
tions, show that changes in service do have an effect on
riding, sometimes enough to wipe out any gains in operat-
ing cost. While the data are not the result of controlled
experiments, they nevertheless do lend themselves to simple
analysis and a rough set of rules for estimating these changes,
(see Chapter 5).
2. In part because of the above omission, there
is no regular pattern of followup checks and control meas-
ures to test the results of changes that are made. Cleve-
land is better in this respect than Boston and New York;
but the followup data in Cleveland is used to confirm the
obtention of the desired results, not as a basis for estim-
ating the results of future changes of a similiar nature.
3. There is no general practice of feedback from
the run splitting to the schedule specification steps, although
the same men usually do both. Once the headway, running
time and routes are set, the runs are usually cut without
further changes in specifications. Sometimes times may be
changed here or there by a minute or two; in Boston and on
New York's "MaBSTOA" division, excessive non-rush hour serv-
ice between the A.M. and P.M. peaks is often scheduled be-
cause of the recognition that the men involved have nothing
to do otherwise in that period. But there is no regular
pattern of feedback.
The examples in Exhibits 9 and 10 clearly show that
a great deal of manpower time is available outside of the
rush hours. B7 running shorter trains on shorter headways,
no mileage increase would be incurred, and the manpower is
already being paid. This is a case where the above des-
cribed feedback could profitably be used.37 Another case
might be a route with a long running time. Alternative
routes will sometimes have running times that fit, in three
or four round trips, more exactly into an eight hour day
than the present route, whid may require excessive guaran-
tee or overtime payments.
4. The scheduling process itself does not normally
involve computing the costs. The schedule department com-
putes mileage figures, and thus does not make use of the bal-
ancing between costs and'revenues for alternative changes
that might give it better insight into the efficiency of its
changes. (Costs are normally computed by the accounting
department, except in Cleveland; but none, as pas indicated
earlier, computes revenue changes).
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5. New York and Cleveland do not use added cost
(marginal cost38 of added or removed service) as a basis
for their cost calculations. Many use rule-of-thumb aver-
age which include a number of fixed costs. Boston uses an
added cost per mile figure, distinguishing it from a"move-
ment cost" per mile figure which is higher, and computes the
platform wages (cost of the operator's time and benefits)
separately-, However, neither Boston nor any other system
varies their added mileage costs with the speed of the serv-
ice in question, although cost data from the New York system
indicate a definite reduction in cost per mile as average
speed increases. 39
6. Potential trips - trips not now served by
transit in an area already served by the transit system -
are ignored. No use is made of origin and destination data
culled from home interview surveys to seek out directional
trip volumes with a poor modal split from the transit manage-
ment's viewpoint. This is again in part because of the re-
luctance of transit management to believe that such addition-
al services could attract anyone not already using the tran-
sit system. While this reluctance is justified in certain
cases, there are many possibilities for viable new services
that are overlooked.
7. No provision is made on most systems in the
scheduling process for matching feeder bus and rapid transit
or bus and intersecting bus line headways for convenient trans-
fer connections. Some systems, as in New York, have two en-
tirely separate departments for surface (bus) and rapid trans-
moo,
it (subways) scheduling. Cleveland, in an exception to this
rule, does schedule all its feeder bus headways in non-rush
hours as multiples of the rapid transit headways, and avoids
scheduling missed connections at the stations; but they do
not schedule either consistent headways or connections on
intersecting bus lines. The result in most cities is an
interweaving fabric of lines each operating as an independ-
ent fiefdom as far as the passengers are concerned. In
Boston, where about 50% of all bus riders transfer to the
rapid transit lines, and another 30% to other bus lines, it
is not uncommon to have a feeder headway of 9 minutes and a
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rapid transit headway of 10, or 8 minutes.
New York's extensive subway system and frequent
headways on most bus lines makes transferring much less of
a liability for the passenger. The percentage of feeder
riders is much lower, and the major divisions on the sub-
way run the same headway on all lines in the non-rush hours
with scheduled across the platform connections wherever pos-
sible. However, passageway transfer between divisions, and
transfer to feeder bus lines at outlying terminals is still
subject to the same lack of headway correspondence.
8. The random variation of headways, and in pas-
senger arrival; rateswith its affect on loading, or of the
distribu-tion of passengers through a subway train, is not
recognized as important. When average load factors are the
criteria for the schedule, however, the variation will not
infrequently produce loads or headways far in excess of the
acceptable standards. Knowing the extent of this variation
from car to car and bus to bus will help determine, in Doo-
little's words, "the excess of seats over passengers which
it is necessary to provide under normal conditions to fur-
nish seats for all, at a time of day when a company can
best demonstrate to the public that it is acting in good
faith in its attempt to serve the convenience and comfort
of its patrons."41
Similarly the effect of such variations on running
time and the adequacy of terminal layover time is general-
ly overlooked. While a small percentage of vehicles may,
on the average., arrive too late to leave a terminal on time,
the effect on queuing of vehicles and gaps in service at
certain times of the day may be felt by a much larger per-
centage of the riders due to the cumulative effects of such
deviations.
Omissions in Practice
In addition to the omissions of method. , there are
a number of discrepancies between the stated objectives and
methods and the actual conditions. These include:
1. Vaguely defined criteria with respect to load
factors, running time, checking procedure, and so on.
2. Scarcity of non-rush hour traffic checks, es-
pecially for weekends and late at night.
3. Inconsistent application of stated objectives.
4. Lack of initiative resting with schedule de-
partment.
5. Most surveys only at the peak load point.
6. Tendency to ignore special events and even,
in some cities, late shbpping nights.
7, Running time and Terminal time too tight in
the rush hour, too loose at other times.42
8. Tendency to look on lateness from traffic
congestion or heavy loads as beyond the control and con-
cern of the scheduling department.
Optimal Scheduling Models
Most of the research done so far in this area, dis-
cussed below, does not address itself to the problems and
methods surveyed in this thesis. There is, however, in prog-
ress at the time of the writing of this report a Mass Transit
Demonstration experiment entitled "Systems Analysis of Tran-
sit Routes and Schedules" in Washington, D. C. At first
glance this project would seem most appropriate to the ques-
tions concerning this thesis.
Unfortunately, it has been learned that the essence
of "systems analysis" for this project is the analysis of
the entire system at once, using a minimum-time and distance
coded network similar to that used in highway planning.44 As
the next chapter will describe, systems analysis is not de-
fined properly In this manner.
Even ignoring this constraint, the model being de-
veloped will be seeking to create an optimug or at least
better, configuration of routes and schedules using post-
card survey information gathered in 1966 and distributing
the passengers over the system to achieve minimum total
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waiting times, or minimum costs of service subject to
certain constraints, or some similar objectives. An
important assumption of- the model is that no matter what
changes in service are made, the total passengers travel-
ling by transit between each origin and destination zone
will remain constant.45
This assumption, in the author's viewpoint, total-
ly destroys the validity of the model. Chapter 5 demon-
strates the significance of knowledge on the sensitivity
of demand to changes.in service. By ignoring this sensit-
ivity, any optimal configuration arrived at will immediately
be out of phase because of unexpected increases or decreases
in riding on various lines. For example, a route extension
into a suburb beyond a terminal point will be assigned only
those passengers now driving or being driven to the present
terminal of the line. 46 Since the system plan that would
include such anextension would require utilization of the
existing fleet, the overload that would occur in actual
practice would require taking a bus from some other service
supposedly at an optimum in the system configuration in order
to serve the new route.
There are a number of other inadequacies in this
model. Since only inbound trips were surveyed in the
postcard survey, manual estimates of the origins and des-
tinations of outbound trips are being made according to trip
purpose distribution. Assignments being made on a minimum
time basis are using a weight factor of 2.5 for wait and
transfer times, with a factor of 1.0 for walk and line-haul
times.47 These and other arbitrary assumptions, applied
uniformly over the whole system, smooth over important vari-
ations peculiar to individual lines or areas.
The major output as of the spring of 1968 has been
a vast number of maps showing time and distance and headway
for each link in the transit system, or showing origins and
destinations from or to given zones or sectors to other zones
and sectors. The latter is certainly a useful tool for anal-
ysis, although it is derived from the postcard survey and not
a product of any optimal scheduling method. The former is
based on information from D. C. Transit System communicated
to the consultant. The running times and headways being
used are scheduled, not actual times. Chapter 7 illustrates
how these parameters can in actual performance be quite dif-
ferent from the scheduled specifications. Since passengers
make their decisions on the basis of what they experience,
not what the transit company would like thi to experience,
this could introduce a serious error into the model on some
lines, depending on the difference between scheduled and
actual conditions. In addition, the coding of all this in-
formation is being done by only a few people who have little
knowledge of and do not use the D. C. or suburban Transit
systems (the consulting agency is in an industrial park in
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Virginia) . This means that coding errors are not likely
to be discovered, and some of these errors are likely to be
important.49
Finally, in spite of the considerable flexibility
of the network model, only two system alternatives will be
considered. The alternatives will be developed by looking
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at the postcard survey data maps, talking with local community
and political groups, looking at the model output, looking at
applications for changes made to D. C. Transit, and studying
the street pattern. It will be difficult to apply realistic
criteria, when such assumptions as calculating service based
on an average load factor over 3} hours are an integral part
of the model.
It is not at all clear that the expense and effort
associated with such global attempts are worth the results
they produce. A line-by-line or areal analysis, taking due
note of the effects on adjoining lines, would reduce the
problem to a more manageable scale. The effect of a change
on a given line is like that of a rock thrown into a lake:
the impact is greatest where it falls into the water, and a
circle of perturbations spreads out and dies away from that
point. Most of the lake is untouched. In addition, the
changes recommended in a complete system overhaul of this
sort can rarely be implemented all at once. In caseswhere
there is a time lag, the original premises may change. It
seems especially odd that Washington would take this approach
now, in light of the rapid transit network now under construc-
tion.50 While some improvements may be needed now, rather
than waiting for the opening of the rapid transit lines,
others will be outdated almost as soon as they are effected.51
An example of a more complex mathematical statement
of the scheduling process is R. W. Simpson's work in airline
scheduling,52 which has been well received by the airlines.
No data was available, however, on the variation in demand
with changes in service; and the method uses network flow
theory, seeking to optimize over a network of fixed zone
to zone movements of passengers, rather than on a line by
line basis for varying point to point movements with con-
tinuous entry and exit points, as is the case in a transit
system. This is not to say that the application of linear
programming would be without merit in the transit schedul-
ing process; but the shortcomings of the applicatiorsdevel-
oped so far with respect to the nature of urban transit
scheduling place it beyond the scope of this thesis, which
is the development of methods of incremental route and sched-
ule analysis.
The output of nmodels such as Simpson's also presents
a problem for the urban transit analyst. He finds that for
the semi-optimization of vehicle utilization, uneven depart-
ure times are most appropriate. Outside of some rush hour
service on frequent headways, this concept would be infeas-
ible in urban transit service (or, for that matter, on an
air service such as the Eastern Airlines shuttle from Boston
to New York and Washington to New York), because of the pre-
mium passengers place on regular and - where service is in-
frequent - easily remembered headways (this was a major sel-
ling point of the Eastern shuttle53 ).
Donald E. Ward54 has investigated several optimal
dispatching policies. In all the models, it is assumed that
the exact number of people waiting to fill a vehicle at any
given time is continuously known to the dispatcher, who is
continually controlling the dispatche-s of vehicles. This
is not, however, the case in an urban transit system where
many kinds of unpredictable perturbations in demand at stops
along the line can occur (see Fig. 1 and Chapter 5, pp. /9-/).
He finds that optimal schedules (defined as those yielding
minimum passenger delay for a given number of dispatches per
time period) give a smaller fleet size over "straight" sched-
ules (equally spaced departures through a time period).55
This is similar to the conclusion in Simpson's model, and
valid when the arrival rate of passengers along the line is
continuously known. Ward also finds, as does Simpson, that
in an optimal scheduling process, the frequency of depart-
ures is geared to the peaking of demand.
Certain aspects of Ward's models do, in spite of
the reservations expressed above, look promising. The
Multiple Station Dispatch model (p. 49) might be simpli-
fied to use data on passengers per minute at the peak load
point. However, further work would have to be done to fit
these models to the conditions existing in urban transit
systems.
The trouhe with most of the models of this sort is
that while they may be useful for investigating a highly
controlled new technology, such as that proposed for the
High Speed Ground Transport program, they do not address
themselves to the characteristics of existing transit sys-
tems. Robert J. Gladstone, for example, has developed a
scheduling model for a system where vehicles travel at -con-
stant speed, enter and exit the main arteries at high speed,
have a capacity of only a few passengers, and are scheduled
56for departure in response to real-time demands.
None of these states are true of existing urban transit
networks; the latter two would be highly unlikely in any
form of controlled, public transportations
The "transportation problem" form of the linear
programming technique is utilized in works by James B.
McCord, III57 and Michael A. Simonnard58 . Their models
assign optimal distribution over links in a network with
predetermined amounts of supply and demand. It is un-
paired origins and destinations that are distributed, with
the objective being lowest total cost. Demand varies ran-
domly. Obviously, in an urban transit system, origins and
destinations are already paired: the choice of pairing is
made by the units being transported (passengers), not by
the management, and the demand resulting from this choice
is not random.
The models discussed above form a good illustration
of the dichotomy between practicing management and systems
analysis research or operations research discussed in the
next chapter. In order to achieve mathematical viability
and logically satisfying optimizing procedures, assumptions
are made and characteristics specified which have, so far,
removed them frcm consideration as useful tools. Hopefully,
future research will narrow this gap.
/TABLE 1
Summary Comparison of Schedule Proces
in New YorkBoston, and Cleveland
New York
Rapid
Bus Transit
l.a) Rush Hr. Load
Ratio:
Consistency of
Application
b) Non-Rush Hr. Load
Ratio:
Consistency of
Application
2. Maximum Headway,
Daytime *
3. Changes Initiated
via:
a) Public Complaint
b) Union Complaint
c) Traffic Checks
d) Supervisor's
Reports
e) Arbitrary Policy
Consistency of
Changes
4. Initiative Taken
by Sched. Dept.
5. Before & After
Comparisons
6. Use of Comparisons
for Predictions
7. Surveys & Checks:
Frequency of Daily
Frequency of
Weekend
Frequency of
10P-6A
Focus on Rush Hr.
150%
100-
115%
No
40
Yes
Rare
Some
Rare
Yes
No
Rare
300%
No
150%
No
20
Yes
Some
Yes
Rare
Yes
No
Some
Rarel Rarel
No No
6 mos.-Several
years
Rare
None
No
Rare
None
Yes
Boston
No
No
60
Yes
Rare
Some
No
Some
No
Some
No
No
3 mos.
Rare
None
Np
Cleveland
130%
Yes
100% or
less
Yes
30
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Almost
all
Yes
No
2 wks.-
3 mos.
1 mo.
Occasional
Split
_ _ _ __ _
6y
TABLE 1 (continued)
New York
Rapid
Bus Transit
Focus on Changes
or Regular Service
Location Other Than
Peak Point
On-Off or On-
Board Counts
8. Criteria for
Deciding on Alter-
nate Headways
Coordination of
Feeder Bus and
Rapid Transit
Headways
Variation of Head-
way in Non-Rush Hrs.
to Match Load
Special Sched. for
Spec. Events
Special Routes for
Spec. Events
Separate Late-.
Shopping Scheds.
Schedules for
Spec.Loads (Snow)
9. Feedback Work
Program to Sched.
10.Running Time Checks:
Frequency
Outside (Street or
Platform) or in
Vehicle
By Whomk
Both
Some
Rare
None
Boston
Changes Regular
Few
No
None
No.
Some
Rare
No
No
No
Rare
2Rare2
Outside
Checker
No
No
None
No
Little Little
Some
No
No
No
No
No
No
On Subway
No
Indirect
Some
Outs ide
Checker
No
Outs ide
Checker
Cleveland
Both
Yes
Yes
Match Rapid
Hwy. or
for 100%
load
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Both
Supervision
& Checkers
Use of Daily Dis-
patch Records No Rare No Yes
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TABLE 1 (continued)
ll.Actual vs. Sched.
Running Time Rush:
Midday:
Evening:
Owl:
Sched. vs. Req.Rush
Hr.Term.Time:
Non-Rush Hrs.:
Adherence to
Running Time:
Penalties for
Running Early:
12.Reliability on
Heavy Lines
Effect of Term.
Time on Reliab.
Effect of Supervi-
sion on Reliab.
13.a) Estimates of
Revenue Changes
b) Estimates of
Costs: Basis
Done by
Vary tw/Speed,
etc.
14.Use of On-Vehicle
Postcard Surveys
0.& D. Home-
Interview
Surveys
New York
Rapid
Bus Transit
Not Enough.
Some Slack
Slack Some
Slack
Very Slack
Varies-Not
always enough
OK
No
Rare &
Complex
Poor
None
Some
help
No
OK
No
Held by
Towers
Fair
None
None
No .
Total Mileage).
Avg. inc.some
fixed
Budget Dept.
No
No
No
Rare
Boston
No Time-
points
No Time-
points
No Time-
points
No Time-
points
Varies-
Some
Slack
Excessive
No Time-
points
None
Awful
None
Little
No
"Movement
Cost"
Unknown
No
No
Cleveland
OK
OK
Occasional
Slack
(Unknown)
Ok except
not enough
downtown
Loose
Yes
1 day's pay
per 1 min.
ahead
Fair
Improves
except:CBD
Fait
No
Mileage &
Platform
Hrs.
Schedule
Dept.
No
Yes
No No No No
TABLE 1 (continued)
New York
Rapid
Bus Transit Boston Cleveland
Population & Land-
Use Studies
Revenue/Vehicle
Trip
15.Approximate Size of
Schedule Dept.
Checkers
White Collar
Approximate Size of
Research & Opera-
tions Planning
16.No. of Vehicles
Annual Mileage
(in millions)
No. of Depots,
Annual Passengers
(in millions)
No
No
12
14
0
1967:
2,345
No
No
12
10
0
1967:
7,106
66 316.3
10 N.A.
434.2 1,298.5
No
Rare
5
12
4
1966:
Bus & St.
Cars:
1,017
Rapid:
232
Bus & St..
Cars: 26
approx.
Rapid: 9
approx.
Bus & St.
Cars: 10
Rapid: N.A.
Yes
No
18
16
8
1966:
Bus: 935
Rapid: 88
Bus: 27.6
Rapid: 4.2
Bus: 4
Rapid: N.A.
200 approx. Bus: 90
approx.
Rapid: 17
This chapter has described the existing methods
of Schedule and Route Planning and analysis in urban
transit systems, and outlined the shortcomings of these
methods. More mathematical statements of the scheduling
process developed for the airlines and on a theoretical
basis were surveyed to illustrate their shortcomings and
potential with respect to the urban transit problem.
With the above groundwork laid, this thesis will
now proceed to attempt to improve on the methods described
in this chapter.
Footnotes
1. This type of error can be easily found in many NBTA
checks. The method of detection used by the author
is to note the abrupt disappearance for one round trip
of a vehicle in a sequence of several vehicles and on
a regular schedule, and to.seek the vehicle listing
under another line--where it is usually to be found,
at about the time a vehicle on the line from which it
is missing would be expected to pass. A missing or
extra vehicle number, double or half headway without
a double or half load, or an abnormally high or low
count on a particular vehicle are all clues to this
kind of error. (The MBTA does not apparently attempt
to eliminate these errors, as they are invariably
included in the summary sheets.)
2. The author found, in examining 1967 and 1968 Traffic
Checks in Cleveland on principal lines, several instances
of checks'being taken at outlying locations to determine
the usage of branch lines; and repeated instances of
half hour or one hour checks at terminals and other odd
locations in response to reported problems.
3. The on-bus Postcard survey punch cards for all MBTA
lines were listed and examined by the author. Frequent
errors and omissions, by both passengers and coders,
were discovered in certain of the questions. For
example, many passengers did not understand the "mode
from station" question and indicated "walk," thinking
of their final mode, rather than "subway" as their con-
tinuing mode. Coders occasionally punched incorrect
digits in the origin or destination zone.and subzones,
or processed cards from a different line as part of a
given line's data.
Many of these errors can be eliminated by analyzing by
hand; computer analysis would retain them.
4. No Boston area transportation planning body, consulting
agency or university, including the MBTA, contacted by
the author in the past few years has even had available
any listing or summaries of the postcard survey data.
7),1
5. Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois
Metropolitan District and Bi-State Transit System, The
Radizal Express and Suburban Crosstown Bus Rider, United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development Mass
Transportation Demonstration Project INT-ID-8, Final
Report, p. 5. See also Chapter V, this thesis, p. /c9.
6. Transit Record, monthly publication of the New York City
Transit Authority.
7. In the five years of researching the MTA's scheduling
process, and the thirteen years of researching New York's
rapid transit scheduling process, the author has never
seen, in his many visits to the respective scheduling
departments, this revenue data in use or in the files
of the scheduling department, nor been told that it was
currently in use. New York does use such data to measure
the "profitability" of bus lines, i.e., the revenue per
mile operated, and the trends of growth or decline.
8. According' to Mr. George Ihnat, Director of Research and
Planning, February 27, 1968.
9. Federal Demonstration Project WVA-MID-2, "Automatic
Passenger Counting Devices," Approved 1/31/67, Expected
completion 1969.
10. Robert T. Pollock, "Traffic Checking and Schedule Prepar-
ation," Chapter XVI in Principles of Urban Transportation,
ed. Frank H. Mossman (for the American Transit Associa-
tion), (Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press,
1951), p. 146.
11. Once past a specified point (usually the peak load point)
on each line, the operator is allowed to run "free" to
the terminal, and may thus run ahead of schedule on this
portion of the route without penalty.
12. According to Special Traffic and Running time checks
made by the Transit Authority on the M-3 (49-50 Streets)
route on November 9, 1966 and on the M-15 (1st and 2nd
Avenues) route on November 10-14, 1967.
13. G. F. Newell and R. B. Potts, "Maintaining a Bus Schedule,"
Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Australian
Road Research Board (1964) II, 388ff.
-74
14. Based on examination by the author of several month's
worth of terminal and "gap" (wayside dispatching) sheets
during the -summer and winter of 1966. The discrepancies
were greatest on lines experiencing the greatest delays
and thus the largest number of turned and out of place
trains,
15. For example, Harvard to Dudley bus line midday observed
mean running time is 26 minutes, terminal time 19 min-
utes (42%); Chestnut Hill to Kenmore, observed mean
running time 19 minutes, terminal time 11 minutes (37%);
Harvard to Lechmere observed time round trip 27 minutes,
terminal time 18 minutes (40%). Boston has the lowest
number of miles operated per bus per month--1,742, com-
pared to 2,550 in Cleveland, 2,600 in New York, 2,696 in
Chicago, and 2,920 in Detroit (1963 company data).
(Cleveland's figure is probably lower than one would
expect from the efficiency of its scheduling process due
to the union requirement of 10% minimum terminal time.)
16. Based on observations by the author. For example,
Harvard to Dudley or North Cambridge to Waverly and
Watertown.
17. One-way average route length:
Boston 3.33("Line Statistics of Schedule in Effect,"
MBTA timetable office, 1966).
New York 5.00 est., 4.50 excluding duplicate (two routes
on same street) mileage (Transit Record, op. cit., note
6, August 1967).
Cleveland 6.50 local, 12.0 express (route data obtained
on visit to Cleveland, February 1968).
18. As examined by the author during his visit to Stockholm
in July of 1967.
19. A "pick" consists of the posting of new employee sched-
ules (runs) and the process of operators choos ing the
runs on the basis of seniority. In Boston this takes
place every three months, in New York every six on the
average. The pick must occur regardless of whether
thdre are changes in operating schedules, in order to
update both contracted work rules and seniority
preference.
20. Compared, for example, with 87 in the afternoon peak
hours in New York for nearly 5 times as many passengers.
21. Based on studies of traffic checks and street observa-
tions by the author. For example, on the bus lines
entering Dudley station (Boston) in the morning peak
hour, the peak direction average load per bus per line
is: 42, 45, 45, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 65, 69, 76, 87.
This represents a range from 94% to 194% load factor
(the last is the count in Cambridge on the Dudley-
Harvard line). In New York, the 1967 Cordon counts
from Upper Manhattan and Queens show a scheduled aver-
age load factor per subway train per line from 10:00 to
11:00 AM of: 61, 80, 106, 108, 110, 114, 113, 118, 129,
140.
22. Based on examination of 1967-68 traffic checks and exten-
sive street observations on heaviest lines, week of
February 26, 1968.
23. Cleveland's checks show 6,500 passengers in the peak hour,
with 20 trains of about 320 seats each serving these
riders from the west; from Windermere, the figure is
3,500 riders on 10 trains of 320 seats each. In Boston,
the Ashmont line reaches 5,400 to 5,700 passengers in the
peak 15 minutes with 20-24 cars (approximately 350%),
and over a longer period services about 4,500 passengers
with 20 cars per 15-minute period (320%) (MLBTA 1967
Traffic Checks). In New York, 1967 Cordon count traffic
checks show the Queens IND lines with 230 passengers per
56 seat car (410%) and.the Bronx-Upper Manhattan IRT
lines with 180 passengers per 44 seat car (410%).
24. About five per cent, according to Mr. George Ihnat,
director of Research and Planning. This is on an aver-
age basis.
25. Based on observations by the author and statements by
Cleveland management.
26. New York's schedule-makers have complained on numerous
occasions to the author of their inability to effectively
use their own best judgment and observation in construct-
ing schedule specifications, of having to fulfill "orders
from above" with which they disagree. They feel they
cannot voice their disagreement--and are usually not
directly represented in top management meetings which
make the decisions on schedule changes. The result of
this and the heavy paperwork is an often expressed
malaise, a futility of initiative or interest, an "oh
well, what can you do" attitude.
27. Based on studies by the author over thirteen years of
schedules in New York.
28. Mr. LeFevre, chief run-splitter, Cleveland, 3/1/68.
29. Stated by Mr. J. LeFevre, interviewed on February 29,
1968; also true from the author's experience.
30. In New Yo'rk about 3 to 5 years ago, no published refer-
ences known; in Philadelphia, see International Business
Machines, Electronic Transit Scheduling at Philadelphia
Transportation Company (no date, publ. 1960-61).
31. See, for example, The Use of Digital Computers in the
Economic Scheduling of Both Man and Machine in Public
Transportation, Kansas State University Bulletin, Kansas
Engineering Experiment Station Special Report No. 49;
and A Mathematical Model for Optimizing the Assignment
of Man and Machine in Public Transit "Run Cutting,"
West Virginia University Engineering Experiment Station
Series 67, No. 3-5, September 1966 Research Bulletin
No. 81. Both are technically Final Demonstration
reports.
32. Transit Authority working papers show that the computer-
ized run-splitting procedure, compared with a set of runs
prepared under similar rules and restrictions in two
other boroughs, raised the average hours per run actually
worked from 6:49 to 7:32 hours while reducing the average
pay per run from 9:31 to 9:12 hours. On nine MaBSTOA
routes comprising 16% of the total number of runs, the
computer produced a 1.2% reduction in the pay hours while
reducing the number of "special" (piece) runs. Cutting
all 4,113.runs and printing them took 11 minutes.
33. Related to the author by phone, March, 1968.
34. In interviews conducted February 25 to March 1, 1968.
35. R. Pollock, ibid. (note 10), p. 156.
36. Although the prediction usually follows the gross system
decline formula of Simpson and Curtin--see John F. Curtin,
"The Effect of Fares upon Transit Riding," paper, 47th
Annual meeting of the Highway Research Board, Washington,
D. C., January 1968 (see Chapter V, page/Si).
37. New York's schedule-makers point out that shortening
trains in the non-rush hour midday would require addi-
tional men to transfer cars to and from yards at the
terminals, sufficient to offset the economic advantages
of such a practice. However, the author has made calcu-
lations which show that in spite of this, there are
cases where the alternative should still be considered
(See Chapter VII, pp.0a and 32 .)
38. See Chapter III, page//() and Chapter VI.
39. Alex Friedlander, Mar inal Variable Costs per Subway Car
and Bus Mile on the New York City Transit Authority System
(Brooklyn College of the City University of New York,
1962). Reference is made to this, and more recent data
introduced in the chapter on costing.
40. For example, in the evening on the Arliington Heights bus
from Harvard and the Harvard-Ashmont subway. This line
is not the best example because for most of the day it
is one of the only MBTA lines with the same headway as
the rapid transit connecting line. On Sunday evening,
this same bus line, however, operates on a 15-minute
headway while the subway is on a 14-minute headway.
41. F. W. Doolittle, Cost of Urban Transportation Service
(American Electric Railway Assoc., 1916), p. 116.
42. In a letter from the late Charles L. Patterson, Chair-
man of the New York City Transit Authority, to Mr. Jason
Fane, dated November 14, 1960, it is stated that "Cur-
rently scheduled running time is not considered to be in
excess of a safe minimum, and does, in fact, compare
favorably to similar operations in other large urban
areas." The author's observations do not bear this out.
However, the slack in New York's non-rush hour running
times (and especially evening times) is on a par with
that observed by the author in Stockholm, and rather
small compared to Boston's.
43. Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, Inc., Systems Analysis of
Transit Routes and Schedules, first quarterly progress
report,- Mass Transportation Demonstration INI-MTD-14
(Washington, D. C., March, 1968).
44. See, for example, Brian V. Martin, Minimum Path Algorithms
for Transportation Planning, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Research Report R63-52, Dept. of Civil
Engineering (Cambridge, Mass., December 1963).
45. Voorhees, p. 10.
46. According to Joel Miller, project engineer, in an inter-
view in McLean, Virginia, on April 17, 1968.
47. The author found this to be true in his work on the Queens-
Long Island model for Traffic Research Corp. in New York
and also in his examination of the data coded by Wilbur
Smith Associates for the Boston Regional Planning Project
in 1963. See footnote 3, this chapter, and footnote 110,
Chapter V. In New York when the author worked on the
Traffic Research Corporation Queens-Long Island modal
split model in 1965, he found a number of uncoded free
transfer points between rapid transit lines in Queens
that were a source of distorted predicted passenger
loading. In addition, scheduled running times given by
the Transit Authority, rather than actual running times,
were being used. Correction of these errors resulted in
the predicted loads by route corresponding more closely
with the actual loads.
48. The first line is expected to be in service by 1972.
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49. For these reasons, New York is planning a staged imple-
mentation of changes in its bus routes, with a view
towards newly planned subway lines.
50. Computerized Schedule Construction for an Airline Trans-
portation System, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Technical Report FT-66-3, Department of Aeronautics &
Astronautics (Cambridge, Mass., November 1966).
51. The scheduled and guaranteed hourly frequency was stressed
as an important factor in the success of the shuttle by
Eastern Airlines management in a presentation at the
Harvard Business School on December 8, 1965. Passenger
surveys show that 32 per cent of the riders use the
shuttle for this reason Che New York Times, February 3,
1965).
52. Optimal Dispatchin Policies by Dnamic Programming,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Report
R66-55, Department of Civil Engineering (Cambridge,
Mass., November 1, 1966).
53. Ibid., p. 6.
54. Scheduling in Constant Speed Transportation Systems
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Operations
Research Center Technical Report No. 34 (Cambridge,
Mass, January, 1968).
55. The Transportation Problem with Random Demands, Interim
Technical Report #12, Fundamental Investigations in
Methods of Operations Research, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.
56. Transportation-Type Problems, Interim Technical Report
#11, ibid.
APPENDIX
% of PASSENGER TRAFFIC by HOURS -- RAPID TRANSIT
- ------ - -  ------ ------ W e d ne r da y - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -
Huirs 1/25/42 3/10/54 3/ 7/56 3/11/59 3/16/60 3/15/61 3/13/63 3/11/64 3/10/65 3/ 9 /665/2z /62
12:mid.- 1:AM 1.21 .86 .77 .78 .75 .73 .76 .71 .67 .69 .85
:AM - 2:AM .66 .43 .44 .43 .43 .41 .42 .41 .42 .40 .39
2:AM - 3:AM .39 .29 .29 .26 .25 .29 .27 .26 .26 .25 .23
3:A 1 - 4:AM 21 0 I *. .20 .21 .19 8
4:AM - 5:AM . 38 .34 .35 .31 .29 .29 .28 .27 .28 .29 .27
5:AM - 6:AM .81 .76 .79 .78 .71 .74 .74 .66 .71 .72 .71
6:AM - 7:AM 3.25 3.61 3.61 4.15 4.09 3.92 3.82 3.99 3.83 3.84 3.62
7:AM - 8:AM 10.2 2.21 12.63 12.28 12.3 1. 11.85 1_ . 4 11.6 11.88 12.13
8:AM - 9:AM 13.00 13.94 14.48 13.81 13.47 13.49 13.72 13.27 13.22 13.46 13.58
9:AM - 10:AM 5.02 4.92 5.04 4.82 5.04 5.29 5. 30 5.12 5.54 5.38 5.34
0:AM i1:AM 3.46 3.22 3.07 3.22 2.95 3.08 3.06 3.14 3.15 3.09 3.16
il:AMt- :_nuon Ljl .84 ,63 2. .55 . 70 .. 7  2.6 2.68 2.6 2.64
2:noon -:PM 3. 19 2. 83 2. 60 2.63 2.48 2. 56 2. 49 2. 53 2. 52 2. 51 2. 61
1:PM 2:PM 3.24 2.91 2.63 2.75 2.68 2.84 2.67 2.79 2.89 2.94 2.89
2:PM - 3:PM 4.15 4.06 3.83 4.25 3.96 4.37 4. 16 4.48 4.50 4.45 3.84
3: PM - M 4.: 4.32 4 5._23 5._02 5. 31 5.15 5.12 5._33 5. .3.2 5.07
4:PM - 5:PM 6.91 9.24 9.43 9.68 8.91 9.06 9.55 9.53 9.57 9. 15 9.27
5:PM - 6:PM 12.93 1. 38 15. 59 14.62 14.97 14. 18 14. 81 14. 32 14. 30 14. 24 14.44
6:PM - 7: PM 7.41 6.68 6.73 6.62 6.95 6.46 6.18 6.27 6.53 6.67 6.93
7:PM - 8:PM 4.51 3.16 3.08 3. 22 33.1. . 1 .0 L_21 3.06 3 16 23.z5
8:PM - 9:PM 3.14 2.10 2.10 2.08 2.07 2.10 1.92 2.04 2.03 2.09 2.23
9:PM - 10:PM 2. 32 1.76 1. 71 1. 78 1. 70 1. 72 1.61 1.60 1. 63 1.65 1.71
10:PM - I I:PM 2. 47 1.90 1.94 2. 05 2. 17 2. 09 2.41 2. 27 2. 23 2. 19 1.92
1:PM - 12: i d .2 1.40 1.8 1. 1 1_.30 1.32 1.4 1.25 1.15 1.14 1. 33
YT----------------------h-1------T-----)h T----- TbT- - (b
1c. n r . 56 1. 63 1. 47 1. 71 1. 61 1. 64 1.41
Tta 00% 100% 100 100 00 100% 1 % 1 10000 % 00 100
otal Passeners 6, 125 4,860 4. 589 4, 563 4,589 4.676 4. 6 31 4,590 4.639 4, 541 4. 431
(in thousands)
Rush Hour s -
7:AM - 9:AM 23. 29 26. 15 27. 11 26.09 25. 77 25. 40 25. 57 25. 51 24. 90 25. 34 25. 71
LPM__7.;L 27. 28 31. 30 31.75 30 92 30,83 29.70 30.5 30. 12 30.40 30.06 30.63
To t a I 40. 57 7. 45 58.86 57. O1 56.60 55.,10 56. 11 55, 63 55. 30 55 40 56. 34
(a) Included in hourly totals
(b) During rush hours only
on stations where hi-turn-
stile readings represent
over 20% of total station
revenue, the readings are
included in hourly totals.
All other hi-turnstile and
train collections are ex-
cluded from hourly totals
and are represented by the
indicated percent.
(c) Hourly passenger traffic
study, normally made in
March. was taken on May 2
because of exceptional in-
crease in passenger regis-
tration on rapid transit
lines due to strike on
privately-owned bus Lines
during March 1962.
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BOSTON REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION SURVEY
Please record your answers to the following questions, even. if you have previously done so on
another trip and place the card in the survey card box or give to the survey worker as you exit.
Any of the survey workers can help you in answering these questions.
At what stop did you get on this vehicle?
Station namne - intersecting street-ornaetbid g
How did you get Check Auto El Taxi [ Su:)Aay or Llevated Walked Train
to this stop? One Bus or Streetcar []Other (Explain)
Before going to this
stop where did
you start this trip? Street addre.. . or nearest interoetion - or building. etc. City. Town. or Section of Boston
At what time? F 3 P.M.
0> At what stop will you get off this vehicle?
Station name - intersecting street - or nearest buildinig
After getting off this vehicle,
where will you end this trip?
Street address - or nearest intersction - or building, etc. City, Town. or Sertion of Boston
How will you Check ] fAutol i Taxi ] Subway or Elevated Walk Train
get there? - One 0 Busor-Streetcar E) Other (Explain)
1> At what time do you expect to arrive there?_ 0 A.M.
I] ni'm. To or from Social
What is the purpise (Check 0 To or from work [ To or from shopping [D or Recreation
of this trip? One To or from school [ Other (Explain)
Do you rideCheck CDaily? Weekly? Occasionally Do you have a Check
tli - One drivers license? One
my How many persons are In your household? Yels E No
j Ijow many passenger cars do they own? _ _ _ No, I am under 16 years of age
Mall this card at any mail box if it was not collected at the exit - For information telephone 542-9897 in Boston
YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS IMPORTANT SURVEY IS APPRECIATED
VS48 A
for ofi ce viea o
C+i
Q1
Q
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BOSTON REGIONAL PLANNING PROJECT, SPONSOtto AT t MASS TIANSPOITATION COMMISsICM Atl;; W1 MASSACoiSETTS DEPARTM0sT of tusLIc wOuRs.
SI COOINRAflON WITH THt U.. HOUSING AND MoMe ISIANCI AG6NCV. AND THt U.$. OtPASIMINT Of COMMERCE, SURIAU OF PUlittC ROACs.
CONDUc(tM 1Y WitatJ SMITH AND ASSOCIATES
C3 M
£,0'M0Ar H Okr1Ci._" t~itp-CY '& iFW kKAAif W64 .r, 0'4
1. I travel 'by SUBWAY:
daily E often Q occasionally
FOR:
work J school f shopping
0 personal business
2. 1 am going to:
[:Manhattan QBrooklyn
o th e r .......................................................... ...........
The nearest principal street intersection to my desti-
notion is .............. .............. .................................
a n d ...................................................... ...................
3 I take the .......... train (give letter symbol).
I enter the subway at the SAME STATION l used
before the Nov. 26th service changes took effect:
Yes QNO.
IF "NO", what station and line did you previously
use? ................................................. ..... .....
4. After leaving this train I will use the following to
complete my trip:
Owalk F bus
- I transfer to the ............ subway train (Give letter
sym bol) at the ..................................... station.
m o ther .....................................................................
]1582
5. Compared with my previous riding experience-
A. The service improvements:
n save ............ minutes on my trip;
E have made no difference;
E add ............ minutes to my trip.
B. My trains now are:
less crowded Q unchanged
C] more crowded
6. I find your new
MAPS:
E helpful E fair poor
E never use a map
STATION SIGNS:
f helpful G fair poor
TRAIN SIGNS:
E] helpful E fair E poor
7. To help the progress of your long range program for
improvement of subway service, I suggest:
.- 
- - - - - ------ ----- -
.- - ---.-.-
.- -- ".
.-
Thank you for your interest and assistance.
~lTh'~v*L i~A~L.V J~E~Ies~ sV A )T &l vd-eY
....... METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY
RT.NO. DESCAIPTION
1301 ASHMONT -ASHMONT VIA NORFOLK C WASH
1302 HALLET SO - ASHMONT
1304 MORTON 6 CORSETT STS -ASHMONT
1305 MORTON & WASH STS - ASHMONT VIA WASH ST
REVENUE
7.60
60.60
309.22
5 06 63
RT.COST COST
128.57 5.91
106.47 56.92
401.22 77.07
21.25
MORTON C
GALLIVAN
GALLIVAN
WASH
BLVD
BLVO
GALLIVAN BLVD
MORTOu t WASH
NCRTHAItPTON C
BAY VIEW LOOP
STS - ASHMONT VIA ASHMONT ST
& MORTON ST - ASHMONT VIA TALBOT AVE
C WASH ST - ASHMONT VIA TALBOT AVE
C WASH ST - ASHMONT VIA DOR AVE
STS - ASHMONT TERM
WASH - SOUTH STA VIA WASH ST
-. ALBANY GARAGE
PEACEVALE RD C NORFOLK - ASHNONT
MATTAPAN - HAYMARKET - PARK ST
E CO#4CORto ST C HARRISON AVE - COPLEY SO
VUNT AVE C STUART $T - SOUTH STA VIA KNEELAND ST
FIELDS CDR STA - DUDLEY TERX
.8YLS10N C DARTMOUTH STS - DOWDOIN SQ
PIERCE SC MILTON - AS)IMONT
MAT TAPAN - ASHMONT
SOUTH STA - NORTH STA VIA FECEKAL ST
FIELDS COR STA - FIELDS COR STA LOOP LINE VIA REPONSET
KANE 50 - DUDLEY TERM
GROVE HALL - DUDLEY TERM
FRANKLIN PARK PEADODY CIA - DUDLEY TERM
50.30 70.60
235.86 350.0
1.10 9.65
12.40 .99
2.33
320.77 274.09
477.12 942.87
6.10
3.90
.62.95
27.31
79.90
46.61
179.25
258.5%
540.41
908.89
635.38
594.42
.99
21.03
81.86
31.83
158.05
133.91
1.22
420.35
153.44
1007.41
781.05
469.00
648.31
.4
~ ~-~-
I:X4%etr &.-o'N
1309
1310
1311
1313
1314
1315
1320
1330
1331
1332
1335
1336
133V'
1339
1339
1340
1341
1344
1345
1346
71.25
67.23
11.40
252.53
117.03
71.01
616.16
18.54
76.90
as.en
50.55
34.81
42.64
168.48
53.64
116.37
135.45
91.69
f, f
August, 1967 TRANSIT RECORD
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY---BUS OPERATION
RxFNU PASSESNCes AND PASsE5C7R 16v5suE By In.s rx TwEIs MrSuNiis Es455 JUNx 30, 19'U7 AND 1966
BROOKLYN BUS
B-1 Manhattan Beach .
2 Flathusv, Ave.-Ave. R.
3 Avenue U .
4 Iay Ridge Parkway ....
-5 Kings liighway .........
6 ay Parkway-Asenue j
7 Kings Highway-Saratga
Avenue ..............
l8th Ave.-Fosttr Ave. ..
9 60th Street .............
10 New Lots Avenue ......
11 49th Street-53sd Street12 East New York Avenue13 Crescent Street .........
14 Pitkin Avenue ........16 Fnrt Hamilton Parkway ...17 Remsen Avenue .......
18 Wyckoff Avenue .......19 Carlton. Avenue ........
20 Dcatur Street .........
21 Bright-n Beach Avenue ..
22 Atlantic Avenue ........
23 Cortelyou Rna ........
24-29 Greenpoint-Meeker.
Marcy Avenues .......
25 Fulton Street ..........
26 Putnam Avenue ........
31, Geritsen Beach ........
33 Hamiltont Avenue .......
.35 Cuc vne34 Dy Ridge Avenue ..
36Suf Avcue.
37Thid Aenue.
38 DcKalb Avenue.
39'WlimhrhBig .
40 Ralph Avenue.
41 Fl'athuph Avenue ...
42 Rockaway Parkway.
44 Nstrand Avenue.
49 355. julis lIace ....
46 Utica Assnue.
47 T ins Avenue .....
48 Avienue .........
9 Orean Avenue ..........
5 pteh Avenue ..........
R566tu Pas.sc605s
Twelve MoS.. Ended June 30
19f.7 
-19.6
1,005,725
2,26..k558
1,766,55b
1,214.131
4.642.256
3.059,217
5.444,144
2.865.60
5,091.3271.460,784
5.136,98
1.396,4.8
4,822,031
3,635.394
3.344,847
952.9t.3
468,624
1.244,321
2,093,014
3.074,35be
2.044.459
1.635.323
3.8%01,303
4,988,562
2.100,346
214,999
3.97.279
9.048.397
5.050553
5.521.446
8,127,R53
2.512.453
3.713.072
13,823.232
1.9$.425
12,575,911t
55.104.804
11.83,99"5
6,135.467
4.564.9t4
- 5,43,,,1591
1.035.677
2.359,154
1,90 t,..9
1.351.4Z5
4.916,653
6.934.142
3.399,445
5.824.0if6
3.013.772
5,448,714
1,599,216
5,541.4053
1.421,006
5.379.2t.4
3,873,058
3.586f.,053
3.IQ7,491
608,900
1,377.119
2,292,757
3.397,277
2.159,178
-3.810,923
4,.319.482
5,479,.187
2.2i,.364
249.562
4.299.875
9.825.933
5,3t.8.121
6.030.894
8.533.943
2.715.u9
4.241.2t,0
14.777,021
1.927,759
13.747.476
9 54 9.7597
11.714,.542
5..724.211
4.905789
4,;7 1,.50
6i.11240.410-
1'Asmeata RA L.SZ
Twelvt ML-s. Fnded June 301W.7 1966
$ 185,703
453,6.93
324,572
20.893
83 7,930
1,196.416
531.636
956,455
461,575
983,066
258,250
954,670
240,956
902,1,03
600,982
5,26,478
185,331
9f,985
2250.316
378.15 7
656986
359,962
309.399,
755,6 86
95,5,44
392,315
39,732
c85,2471,680,1477
8849,539
1,044,r,21
1.500,154
491.152
712.727
2,605.7i3
345.28
2,348.055
978,95,.
2,05 . 14
3,1 29.990
919.524
.7514.004.
1.044,92S
$ 148,966
32 .66
264,127
177.313
676,378
930,464
457.393
773.130
381,897
797,111
220.737
782.317
194.379
765396
500,.60
504.420146.97888.6w0185,A78
312,095
47t.977
293.056
2W,176
1634.,17
794.757
311,79W
34,451
574.879
1,30,9.675
723.782
8564.241
1,220,613
401100,
n17.467
2.113,740
293,946
).944,08A
922,643
1,.79.74f.
948.714
-77,173
t.27,272
877.520
LIN
B53 )terplitan Avenue ....
54 .lrte Avnue .........
55 Rihmnd Hill ........
56 Jam.,ica Avenue ........
57 Fnsbir Avenue .......
58 Cr.,,,sna Aenue .........
59 Gra l Stleet ...........
60 Wlun Avenue .........
61 Crov , . ..wn . ..........
62 Grhan Avenue ........
63 Fifth Aenne ..........
64 86th Street . ..
65 Bertgn Strest ........
67 Seventhi Avenue .......
68 Coney .land Avenue ..
69 Vandiilt Avenue
70 Eighth Avenne .........
71 Union Stiret ...........
74 Nurton's Point .........
75 Smith Street ...........
77 Lorraine Street ........
78 Mill Basin ............
80 Wwld's Fair Special
83 World's Fair Special
83 Ptemylvania Avenue
(from 2/27/66) ......
isdie'laneou(a)..
Total .............
Adjustment of High
Schol Fares .......
Unrgsteired Elem.
Sch.o Fares (on
Monthly Passes) .....
Unregistered Elm.
School Fares ('ms
Federal Grant) ......
U. S. Post OmiSe fares
Adll. School Revenue
Pasyable by, City of
N. Y. .. ...........
To Wa. 55a l N .
R('evmi 5sar.sts - Pax N aRmvt
Twelve Mos. Emltd June 30 Twelve 61on. EnadJv 30
1967 1P-6 197 59'
5,17.552 - 5,207995 $ 895,F-4 S 5I7826,U45 950.543 159,724 199
4,;71.090 -53.284 897,075 72' -
4,743,705 5.123.352 974,43
4.329,117 4,732.976 30,; o 5, 76
5,217.48 " 5,77,987 9+6.949 -;55
1,529.245 ,.042,581 19 , 420 14'.
7-,38.167 7,731,707 1,35 4,917 1,112,21
6,59,347 7,430,574 1,339.974 - 072,161
3,4.3"08 3,61,036 6'53.21 547,547
9,/93.272 11,93,320 1,847,263 1,540.142
..429.201 2,590563 42..4 35.958
4,372,203 5,2is2,905 8501.8 736,153
.,921.653 4,239,,95 729,..2 593,535.879,453 6,293,637 1.058,017 962.0.0
2,10.112 2.429,921 3F2,734 335.2 2
2,114,506 2.304,-42 387.25 !22,543
517,361 531.47$ 93,420 77,126
2.523,227 2,726.,830 471,714 39 .169
2,9F4,633 3,196,35. 357,.36 45,960
1,345.567 1,445,599 246.737 203,7 6
521.729 448.081 63,349 47,123
357,196 . 9299
-- 96,465 - 49,116
6,51.970 2(3,781 155,735 2,643
-- (,762,876, -
262,140,393 23l,87997 $4,339,14 $ 39,87221
(45,963) 430,824 -
14,933.344 13.422,579 401.189 374,354
110.501 -- 25.352
543,432 529.548 168,6S4 79.436
9,903.147 6,,3E.739
277, 6598,' 296,320,947 $ 57,977.555 S 46,647,7;2
STATEN ISLAND BUS
R-1 Riahniond Terrace ....
2 Iay Street ..........
3 Caatlkton Avenue ....
4 Richmond Avenue ....
5-101 Jensy Stre-
t 
Brighton
Avenue ..........
6 \ict..ry i.nlocvard.-
Jewett Avenue .....
tX C3love Road Shuttle
(fr. 6/2/67) .....
7 Verraranw Narrows
3tridgeth)
7. Verrasasno-Narros
Stridge S.. Iteach.
1LklMn. tir. 7!3.66)
95 Staten isand Biooklyn
3.xpnt- (fr. 111.1/.51
102 Ilende In Aven.ue- ...
5503 H slan toulevard ....
104 Tompkins Atenue ....
105 clove R-A ito559 /. 3 '65l4. 1s. ... ...
1ot Wa,stchs.sgue R .....
107 F3or-et Avenue ......
tgRichme.n. U,
17 w 'Arthur KIS R...1157 %.% lh,.. Lanse.
1.392,14
1.89,7 32
5,5566,573 .
2.43.02539
1,453.0110
2.288.14t.
194,9
1,333,939
2,514.4516
543 -
2.0053.731 3.479,,675
49.087
1,412.741
31.15 ,.547
444.2t.9
759.25 S
.5.5 .
$ 257.457 $
4114.7,14
351,558
i11,.215
203.571 R.I5ls
328.5t.8 III.
274.310 31M
89,494 112515
195.910 154,56
3(
23
5
58,56.
l,5005.454.3.067.258
574.537~
1 49.71,9
742N 39
2.,49.20 35
2.7e2.3's3 2,737,349
Midland each ......Manr Road .........lailley Avenue ......
Victry Blvd.-Travis 
P3rinces Ba) .........
Min'elanssi(a) .....
29 2 3 ,91 Total ...............
109 -- Adju-Smert of HighSchool Fares ......
9,442 274.484, 'nregiutercd E6em.
Scl Fares (un
Atonthl, . . . ..
2.028 
-.... enregisttered Eem.
Sch,.A Fares (,n14,727 ,402 Federal Grant)
9.013 1-4.156
01,044 393.682 U. S. Pst Office Fares
9,57o 63,40 AIdl. School Revenue
P byae 6  City of
-. 19.73' N.Y ............
522.296
476.341
9,.,79
3Ss,.633,
49.,93 3,.9
285,.06 298,8893
331.989 349,484
639,555 570.003537,130 530,360
91.162 68,413
-- (251,945)
24,632.617 24.924,040
(6,363) 78,597
2,921,616 2."5.221
21.159t
16,620
$ 46,316 $ 36,79
56.9097 45,435.
96.722 70,%47
94010 67,753
9,R43 6,857
4,
24,073
.- 1,
Toa. SA-mN 1n8ssse
's''.... 274854 27.611.93 I . 5.
353,397 3,38.820
75,855 72,137
4,954 --
3,324 3.52
439,731 1,021350
F77,161 $ 4.484.119
tat Rqeprn t. sI C.5 mptatn 1- f pt ..enger fig Sfr f 9 1t. to c n with p Ien ptocedure.
.1
I -- I milo I 
---- - . -
431
7 - -----
August. 1967
StaTtoN
IRT LINES(a)
Itoatvy 'I Ave. I.txr(al
South Ferry ..... ...Rector Sir-t ...........
C,.tttandt Street ............
Wall ato W.3lb.,m Stict..
Pavk Place and1ru day.
Street ........
Fr.,kln Ntreet ...........
Canal Stmrt ...........-..
Ilouuton Street ....... . -
Chrity.i.her St. She:id.'n S.-
14th Stre-t ...............
18th Strti ........ ...---
23rd Street ........
28th Stert .. ..-.----
Permltvantia Stt . ....
50th Streelt -.-...46.th Street .
72. Sittt ... -. -
79th Street .... . --
Ieth ,.tret . .... -
9r"th stre-et ........ -.. .
tt Steet ....
110t St. (Cathe ral P
134.11, SI it'olmbia Iit 
125th Stt .....
137th Stret Wit) C..1e1. .
145th Stre4.et ..
357th Stret
lIR8t Street . . .
1
9 1st 41mt . -..
Dyckm:,n Street .....207th Stie..
215th StreeI ...
225111 Stmt .
231t Street . ..
2.%8th Strees ... . . . . .
242nd.SI. (Ilan. College)
Too l, ... . . . . . .
1.No. Avr & Wiu. P1.
Rp. 1,s.
I l0th St. & Ixnox Ave.
Iloth St. & 1.enox Ave.
1251h 10t. & 1i-no Ave.
135th St. & Lexts Ave.
1451h St. & L.nox Air.
S 149th St, and Third Ave.
Jackson Aventue ...
P's pet Avenue ...
Ituterle Avenue.
Sini,3r.n Stret.
Feeman .lStret .3743, $111.svt.......
174th Street ..... -...
177th Street . ..
Ea..t 1801h Street.
Wton% Palk Eait.....
Pelhat Parkway.
Alletton Avenue .
Burke Avenue ....
Curn 111 Read ...
E.t 214th Street.
Fa.t 225th Street.
Fa4t 2.130 Street .
.t 2318th Street ..
Fast 241%1 Street ..
Total ...............
TRANSIT RECORD 7
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY-RAPID TRANSIT OPERATION
RmUF.~r IA L~s k F~ Ol TWEI. M\IONTIi Es i o ,m JUp . 30, 1%7 ASN 1966
REVENUE PASSENGERS BY STATIONS-(Continued)
T .h 3 M,. Ended Jtie 30
19.,,'"..
1.7 3S,934
.. 1.73
.1. 47 11 ,3
2115.172
1.04544
124.3A
,,075.773
20.89.371
7,0.4 2,467
31.7 37.852
8.Q35.054
.,580.362
4,432,852
9 .83 . 2f,
- 3.292.549
1.162.2
2.,056,.29
2.4.2.952
1.1.39
215.284
921.879
1.5 1.. 95
1,837.403
1.974,859
2,91.1,539
3.1ths,481
o.894,7422.6.47.46.6.
3,98.,745
1pi.17.4 13
.,27 2.064
.,223.547
3.518.5''.
3.l1l1.9012
I.248,07I
488,979
1.91.4,2317
1.,465..375
682.528
1,7.81.5
5 48,5985
1,249,834
3,073,9859
5l5,759
1.389.2.2
55.037.137
7.9.1.
. 071.51
2.637.221
1.(07.3,k8
1.537.815
3.1763..27
1.7 37. 48
3,.8459
4.1.%4743
3. , 87.49 .
o~;3.o. 2 7
3,25121,9.00
3,955.770
2.4 35.1 35
1.542.,.66
1,4.7,479
32.0018
228,356
944.141
1.t21,133
1,025.59$
1.874.436
129M.2.751
3,121.018
3.725,214
,788.149
4,1101.3195
1....7 188
3.415,329
3,37 4.49Q
3.500.;02.
3.2!7.875
1.2,.7061
1.957.757
1.413..7
179.132
1164.12413,46.3
1.243.204
1.7 2. 293
S37.836
1,397,444
5,.435.1 92
IRT LINES(a)-Cont-
1.txr.To.-.r Ava.
Listta) 
-
I]k-wling: Green ... . .. .
W\all Strevt and lr-ulaay..
Canal Stre-t . ..
SpringL Strat...
lIterLer Street...
Astor 'lace.....
231r. Set ....
2-th Stit . ..
3.in4 Street .. . . . . . .
Girand totra ......
SIt Street ..
68sth St. (llunter C ollege
77th Stret ....
S6th Street...
96th Sitet ....
103rd Stret....
110th Stre.t
110th Stree ...
125th Street ... ..
l38th St. .an. tit.0 ed C.ncourse
14'0h St. and Grand (oncour-
10t1 ete .:. . .
1671h Street . ..
1701h Street .... . . . .
Mt. Flen .\venue.
176th Street .llurnside Ave. INN't. .)
18314 SIt-ee ... . . . . .
Fordha m Rad ....
Kin .,b Rad ........
iei)PakiTL . Illt.1.200th St.
Mloshoht V'.kway .........
Woodlawn. ....... .........
Totaital ................
PnIA BAY PAR anc
33th St. & Third A\e. ...
1rook Avenue .............
Cstrcs. Avenue ...........
East 143nJ SITre. .........
East 149th Street .........1.ongW- Av,,me .........tuns P11oint A enne ......
Whitl.ck Avenue .........
Ebler Avenue .......
Smd \iew Avenue ......
St. I.awrienec .\ u....
at177t St. (Parkeester)
a Hill Av~ome .
Ze re, '.venu ..e .
Westchestvr Sqna,.re.
Mli,ldet.own Road......
ulthr, Avenn e..
Pelham 31.y Par,.
Total ....... ......- .
1lanot.t x LI.t(a)
clar, St. (flro.oklyn 1t.)..
liII t Street ............ .
.Nevi , Stet ........
Atlantic Avee ...........
.gen Stlcet .............Grm.. Armry Plxa .......
Fntern P'way (lLn. Mo..)
Franklin .\venue ........
Nostrand Averi.te...... .
Kingston Avenue ..........
Utica Avenue .............
Twelve Mos. Ended June 30
196; 196'.
6.638,794
8.911,34
943,911
1.69o.557
2,074,840
4.274.345
8.391.890
6,140.740
40,842.6446
9.116,266ft
7.537,2c,7
6,678.673
1,$40.01
3.814.27
4,1190.9i2
4..53.214
1.,.8t
2,o27.792
1.352.34
1.509.173
2,450,1133
1, 195,6710
1.1.343
1,547.568821.589
1,1311.018
1,46,7,987
162,793,914
2,211,4741
2,93.920
1,714,185
81,615
1.984.348
1,371,887
2,70.,473
733,400
1.681,537
2.31.493
1,157,181
3.213.547
1.140.1 1
593.7271.,09,027
592,"52
1 394.143
1391,015
30,31.5
1.873.447
2,900,20
2,493.717
5,343.14 I
1.075.108
z.00)5,8o2
3139.81,8
2,553.7 161,23.948
I 1,0,972
6.237.229
6,256.39.6
8,224,301
949.908
1.7 1t.924
2.112.952
4.024.75,.
F.191,955
5. 9 2.99
6,.28,404
39.45".244
8.921.542
7.352.091
6..71.211
9,5 23.618-
3,757.4111
4.174.5$1
3, V72.901
4.5 16.192
-, 02t,
1,65 .75
1,953.7948
1.9317.8581,298.7931.438,130
2.353.820
1.176,919
1,80.>145
1.531,970
778,618
1.32.333
1.41.16.5
158.306,172
1,963.343
3,5 ,128
1.784.970
02.722
2.05,458
1,432.2902,811,645
749.9191,611.375
2,2550t63
1.4.39
3,174.781,621.132
559.827
I.6.73.463588,925
1,348.11-3
1,A407 .349
30.181,049
1.772.738
2,82o.540
2.553,4 o0
5.3.5,t 221.331,9:81.976.6,7611.2 0. 935
2.52'.2431.192,556
1.43*.012
6.169.783
STAtO
IRT LINES(a)-Cont.
BIoOnytX Lztu(a)--ConL
Sutter Ave. (Rutland Road3
Sara-toga Avenue .........
Rockaway Avenue ........
JUu treet.......Pent1y1van4ta Avenue ..
Van Siceln Avenue ........
Nc. Lots Averme .........
Noettv.t., AvtNUE BRANCt
Preident Street ...........
St erung Street ..........
Win throp teet ...........
Church Avenue ............
Irerly Road .............
Netkirk Avenue ..........
Flatbushl Avenue ......
Total(a) ...........
QOrEENSBORo Lm1(a)(b)
Fifth Avenue, Mannhattan
Vernon Blvd. & Jackson Ave.
4 th Ave. llunter's Pt Art.
45th Road Court Hlouse Sqt.
Qureems,1 riu:h Plaza (IRT
and BMT) .............
F4XtsninG BRANCH
33rd Street (Raw,,n St.)
40th Street (Lo.ery St. .
46!h Street (31iiss St. ),...
52nid Sm teet (Lincoln Ave.)..
61.t Stre. tWolside) .
69th Street (Fist. Ave.) ....
A2ml St . .iceS-n e1its . .
90th St. mlmhurst Asenue)
uution Uoulevard ......
1041h St.. Coruna Para ....
111h SItreet .......
WWet Point lIlvd . ......
Main Street, Flushing .
Total(a)(b) ........
DxE Ave.-E. 174Tn ST.
LINE
Dyre Avenue .............
Blaychester Avenue ........
Un.m 11.1 Road ........
Pe:hkru Parkway .......
N.erris Park ..............
Conluctors' Collections ... -
Toal ...................
Tatito Avi. EL. LtS
149th Street ...............
3561h Street ..-.....
161st Stre t .... :..........
16 th S t11-1 ..............
1t9t1h Street .............
Clareimmt Parkway ........
174th Street . . ..........
177th Street ..............
1811h3 Strevt ..............
183rd Street ........
Fontham Rd. (Ford. Uitly
240th Street .......
234th Street ..............
Williamsbridge-210th St. ...
Total ................
Twelve Mos. Ended June 30
1967 196
2,144,847
2,093,095
1,48., 1 38
823,194
1,641.23
982.518
1,478,657
670,590
1,420,901
1.517.651
2,237.014
1.0,86,217
2.233,560
5,646.125
53,53,231
4,549,386.1.t.70.L.4
3,45,,074
2,979.05
1,77,235
1.935., 3
2.467.2277
7-431.4 3373,41
514.891
2,755.544
3,1301 ,.63 2
2.0 f, .t.,1)
1,329,894
1,452.027
14.990,696
54.515.448
68S8,965
5413,854
3,114..97
6114,5803
219,354
3.152.588
108.4 53
311.756
60.18 5
$Q3.315
474.088
81 t,3'8
54.1.367
71 .,499
456,751
13,.9i2
6,897,099
2,110 ,t,04
' 2. 14S,497
'11.5494349 4 -
95. 1,S
9 9H
1.40.,.043
6-47.491
2.184.1341,03.,373
2,11F.135
5,!91,251
5,315 6.16
4,430,778
1 ;2 5,23 7
11,55,594
3,011,530
1, 5, 9
.4
'SO 96 1I
14-'1.55 ,
5.57.7 84
477,576
1,1(152
4(it-.0446,34.
3,44,.
345.g
325448
615;3
6.24,4
95915
920.799
543,
g16529
553.143
7,3,199
4"1.11,
135 ,49114.4"9
149,419
7.194.105
I.
-
(a) F.Ceudes inten.ivkional free tryanfer tation. 11cc pxe 8.
(1. .eoria ItranlCh 0i the gut1en'boro Ine 17 qvrated by and included under the 11MT Div.
j
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APPENDIX II
An Example of a- Schedule and a Set of Runs
A portion of the schedule and work program (run sched.)
for the East 180th-Dyre Avenue Lexington subway service in
New York is shown in Exhibits 9 and 10. Note that in the
schedule trains may run express from 241st Street, local
from Dyre Avenue or local from East 180th Street in the
Bronx; and that trains from these three points may go to
Utica Avenue, South Ferry or Atlantic Avenue (or, on other
pages, New Lots Avenue).
The peak load points on this line are, from the
Bronx, at 59th Street (between 125th and Grand Central),
and from Brooklyn, at Bowling Green. "P" indicates a
train being put into service from storage in a yard, tun-
nel or middle track; "L" indicates a train being taken out
of service into storage (or maintenance). All trains oper-
ating in the hours shown are ten cars.
The scheduled running time is read as, for iexample,
69 to 71 minutes from Dyre Avenue to Utica Avenue, or as
8 minutes from Grand Central to Brooklyn Bridge. The
terminal layover time at Utica Avenue for the first train
listed is ten minutes. These first several trains, in
actual practice, do not usually leave Utica on time; de-
lays enroute southbound are generally greater than the
ten minutes allowed in iayover. Conversely, the actual
running time for the trains shown at the bottom of the page
is 5 or 6 minutes faster than that shown on the schedule.
11 CVy
IRT DIV. FILE NW. 3- 697 NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY SHEET NO. 2-of 6
DAILY TRAIM SO0EWILE SUPER. F!!.E i. 3. 3506
IN EFFECT: 180T1 ST. - DVRE AVE. - LiNE . 4--9.-5 3
241ST DVRE AVE EAST 180Th STR'T :49Th l25HT ST 6 Ce B 8 B.GRa SOUTH.FERRY A A FKLIN UTICA AVE. FRAdlLIN. A A B.GRN S B G.CEN 825Th 149Th ST 3801. STRT DYRE 2381
LEAVE ARRVE LEAVE ARRVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE ARRVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE ARRVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE ARRIE 'LEAVE ARRVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEOI LEAVE VAE ARIVE LEAVE ARIVE ARM
LOC EXP
P- 717
725
732
736
P 71 722 723 738
p- 727 742
-739 734k 745I
709 721 732 747
P-736 75S
P-729X 744 7
723 731 742 757
P- 749 8004
P 735 746 747 802
r.740X 755 806
733 742 753 808
P-750X
P..756x
P-SCEX
-P-li5%
Af
P 757 812
05 816
744 752 803 838
8l 822
754 eoO 8l 826
P 8as 830
828 832
803 833 822 837
830 831 842
al 838 829 844
819 824 835 850
825 832 843 858
831 839 650 853 906
837 848 859 900 - 914
849 856 907 908 922
855 907 918 932
913 928 942
920 927 936 952
938 948 1002
939 947 958 1012
738 749 757 80
742 753 80 805
744 75- 803 80
748 759 807 8ll
751* 752 803 8it 8is
753 754 805 83 817
7S7I 758 .809 8g7 821
801 8 0 1 813 823 825
803
806
08
814
902 913
8034 815 823 827
807* W19 827 631
809 8az 829 833
812+ 824 832f 837
814) 64 j 8344 839
9W2 928
"aS 830 838 * 843
822 834 842 847
824 836 / 844 849
828 840 848 853
832 844 852 857
836 848 856 903 902
838 850 858 903
843 - 854 902 907
848 859 907. 933 912
850 901 909 913
156 - 906 934 918
904 914 922 926
912 922 930 934
920 930 938 942
928 938 946 950
938 948 956 1000
948 958 1006 1010
958 1004 1036 1020
1008 1018 1026 3030
1038 1021 1036 1040
839
843
845
849
85I
855
8S9
903
905
909
91 915
915 919
886 826x
620 830
822 %33
026 836X
830 840
832 845
836 8S
840 856
842 L
846 903
848 L
852 914
854 L
858 L
902 919
904 L
908 927
932 L
918 935
922 L
921 925 928 943
926 930 933 953
934 938 941 l003
942 946 949 101
950 954 957 1023
958 LITE 3005 1
3008 Li &0M2 L.
301$ LT 1022 L
1025
1038
1040
829
833
836 837
839
843
848
854
859
906 910 919 923 931 941 947
934 988 927 931 939 949 955
929 933 941 951 957
922 926 - 934 938 946 956 1002
LOC EXP
930 921 LI GT 93L
914 928 939
932 1.
920 931 LICHT 94*t
93S
943 95.
949 L
9$4
956 L
1001 1012
1009 L
l0ot
1016 1027 L
. 930 934 942 946 954 $004 1010 a024 L
938 -942 950 954 1002 1012 1018
946
954
1004
3034
3024
950 958
95) 3006
3008 1016
l08 1026
1028 3036
1038 1046
1048 a056
3058 106
1002
1010
1020
1030
1040
10
t0l
1028
1038
1048
1020
102
1038
1048
3058
1050 S058 3108
1100 1308 1i8
3330 3338 1128
:026
3034
3044
3054
3304
1134
1040
losB
all&
3032 1043
1048 1059
f08 lis9
1328 3339
It8k, 1a
m
IRT DIVISION - FILE NO 3 - 1697 A
NOTOM1EN & CNDUCTO 1ST
DAILY OaJR PRGGIRW - IN EffECT: .
N A a C P A S S 0 A T S AN
N 0 fF IN 0
17
I 121
-24
27
.28
I 30 ~I34:
NEW Y.1RX CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY
ISOST a DYRE - LEXINGTON AVE LINE
SHEET 40 2 Of 5
SUPERSEDING fILE HO 3 - 1586 A
(4/19/65)
R E P 0 R T DYRE AVENUE ATLANTIC AV UTICA AVENUE DYRE AVENUE i180TH STR* ATLANTIC %V DYRE AVENUE 180TH RELIEVED T E
f-. PLACE ARRE LEAVE ARRVE LEAVE ARRV LEAVE ARRVE i-E AARRVE  LEAVE  ARRVE LEAVE ARRVE TiiE PLACE ACT*L WALL A F
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The excerpted page from the work program gives an
idea of how complex run-splitting can be. Note that lay-
over times for the crews are longer than for the trains.
Thus the first train on the schedule, the 7:17 A.M. from
East 180th to Utica is due to leave Utica at 8:26, but is
crew, run 31, take the follower, the 8:30 from Utica, while
the crew that has picked run 20 take the train out at 8:26.
Of course if run 31 arrives with their train at, for ex-
ample, 8:30, 14 minutes late, the crew with run 20 must
wait for them and leave late (nor will run 31 make an 8:30
out, it might be added).
Note that runs 17 through 24 are straight runs,
runs 25 through 32 are swing. Lunch hours for the straight
runs are the times in parentheses, and vary from 57 to 115
minutes (the contract minimum is 35). Actual time worked
in the column at the right includes lunch relief and termi-
nal layover time; note in spite of this how much less than
eight hour's work is required of each employee for the eight
hour's pay. Overall time is the spread time; notice that
for a spread of less than ten hours, no penalty is paid,
while for a spread of ten to eleven hours, full time is
paid for the excess above ten hours. Differential is the
number of hours and minutes worked from 6:00 P.M. to 6:00
A.M. (for which a bonus of a few cents is paid), computed
on an eight hour basis from report time, not on the atual
relief time.
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CHAPTER III
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND TRANSIT SCHEDULING
CHAPTER III
Systems Analysis and Transit Scheduling
Schedule and Route Planning in urban mass transit are
presently non-programmed activities, not in the sense of be-
ing a new problem, but as described in the previous chapter,
in the sense of being undefined, disorganized and solved by
are
Judgment. Albeit parts of the processAorganized; some sys-
tems - notably Cleveland - are more systematic in their
scheduling procedures than others. There is no absolute
dividing line between systems analysis and present schedul-
ing methods, but it will become clear as we define systems
analysis and look at the way each step is handled that the
opening statement is justified.
Systems analysis has not been introduced into the
scheduling process; indeed, there are few people in the in-
dustry who are aware of its relevance. This is because the
manner and forum of discussion of the whole field of systems
analysis, operations research and management science have
been alien to urban transit management's test of relevance:
what is useful. In most professional journal articles, for
example, "the attitude is that of an exercise in formal log-
ic rather than that of a search for useful solutions of real
problems." Further, there is a preoccupation with "optimum"
solutions, although for most management problems, "mathematic-
al methods fall far short of being able to find the 'best'
solutions. The misleading objective of trying only for an
optimum solution often results in simplifying the problem
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until it is devoid of practical interest." (See Chapter
2, pages 6' ff.)
There is, according to Forrester in the above quoted
test, a dichotomy between practicing management and the
scientists and engineers working in this area. He repre-
sents two regions, diagramatically, and in a series of
scathing comments, suggests for example that in one, "the
goal is improvement of real situations;" in the other, "the
explicit or the optimum solution to unrealistically simpli-
fied hypotheses." The manager "acts on' such information as
he can obtain;" "the analyst often ignores phenomena that
he admits are crucial but that cannot be precisely measured."
The analyst usually ignores nonlinear behavior, loses the
nature of individual action by extracting from averages and
aggregates, and so on. While somewhat exaggerated, the fact
is that:
"The 'art' of Region A (management) is
still better able to deal with decisions
of great consequence than the 'science'-
of Region B (analyst). The overlap bet-
ween the two is slight. The manager has
often found that management science did
not deal with his most urgent problems.
It has not learned to take into account
the variables that he knows to be im-
portant. It is not cast in a language
with which he is familiar." 4
It is the intent of this thesis to overcome some of
this for the urban transit industry. Emphasis will accord-
ingly be on what is relevant and meaningful to transit man-
agement. The methods proposed and techniques used may not
always be mathematically or econometrically precise and ac-
ceptable, but it is hoped that they will generally be approp-
riate to the issues and data at hand.
Systems Analysis: Definition
Decision making can be viewed as dealing with two
types of problems: programmed and non-programmed.
Programmed problems are ones which an organization
has repeatedly had to solve, and for which routine proced-
ures have been developed. Objectives and operating pro-
cedures are well defined through habit and experience.
Non-programmed problems are in some sense unplan-
ned; there is no well defined method of solution. If one
asks a planner how he arrived at a solution for such a
problem, he will say he "exercised 'judgement', and that
this judgment depends, in some undefined way, upon experience,
insight, and intuition."5
The distinction, of course, is not in reality a
dichotomous one. In particular, a non-programmed prob-
lem may be one with which an organization has been deal-
ing for some time but which is still solved by Judgement.
While the objectives and procedures may be routine, they
will also be undefined and disorganized.
This does not mean that non-programmed decision
making cannot be successful a good deal of the time. "Any
worthwile human endeavor emerges first as an art. We suc-
6
ceed before we understand why. Non-programmed decision-
making is an art, developed through empirical experience.
But
"Without an underlying science, advancement
of an art eventually reaches a plateau." It
"in time ceases to grow because of the dis-
organized state of its knowledge. . . If prog-
ress is to continue, an applied science must(be developed) to explain, organize, and dis-
till experience into a more compact and usable
^ - 17
Systems analysis is a method which addresses itself
to putting the relevant factors of such problems into ord-
er. Arthur Hall, a systems expert at Bell Labs, defines a
"system" as any set of objects with relationships between
the objects and between their attributes; and to the en-
8
vironment in which it functions. The environment should
ideally include all things affecting the system, but in
practice must usually be limited to those things which
have a significant effect on the system. Analysis of the
system and its environment enables one to see all the
isolated segments as tied together by interdependent func-
tions.
Systems Analysis can thus be understood as a "set
of techniques. . . that enables one to see isolated ob-
jects, or a piecemeal series of events, as interconnected
9
and mutually dependent." In this context it becomes
easier and more desirable to generate and evaluate alter-
native solutions to a problem by manipulating the objects
and events in their interrelationships. Although this can
be done by hand, or with a slide rule and calculator, the
increasing size, speed and availability of computers make
it possible to evaluate many more alternatives. The plan-
ner-analyst "not only can evaluate, but can now
also define alternatives much more
precisely with much more data than
he could use before. He can process
the information in many ways and com-
pare the systems outputs from a variety
of viewpoints." 1 0
The use of the computer does not, however define
systems analysis any more than any other tool that may be
employed as a means. to the method. Systems analysis is
properly defined by a series of steps, all of which are
essential to the method.
Steps in Systems Analysis
1. Problem definition, including the identification
of the purpose, objectives and output of the system. Be-
cause of the difficulty of agreement, planning objectives
a-e often implicit or rest on weak foundations and un-
proven assumptions. The entire procedure of systems analys-
is, however, rests upon a quantitative evaluation of the
stated objectives, and therefore requires explicit object-
ives to measurne. In requiring precise description of major
objectives, a common ground can often be provided for coop-
eration among departments, organizations and even political
groups. This aspect has "all by itself brought about major
changes in the Defense Department and has been one of Sec-
retary McNamara's prime tools to effect change in out-dated
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procedures."
"The really difficult and important part
of doing a good analysis is not the com-
putation; it is formulating and defining
the problem, clari ying the objectives,
and determining wh ch assumptions ought uIL
to be considered."
For this reason, systems analysis is not the exclus-
ive domain of computer experts and mathematicians. It is
more generally, but not necessarily, the product of an inter-
disciplinary team or background.
2. Definition of operational measures. Quantitat-
ive measures must be determined for all aspects of the sys-
tem in order to evaluate whether and how well the solution
satisfies the objectives defined in the first step.
Where no data exists, experience and research should
be employed. Of course, no planner, engineer, designer
or analyst can quantify, or for that matter, predict, the
relative importance that decision-makers will in practice
ascribe to all the factors to be considered. It is im-
portant, however, to quantify as many aspects as possible,
or at least to determine the value of one objective as a
substitute for another. As McNamara points out,
"To undermanage reality is not to keep
it free. It is simply to let some force
other than reason shape reality. That
f-orce may be unbridled emotion; it may
be greed; it may be aggressiveness; it
may be inertia; it may be anything other
than reason. To argue that some phenom-
ena transcend precise measurement - which
is true enough - is no excuse for neglect-
ing the arduous task of carefully analyz-
ing what can be measured." 12
Systems analysis is a rational process, and only
operational (:testable measurable) goals lead towards
rational analysis; non-operational goals lead to bargain-
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ing and dispute. It is important to note that an opera-
tional goal does not necessarily have to have a number
attached to it; the qualities whiich make it operational are
that it is explicit, consistent, and testable. One of the
contributions of systems analysis is that a goal such as an
aesthetically attractive right of way can be included as an
objective, even if there is no precise worth that can be
placed on it in economic terms. There is, of course, no
all inclusive "magic answer" arising out of systems analysis.
MMENk
One must
"Render unto the coMlputer those things
that are the computer's and to Judge-
ment the things that are judgement's.
In the end, there is no question that
analysis is but an aid to Judgement
and that, as in the case of God and
Caesar, Judgement is supreme." 14
In this light, the most appropriate function of
the systems analyst is ''to present decision-makers with
an interesting set of alternatives together with an ex-
plicit identification of their consequences rather than
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a single solution" and to indicate what may happen if
his (the analyst's) assumptions are incorrect. This jumps
us several steps ahead, however; further consideration of
the process of evaluation and selection will be given in
steps 5 and 6.
3. Model definition. In quantifying relevant
aspects of the system, one must at the same time perceive
the way in which these aspects are functionally related
with each-other and with the environment.
A model is simply a collection of equations and
relationships which describe the system. It is a math-
ematical or symbolic representation of the facts and of
the system's behavior. It need not consist entirely of
f ormulas or equations, as the exact relations between
variables are often not clear to the analyst. In form-
ing a model of the syste4 the basic steps can be described
as:
a) Separate the system into its component parts
b) Form theories to explain how the component parts
interact with each other and with the environment
/c
c) Check to see if the theory explains the known
facts and observations for each postulated relationship
(this involves reformulating the facts in terms of the
theories)
d) Test the validity of the theorized interactions
(represented by equations, or statements, or ratios, or
some other symbolic representation) through prediction.
The above process, which is a variant of the
"scientific method", will make clearer what parts of the
system can be manipulated and what the results of vary-
ing the subsystem characteristics will be. From the first
it then becomes possible to
4. Generate alternatives. Knowing which parts of
the system can be varied ,to effect a change in a given ob-
jective in the intended direction establishes a precise cor-
respondence between the alternatives proposed and the results
desired, in a way that would not be possible without systems
analysis. It may reveal several alternate ways of achieving
an objective, where only one was thought possible. And the
previous steps make it possible to use computers to generate
a more extensive range of alternatives than could be done by
hand, where this is possible.
From the second (perceiving the results of manipulat-
ing subsystem variables) it is possible to
5. Evaluate alternatives, in terms of the operational
measures defined in step two. In theory one is looking for
an "optimum" or best over-all system. Often, however, the
real output is one or more "satisficing" solutions, which
are better than the present solutions, but which may none
of them be an optimum solution - simply because the opera-
tional measures and/or the model cannot be made precise
enough to predict an optimum with certainty.
In generating and evaluating alternatives, another
basic aspect of systems analysis is its ability to address
itself to the bulk of the problems that face the planner
and decision maker which are incremental, or which should
be even if they are not on the surface. The computer can
search out numerous possible incremental alternatives,
either by its capability of generating random selections,
or through programmed criteria; the same process, to a
more limited extent, can be done by hand.
"It is this process of gradual improvement
by testing the effect of small changes that
gives the method its resemblance to Darwin's
doctrine of natu l selection, the survival
of the fittest."
Directly related to this facet of systems analysis is
the technique of Marginal Analysis. Marginal analysis asks.
what a proposed change will add to the net benefits (or costs)
of a pre-defined group or groups. In urban transportation
either the transit operator or the urban populace may be the
groups whose benefits are weighed. Marginal decision making,
according to Baumol, states "that an action merits perform-
ance if and only if, as a result, the actor can expect to be
17
better off than he was before." The application of sys-
tems analysis in the generation and evaluation of alternat-
ives will thus guarantee that economic decisions will be
made on the basis of added costs and benefits, not average
18
costs.
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6. Selection. The various alternatives are not
apt to meet all the objectives equally well; in fact,
none may give the precise result desired. It is here
that judgment will enter the picture more explicitly
than elsewhere in systems analysis. The planner should,
as suggested earlier, present several alternatives to the
decision-makers rather than a single solution. This is
19
the practice that was followed in the Defense Department.
In selecting among several alternatives, it is often
helpful to know how unplanned changes in the environment will
affect the desireability of the choice made. This practice
is known as Sensitivity Analysis. It "consists of varying
characteristics of a system by relatively small amounts to
see what effect these changes have upon other characterist-
20
ics (such as cost, or output) of the system.
This provides a means of accounting for the un-
certainties that exist in any system. For example, if
analysis indicates that a 10% increase in demand on a
transit line will not be accommodated by the planned cap-
acity, then it would be desirable to increase the capacity
to provide for such an increase (which might very well occur),
while another line with excess capacity might not need such
an increase.
7. Implementation. While not strictly a part of
the method of systems analysis, the proper implementation
of the chosen alternative is essential to both achievement
of the objectives as envisioned in the plan and to the gen-
eration of feedback into the model (discussed below). The
usual case is that different people and different approaches
are involved in the execution of a solution. As a con-
sequence, decisions made during the program elaboration
(steps one through six) are rarely re-examined during the
21
program execution. This dilutes the effect of the whole
procedure of systems analysis, and may put holes in future
use of the model. For this reason, there should be ample
communication between the planners and the executors of a
given program.
8. Feedback. The results of implementing a given
solution provide information with which the various, hypo-
theses and functional relationships comprising the model
of the system can be- tested and, if necessary, changed to
better represent the current state of the system. Thus a
continuing feedback of such information is necessary to the
successful continuance of systems analysis. Where such feed-
back is "real-time" or close to it, and the continuing chang-
es in pieces of data are fed into continual computerized
evaluation of incremental alternatives (sensitivity analys-
22
is), an information feedback-control system is in operation.
An effective continuing process of systems analysis incorp-
orates information feedback-control.
Management Oranization fbr Systems Analysis
,Systems analysis does not take place in a vacuum,
of course. It takes place within an organization, and re-
quires an organizational structure conducive to its use.
For one, resources should be separately and specially al-
located to the planning task; where daily routine precludes
a clear understanding of the goals or an attention to inno-
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Most importantly, management ought not to be top
heavy, too centralized. The planner should be given en-
couragement and lattitude to innovate, in an open-minded
atmosphere, with the understanding that the alternatives
presented to the decision makers will be respected and
not arbitrarily discarded. Centralized control of manage-
ment tends to militate against this kind of atmosphere, be-
24
cause of some or all of the following characterstics:
1) Suppression of alternatives, as lower levels of
management lose their bargaining power
2) Dominance of a favored group in decision making
3) Dejartments or agencies lose incentive to invent
4) Sense of preference of superiors dampens the
enthusiasm of lower levels for making strong cases for al-
ternatives frowned upon higher up
5) One-shot instead of properly sequential decisions.
as a result of staff shortage or from resistance to too much
change
6) 'Neglect of all impacts or uncertainties - only
the viewpoints of the controlling group are considered
7) Conservative bias to choices: it is difficult
to show benefits, easy to see costs.
8) Disregard of uncertainties, preference for
"safe" proposals, little exploration of "bold" ideas.
For really effective use of systems analysis, then,
a considerable amount of decisionmaking authority should be
left in the hands of middle management, and the analysis and
implementation should be carried through at this level, pre-
ferably under the aegis of a single person or group. This
would help integrate program solution and execution, and
overcome some of the problems of centralized management
outlined above, in particular one through four.
Application of Systems Analysis to Schedule and Route
Planning
The first problem in applying systems analysis to
schedule and route planning will be the definition of the
purpose, objectives, and desired output of scheduling and
route planning. As was described in the previous chapter,
the purpose of a schedule from management's viewpoint is
not even always the best that management could ask from
it, and frequently not what the public and employees use
as a test of effectiveness. Objectives, where they are
defined, are not consistently adhered to; and often they
are not made clear at all. The full range of possible
objectives is rarely considered. Systems analysis per-
mits the exploration of the consequences of seeking to
fulfill alternate objectives; this is an advantage which
the transit industry should make use of.
What, for example, would be the result of having
as an objective a seats-for-all pattern in New York in
the non-rush hours, rather than an average 115 to 150%
load factor policy. It would cost more, of course; but how
much more and in relation to what additional revenues and
benefits to the community? The answers to such questions
will not always be what many might intuitively expect, al-
though some times they undoubtedly will be. Or what if a
totally different objective were adopted, such as reducing
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the need for additional expressway construction.
Pinning down and making explicit the objectives
of a transit system's scheduling policy will, if nothing
else, tend to make the adherence to these objectives more
consistent - if they are accepted as continuous tests of
schedule policy.
The heart of the application of systems analysis
to transit scheduling and route planning will be the de-
velopment not so much of the overall model, which will be
presented more for a conceptual foundation than for actual
implementation, but of the submodels, which will both de-
fine the relat;Lonship of the variables that can be manipul-
ated to the environment and at the same time provide oper-
ational measures for these variables.
For example, one of the variables that can be manip-
ulated in the schedule is headway, the interval between ve-
hicles or trains. At present, as should be clear from the
previous chapter, the only relationships and measures that
are considered are those of cost to the transit system, and
at that these costs are inexactly measured in many cases.
Changing the headway, however, will have a number of ef-
fects; it is important that management be aware of these ef-
fects, so as not to make decisions inimical to their own
stated objectives.
Thus we will need to define the effect of changes in
headways on demand, and hence revenue. A hypothesis will be
presented, tested, and used; the effect will be quantified.
At the same time, headway changes will mean a longer or
shorter travel time for the passenger. Even if transit
management places no value on this, the traveler does; and
it might be useful to attach an operational measure, such
as the imputed value of time to the traveler, depending on
his income and trip purpose, to compare the reduction in
cost with the increase in travel times aggregated over the
community.
Take, for example, a bus line with revenue per mile
below some acceptable value. At present, there is not al-
ways likely to be an acceptable minimum value; systems
analysis would require that one be defined, if revenue per
mile is to be an objective, as an operational measure. If
there is an accepted minimull it may not be consistently
applied due to political pressures or the current financial
crisis; that is, no attention may be paid to lines below the
minimum value unless it is necessary to cut costs (although
the resources being wasted in a time of profit might better
be used on some other service). An effective systems analys-
is applied continuously to the system would keep turning such
cases up and call for changes. When changes are made at pres-
ent, consistently or not, they are apt to be made without full
awareness of what the effects on costs, revenues, non-transit
transportation expenditures for the community, and so on will
be; by plugging in alternative Changes into the model, the
systems analyst can show management what all these effects
will be* and in a way that he can measure them against his
objectives.
Importantly, in defining the relationships between
variables and the environment of the transit system, it will
be possible to look at the system in reverse. That is, rather
than or in addition to seeing how changes in headway may
increase revenue per mile, it will be easier to see what
other solutions might also do so - for example, running
some buses down an alternate street, or increasing pro-
motional efforts.
Having thus defined clear objectives, developed
operational measures to test these objectives, and seen
more clearly how the various components of transit sched-
uling interact with each other (including, for example, the
effects of schedules on work programs or run splitting and
vice-versa) and with their environment, we are in a much
better positioA to generate and evaluate alternatives in
the incremental manner of marginal analysis described
earlier. This is so because the understanding of the
interactions between variables makes it easier to see
readily the many ways that a given factor can be changed,
rather than only the most apparent; and the definition and
quantification of objectives makes it possible to assign a
measure or number to each small alternative possible change.
The use of average measures, so prevalent in the
transit industry (and not likely to be diminished outside
the framework of systems analysis) can often violate the
principle of marginal decision making, however. As an ex-
ample of how this occurs, let us pursue the above example,
with revenue per mile as the objective.
Use of Marginal Analysis in Transit Scheduling
Consider a hypothetical pair of bus lines with re-
turns of 60/ and 43/ per bus mile respectively. A not un-
common approach in urban transit scheduling is to reduce
the mileage (i.e., service) on the lower-return route.
However, it is entirely possible that the higher return
of the former is due to service being better adapted to
the market - that is, serving a greater number of potential
origin-destination trip pairs at low total trip price (see
chapter 6). The reduction in service in the latter may
have little or no effect on its return; it may even re-
duce the return per bus mile (see Pollock's quote on p.67,
previous chapter). An-analysis of the return per bus mile
added or subtracted, rather than of the average returns per
(existing) bus mile would have revealed this and prevented
such a mistake.
Figure 1 illustrates such a case. Note that line A,
which at 100 miles is making 60/ per mile, consistently makes
more revenue per mile than does line B; and that a reduction
in service on either line at that point will reduce revenue
per mile; in fact, the graph shows that an increase in mile-
age will actually increase revenue per mile. This is not an
imaginary situation: chapter 7 gives several examples of such
a relationship, using the hypotheses on frequency of service
and through service developed in chapter five. Note that in
the graph, a reduction to 80 miles brings revenue down to 40/
per mile on line B. This is equivalent to a loss of 50-/ per
mile for the 20 miles eliminated.
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FIGURE 1 : REVENUE PER MILE vs. SERVICE
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There are other possibilities too. The line with
a lower return per bus mile may be operating on less con-
gested streets, in less densely populated areas, and thus
by virtue of its higher speed have a lower operating cost
per mile which would not show up under average cost an-
alysis; it is conceivable that the difference might be
sufficient to suggest that the route with the higher re-
turn per mile is losing more money!
"The use of average data in any optimization problem
can lead to such unsatisfactory results. The logic
of the difficulty is not hard to explain - the ques-
tion is not whether money a ready spent in publiciz-
ing product A has brought high returns. What must
be determined is whether the spending of additional
money can be Justified. It may well be that the
public is already saturated with product A . . . the
money may be better spent on the promotion of some
product B, on which previoIs outlays were so niggard-
ly as to be almost completely ineffective, but where
the payoff to additional expenditures may be large
because they permit some sort of public perception
threshold to be reached."25
Why, then, do rule-of-thumb calculations, made in terms
of average rather than marginal quantities, so often serve
as substitutes for optimality or satisficing computations
in scheduling'and route planning, and in many other busi-
ness operations? The most likely answer is that it is
harder to obtain marginal figures than to acquire average
26
data, for several reasons:
1. Accounting information is usually in the form
of average or total, rather than marginal, figures;
2. Marginal data may frequently require information
beyond the range of the firm's actual experience;
3. When relevant data are available from past ex-
perience, it is still much easier to use the statistics
required for average figures, as they require a smaller
number of observations, due toiexisting compilations.
These reasons are all true of the transit industry.
To them can be added the fact that in most transit systems,
the personnel charged with determining the effects of changes
in schedules and routes - usually the schedule and budget de-
partments- are too occupied with the procedures considered
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essential to the bureaucracy, largely rote or mechanical
in nature, to find even a fraction of the time necessary
to collect and analyze the necessary data. This refers
to the whole problem of an organizational environment
conducive to the introduction and thriving of systems
analysis, discussed earlier in this chapter. Transit
systems in general do not present such an environment,
and changes along the lines suggested earlier would be
necessary to make any attempt at the methods outlined
here successful.
If the model of the scheduling process is
accurate, the search for alternatives and the use of
sensitivity analysis in their evaluation and selection
will also be able to measure the effects of random and
non-random variations in passenger arrival rates and
vehicle arrival rates on load factors and running times,
as discussed in the previous chapter. That is, the
model will show that although an increment in service
may reduce the average load factor to the desired ob-
jective level, a definable percentage of passengers will
experience load factors above this level (with further
consequences on passenger demand, running time, and so
on). This is a case where evaluating the alternatives
via the model may suggest the possibility of alternate
objectives which management may want to satisfice. That
is, in this case instead of making a load factor of 150%
the objective, it may be preferable to stipulate that no
more than five percent of the passengers should experience
a higher load factor.
In summary, this chapter has attempted to
describe systems analysis and to show, with reference
to the previous chapter describing the scheduling process
now in use in the transit industry, how the essential
features of systems analysis address themselves to the
various shortcomings of schedule and route planning
detailed previously. Succeeding chapters will attempt
to develop models and procedures which will successfully
fuse the two disciplines and create a method of scheduling
that can readily be adopted by urban mass transit
management.
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CHAPTER IV
A MODEL FOR MASS TRANSIT SCHEDULING AND ROUTE PLANNING
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CHAPTER IV
Introduction
In the prece ding chapter, it was seen that an
essential and first step of applying systems analysis
to schedule and route planning Is the definition of
objectives, of operational measures relative to the
environment and to the variable elements of schedules
and routes controlling these objectives, and the inter-
relationships of the objectives and variables to each
other.
This chapter develops a model of mass transit
scheduling and route planning which makes the identi-
fication of these relationships possible. In Part I
the schedules and routes are defined in terms of a
series of state-of-the-system variables; their re-
lationship to the environment (Fixed and External
elements) and to the schedule and route variables con-
trolling them (Control variables) described; and opera-
tional measures suggested for the State variables.
Part II outlines the way in which alternative
- objectives can be evaluated and manipulated within the
framework of marginal analysis of changes in schedules
and routes. The objectives are seen as a system of con-
straints and specifications on the operating measures of
the"State variables defined in Part I.
Specific objectives for each State variable and
examples of the application of the model with respect
to each State variable are the subject of a later chap-
ter (chapter 7). This was done in order to first develop
hypotheses and present data on the effects of changes in
Control and State variables on revenues (chapter 5) and
cost (chapter 6).
Objectives of Model
The primary function of the model is to make
explicit the systematic manipulation of the state 'of
the transportation system by changes in each Control
variable, or element, of the schedule and route, in
order to produce a new State, or output, closer to the
desired measure of efficiency for each State variable.
The model will:
1. Show the management all the points where a
particular deficiency exits (subject to its objectives
with regard to each State variable) by generating in-
formation on all measures of efficiency for all route
segments, homogeneous time periods, etc.
2. Tell the company how alternative changes in
the variables controlling schedules and routes will af-
fect variables describing the state of the system (and
thus, to the extent that the company has researched the
relationships, how each change will affect costs and
revenue).
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3. Locate local configurations of schedule and
route variables which optimize the stipulated measure(s)
of efficiency (and, in theory, "global" configurations,
that is, configurations over the whole system, of the
control variables which improve or maximize the meas-
ures(s) of efficiency).
In economic terms, the overall objective can be
said to be maximizing the supply subject to varying de-
mand, the latter being partially influenced by the sup-
ply. The extent of the postulated influence will depend
on the available functional relationships describing the
effects of control variable changes on demand, which is
one of the State variables (see ensuing descriptions of
variables and chapter 5). The changes will be primarily
short range and marginal, involving changes in modal split
rather than in total travel demand or patterns (although
possible changes in this area - "induced" demand, for ex-
ample - cannot be ignored). Hence overall movement patterns
are considered as fixed elements in the input.
The objectives of the model will require:
I. Transformation of System State by Control Variables
1. Knowing the input variables, both controlled
within and external to the company, to the
system state, and how they function;
2. Identifying the control variables and their
functional relationships to each other;
3. Specifying the elements of the system state
and the manner in which changes in the con-
trol variables, mixed with the other inputs,
transform or change these elements:
4. Evaluating the output (changed state).
II. Executive (Decision) Phase
1. Structuring the output for decision making
and
2. Generating alternative changes in the
Control variables.
The chart on the next page describes part I; an
additional chart further on describes part II. The fol-
lowing pages describe the variables and functional re-
lationships in more detail.
Part I
Fixed Elements, External Influences Described
The Fixed elements (fixed in that they are "givens"
to the transit system, which has no control over them) are:
Movement data: Overall (total) travel patterns
and destinations by all modes as reflected
in available home-interview, cordon, post-
card and stationary tallies.
Pooulation data: United States Census data on
totals, income, automobile ownership, ethnic
grouping; growth or decline.
Geographic data: Homogeneous housing and/or
' activities by sectors, natural or man-made
boundaries.
Physical structure of system: (right-of-way,
stations, trackage, streets, gradients)
Land Use and Activities: defined in maps, surveys, etc.
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The External influences include elements of the
environment which are neither fixed nor controlled by the
agency. These are:
Weather
Crime rate
Special events (parades, ballgames, etc.)
Disasters and emergencies
Street repairs and congestion
These elements often have significant effects on
the actual load, headway and running time, hence on the
reliability of the service.
Both fixed and external elements enter into the
functional relationships in the model as specified fur-
ther on.
Control Variables Described
The variables under the control of the transit
agency will be classified into two groups which affect
the State of the transit system:
I. Those which are mutually dependent or inter-
related; for which functional relationships (especially
concerning demand) are available; and over which immedi-
ate control (change) is possible (say in 0 to 6 months).
II. Those which are usually independent of each
other; for which functional relationships are often not
complete at present; and which often take more than six
months to effect.
Examples of group I would be headway or run-
ning time; of group II, air conditioning of vehicles.
The control variables in the model fall in
group I. They affect the schedule and route of a line.
They are:
1. Route, or location: Described by the ter-
minal(s), streets and bus stops, or by the right of way
and station stops, turnback facilities, intermediate and
terminal (location and capacity), line capacity; and phys-
ical or transfer interchanges. The Route is not dependent
on (functionally related to) the other Control variables,
although it is a function of certain fixed elements. That
is, a change in Headway will not cause a change in Route
to occur, while a change in the physical structure of the
system will; and a change in population, movement or land
use patterns might require a change in the Route.
2. Headway: Described 1y the scheduled inter-
val between vehicles and/or trains, by homogeneous time
periods, by route, by length of train, by scheduled con-
nections with other vehicles or trains.
3. Running time: Describing the scheduled
time between terminals and intermediate points, stops or
I
stations, for each route; by homogeneous time periods.
4. Terminal time: Describing the scheduled
standing or "layover" or "recovery" time at final or in-
termediate terminals, to satisfy the minimum required by
union agreement, and to allow for recouping of delays along
the line.
5. Number of Vehicles: By route, time period.
Headway, Running time, Terminal time and Vehicles
are inter-related by the following functions:
VEH z RNT + TMT'/ HWY = k(TLN)
HWY c (RNT + TMT) / VEH
RNT = c(HWY x VEH - TMT) k(RTE)
TMT c(HWY x VEH1 - RNT) k(CON)
Where VEH Vehicles, HWY= Headway, RNT Running
time, TMT = Terminal time, RTE m Route, CON = Supervisory
and Control (see below), and TLN : Train length; c and k are
constants. Thus for example, an increase in Headway (less
frequent service), holding Running time and Terminal time
constant on the same route, would require a decrease in
the number of vehicles.
6. Supervisory and Control measures: Not depend-
ent on any of the other variables (although affecting the
Terminal time in many cases), these measures affect the
actual load, running time and headway (i.e., schedule per-
formance) by means of number and placement of dispatchers
(street or platform supervision), passenger flow devices,
communications on-line, and the use of "gap" crews and
vehicles (non-scheduled to fill in variable gaps in serv-
ice).
Reliability, or the dependability and regularity of
the actual headway, running time and load (as compared to the
scheduled Headway, Running Time and Load) is not directly
controlled by the company. It is, like cost, an effect of
both the control variables and of external influences. Com-
fort and crowding, or Load, is in a similar category. Both
are therefore assigned to the State and Output (transformed
state) vectors.
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Control variables listed above form a vector of
inter-related controls which the transit company applies
to the State of the system in order to change it. Often
it is desired to know the A (incremental) change in the
State as the result of an A. (incremental) change in one
or more Control variables.
The model is addressed primarily to this question of
marginal analysis, or the effects of additions or subtrac-
tions to the existing system, as a means towards optimizing
the operation.
The way in which the Control eariables affect the
State is described by a set of Transformation functions.
One or more of these functions correspond to each State
element, and at once define these elements and their re-
lation to the Control variables. A.brief description of
each follows (a more detailed discussion of the analysis
of state variables is the subject of chapter 7).
State Variables Described
Scheduled Headway or Frequency
A function of Headway or Vehicles. As a measure of
flow, Frequency = 60/Headway (minutes)-= Vehicles/hour. As
a measure of average wait, Frequency - } Headway.
Scheduled Running Time or Soeed
Speed-= Route mileage/Running time in hours (miles/
hour).
Load or Comfort
Load - Passengers/(Vehicle x Seats), per vehicle,
and/or Passengers/(Vehicle x Capacity), per vehicle.
This is the percentage of available seats, of standing pas-
sengers, or of remaining capacity, scheduled. It thus de-
pends on the scheduled headway, reflected in the appearance
of the variable Vehicle in the function.
Actual Load
The actual load, along with the actual headway and
the actual running and terminal times, is a function of both
the Control variable Control (Supervisory and Control meas-
ures) and External influences, as well as of Scheduled Load.
All three "actual" variables are measures of reliability. In
general, surveys by transit agencies have shown that the
heavier the scheduled load per vehicle, particularly in bus
service, the more variation there will be in all three "actual"
measurements. Also, the less variation provided in the Con-
trol variables to adapt to known variations in External con-
ditions, the more variation there will be in actual load,
headway and running time.
Actual Load measures the variation in Load over time
(see figure 2) and train (see figure 3) and thus computes the
actual percent standing.
Actual Headway
The Actual Headway is computed by taking the variation
in observed headways in a given time period (see figure 4) and
weighting by the number of passengers on each vehicle, to give
the actual average perceived headway. Measures of the variation,.
limits, and intervals exceeding X0 higher than the Scheduled Head-
way are also obtained.
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Actual Headway = function of (Headway, Load,
External, Running Time, Control).
Actual Running Time and
Actual Terminal Time
refers to the variation per interval of time com-
pared to the scheduled Running time and Terminal time,
and will show the percentage of intervals whose Actual
Running time exceeds the combined Scheduled Running and
Terminal times (see figure 5). It is a function of (Run-
ning time, Terminal time, Control, External and Load).
Demand
Demand.= function of (Frequency, Speed, Comfort,
Route, Fixed, and External), where Route is in turn a
function of Destinations served, Population within walk-
ing distance, and Transfers. Thus, in theory,
DEMrnt/X pop. within Y walking distance
(finc or autokloaditnf*est/0& ext)/Headway
L
per homogeneous time period, where
DEMrnt = separate demand curves for various running times
pop. population
inc or auto = income or automobile ownership classes
tnf transfers
dest/O&D-=- destinations served by the service compared
to all origins and destinations of the pop-
ulation.
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(See figure 6).
The demand functions actually presented in the next
chapter will be estimates or best guesses on the basis of
data available in Boston and New York, and from Demonstra-
tion experiments. They will not be assumed to have pre-
dictive validity. The functions relating demand to Head-
way will be based on regression curves developed previously
by the author. A sample equation (used for the table fur-
ther on in this chapter) is:
Passengers/1000 served 1 mile walk, 4 hour period
inbound 10:00 A.M. - 2:00 P.M. feeder 80.65 -
2.18 (Headway).
Work Program
The Work Program divides the trips (determined by
the headway and.running time) scheduled for each route
into a Man's work day according to
-terminal time (layover) for the crew or operator
-lunch allowances
-report, sign off, transfer of vehicles from storage
areas to nearest route point time allowances
-special rules for swing (gap of two or more hours
between first and second parts of day's work) runs and
piece (less than a fuli day's work) runs
-overtime pay and guarantees
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Two kinds of measures are required: one, the number
of men or crews, can be-estirnated for an entire 24 hour
schedule by this rough formula:
#trips (Running + Terminal time + Allowance &
#Men = in hours Guarantee)
Work day (in hours)
+ (for schedules requiring swing or piece runs)
- the peak vehicle requirement less the base
vehicle requirement.
The only truly accurate measure of the manpower require-
ment, however, is the revised work program.
The second kind of measure is that of Work program
Efficiency. This would require these measures:
-Percent of paid hours actually worked
-Percent of total round trip time in terminal
-Excess of terminal time, lunch, etc., over
minimum required by contract
-Excess lateness and resultant overtime payments.
Mileage
Mileage= #trips (route mileage) plus an added
percentage for non-revenue mileage in yards, or to and
from depots. Measures of mileage efficiency would be
revenue per mile, miles per crew or operator, etc.
Transfer Volumes
These are a function of both the Route and Fixed
Elements, and are expressed as an absolute number of
passengers or as a percentage of the total on a vehicle
transferring at a given point, or as a percentage of the
total passengers on a given route transferring to or
from other routes, etc.
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Unserved Origins & Destinations
or Activity Nodes
These are also a function of Route and Fixed
Elements, and are determined by comparison of origin
and destination data and map and population analysis
to the routes. Unserved trips could be those link-
ages not served at all, or those with a modal split un-
favorable to the transit system.
These State variables, when changed by manipulation
of the Control variables, become the Output. They may be
expressed as absolute numbers: for example, Frequency
changed from 8 to 10 minutes; or as increments: Work
Program t 5 men. How any State variable is changed into
its associated Output is determined by its functional re-
lationships with the Control variables and the input (Fixed
and External) variables on which each State variable depends.
Value Functions Described
The values assigned to the Output are determined
only in the case of the manpower in the Work Program and
the Mileage and Vehicle requirements, for which cost func-
tions will be developed in chapter 6; and for Demand (see
chapter 5), which multiplied by the fare gives Revenue.
The cost functions to be derived from the analys-
is of data in New York (and to the extent possible, Boston)
will have the approximate functional forms:
Maintenance of Equipment Cost =capdMg + kMlgi- rVeh
Power Cost = f(Spd, Stops, etc.)(where Stops stops per mile or per route)
Maintenance of Way Cost - spdilg +kvol-wtMlg
4-location +- External
Accident & Insurance Cost C f(Passengers,Spd,Mig)
Where Mig . mileage, Spd -- speed, Veh = vehicles,Vol-wt. -e
ton-miles (vehicle) per track or street mile and is in turn
a function of Load)Location --" underground, open cut, elev-
ated; and c, k, r =constants.
The cost function for equipment maintenance on a
system with sufficient variation in shop size or seasonal
mileage to show economies of scale with increasing mile-
age might look something like figure 7.
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Other functions, such as power costs, might better
be expressed in tables computed from analysis of rate
schedules and route alignments. in some, speed or mile-
age may not be a variable.
Capital costs resulting from changes in Caitrol,
Vehicle or Route; and the demand in number of passengers
times the fare are the other varibles to which monetary
value can be assigned. The costs and revenues for each
change form the Net Operating Contribution (NOC) vector
(see next page).
The remaining Cutput is at least in theory capable
of taking values comparable to the dollars and cents of
cost and revenue; but the values are presently unknown.
They comprise the positive or negative B enefits which, if
they could be expressed in dollars and cents, could be com-
pared to NOC.
Part II
EXECUTIVE (DECISION) PHASE
NOC (Net Operating Contribution to overhead and
profits) is in practice the most commonly used measure
of either profit maximization or constraint on other
goals. Total NOC for one or more routes or schedules
Revenue less Variable Cost (not total cost).
Marginal NOC consists of the cost and revenue
increment of each change. That is, marginal NOC is the
actual (not the absolute) value of the difference between
the added (not average or total) cost and the added (-or+)
revenue per unit change in (any) control variable. As long
as marginal NOC is increasing (even if by ever smaller
amounts) total NOC is increasing and the change puts the
company in a better position.
The point of maximum total NOC and optimal marginal
NOC per unit control variable is where MR == MC MNOC - 0
(marginal revenue, cost and NOC all = 0). Graphically,
the slope at this point (= marginal NOC) levels out (r-O)
and there is a peak on the curve (see figure 8). Any move-
ment in either direction from this point of maximum total
NOC per unit control variable will in theory result in an
increase in marginal net cost (that is, the marginal cost
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will be greater than the marginal revenue). For example,
if maximum total NOC occurs at an 8 minute headway, a
shift to either a 7 or a 9 minute headway will result in
a negative marginal NOC.
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Often, however, the company may wish to satisfy
some objective other than profit maximization, perhaps
maximum demand subject to a minimum acceptable total
NOC. In the above example, although a 7 minute headway
may have' a negative marginal NOC, the total NOC may still
be positive and above the minimum acceptable to the com-
pany, and the demand will be greater. In addition, there
may be several points at which marginal NOC = 0, only one
of which represents a maximum total NOC. These conditions
/3
are further discussed in the following pages.
The valuation of NOC and Benefits (or their proxy
Output) is both the means of decision and of generating
alternatives. The transit agency must set acceptable
levels for the State variables in the absence of complete
information on Benefits. This decision and choice part
of the process is iterative, and works through the
following procedure (see Figure 9):
Step 1 - Identification of State variable
calling for change (Initial Directive Criteria).
The State variables described earlier are subjected
to criteria which are set, in some cases by purely
arbitrary subjective or political means, by the transit
company. In other cases, continued experience with the
model will suggest these first order constraints, as for
example a non-rush hour Load above which any more crowded
condition always results in more evenue loss than cost
savings.
An example of this first step for the State
variable Mileage (here as Revenue per Car Mile) is:
If STATE Variable Rev. per CARMile Then
reduce headway one unit
(minute
2) A < /c*-di(;< A +x
3)
4) Kclr .
do nothing
increase via positive changes
in relevant control Var. (do
not service)
increase (Rev/CM, as above)
to A-y or better, subject to
constraints on minimum service
A
eec.
Where
T1C. D
system average
+ x maximum above which too heavy loading is
indicated
- y minimum acceptable to company (at or at least
below which there is usually no possibility
of an improvement in service producing a positive
marginal NOC).
(In the event that all such initial directive criteria
are satisfied - that is, call for doing nothing - the company
can still bypass the directives and continue with the analysis
if it wishes).
Initial Directive Criteria for each State variable
are discussed in chapter 7, and a possible set of such cri-
teria is listed in chapter 8.
Step 2 - Choice.of Control variables necessary to
change State variables.
Each Output or State variable has a function relat-
ing it to specific Control variables (see part I). The
~s-Vty~
~x-)o~9A -9PPNNW?4(Jv 31C 0a ivs-- inai 1DW
3
*Jj ~3 L~~1I 9~~ 9
T P IMIR 1 ",919 ON PTIMPOOMP "MRill I
/i// I
functions are by unit (feasible) steps. For example, Head-
way is measured in units of one half minute.
For each unsatisfied Initial Directive Criterion,
the function belonging to the State variable evaluated will
contain the Control variables that can be changed to effect
a change in the State variable. Each must be examined (see
step 3). Some control variables can be eliminated from
specific situations by means of operational constraints.
For example, if there is no terminal capacity at a turn-
around point, Terminal time may be eliminated as an oper-
able Control variable for that point.
Step 3 - Evaluation of effects of various possible
Control variable changes on State variables.
The values of NOC (Net Operating Contribution)
associated with each unit change in one control variable
can be displayed singly and in combination over their feas-
ible ranges in graphs. These graphs (see figure 10) are
derived from the Value functions. By applying the stipulated
criteria (for example, maximum total NOC) to a single input
variable graph, a decision point will be located. The alter-
ed output (new State variable) would then be resubjected to
the Initial Directive Criteria (Step 1).
In theory, when two or more Control variables are
input, a surface, rather than a graph, is formed. Setting
each 9 State Variable - 0 will give one or more maximum
2 Control Variable
outputs associated with each change. On each iteration the
Control variable(s) chosen would be the one(s) whose partial
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derivative at 0 yields the maximum output.
Ideally, the analyst would wish to range over the
entire surface to find the "global" optimum, where for
each State variable, NOC for example, ~) 0t0_Z
However, the "global" optimum is not necessarily the sum
of- the local optimum points. By optimizing or taking
maximum peaks from two graphs comprising a surface, or
from setting each partial derivative equal to zero separ-
ately, one cannot be assured that the function describing
the surface is thus optimized. Therefore, some means must
be found for ranging over the surface to search for its be-
havior and lead to the global optimum point, where a change
in any control variable will result in negative marginal
change in any State. Variable.
Such a point is clearly hypothetical, particularly
since the values assignable to all State: Variables are not
known. But in approaching an approximation of this goal,
or in dealing with sub-surfaces, the need is pointed up
for one of two procedures to find the optimum:
1. Complete enumeration of all points which would
yield the single optimum point. This is feasible in isolat-
ed problems like the one illustrated on the previous two
pages. In the graph, there are three maximum points at the
original fare that satisfy the criteria of minimum accept-
able NOC of 10, but only one that additionally satisfies the
criteria of maximizing passengers (subject to minimum NOC)
or of maximizing NOC. The use of complete enumeration de-
pends on the computational effort involved. Whether or not
- N
the costs of calculation are worthwhile is a matter to
be determined on the individual merits of the case.
2. Hill Climbing techniques, a search for the
point or points where the second derivative (rate of
change of the slope of the curve) is greatest as a guide
towards the summits, eliminating the need for enumerating
every point. The hill climbing method may omit some peaks,
and can thus be said to lead to a better, but not neces-
sarily best solution. However, in complex surfaces, the
additional effort and cost of computing all points may not
be worth the increment of the difference. Further research
into the application of this methodhoudbe carried out.
Continuous hill climbing, or poking around the slopes
and ledges, would eventually lead to complete enumeration.
Thus the eventual process applied may have a combination of
both features - approximation over part of the surface, and
complete enumeration over the most sensitive or undulating
parts of the surface.
At each step along the way, many alternatives will
be ruled out as infeasible due to various Eternal and
Fixed factors and constraints. All alternatives that are
politically or logistically feasible will be considered.
Often, however, the agency must assign arbitrary values
to conflicting alternatives (where one criterion calls
for a change that violates another criterion).
Step
The final choice rests on the application of (pres-
ently unknown) Benefit or Value measures to the alternative
consequences. Whether to get the same NOC with 800
passengers at 3712 or 672 passengers at 25# (one-way)
in the above example depends on the value of diverting
the extra 128 passengers to mass transit, in terms of
trip price reduction for those 128, decreased traffic
congestion, possible reduced need for additional highway
or arterial construction. Often the final decision will
depend on the balancing of intuited long-term effects of
inadequate service against various degrees of loss or
negative marginal NOC.
The foregoing chapter has presented a model of
the Scheduling and Route Planning process in a somewhat
theoretical framework. The next two chapters, chapters
five and six, develop hypotheses and functions which will
be used to determine the Value functions described in the
model. Chapter 5 will deal with the effect of changes in
State and Control variables on demand, thus providing a
basis for estimating corresponding revenue changes.
Chapter six will examine the variables in manpower and
mileage costs associated with changes in the Control
variables.
The practical application of the model is described
in the last two chapters. Chapter seven develops appro-
priate Initial Directive Criteria and applicable alternat-
ives for changing the State variables, based on the
transformation functions described in this chapter and
utilizing the relationships developed in chapters five
and six. Chapter eight gives an example of the entire
Scheduling and Route Planning process developed in the
first seven chapters.
Footnotes
1. In general, a time period is homogeneous unto itself
if there is no substantial change in either the rate
of passenger flow or the headway. Divisions of the
year, season, month, week, day and in some cases hour
are all eligible homogeneous time periods within
these requirements. See table 12, chapter 5.
2. The Effect of Quality of Service on Transit Usage in
Boston and New York, MaSsachusetts Institute of Tec-
nology, Department of Cityand Regional Planning,
research report (June 1965).
3. See chapter 6 for development of the cost functions.
4. See chapter 6 p.2 32 ff.
5. At $4.00 and hour, includes (approximately) allowances
and guarantees for driver times 8 hours (assume the
vehicles are available), Boston, 1965. (1967 costs
are up to $5.25 an hour, see chapter 6).
6. Approximate variable cost in 1965, Boston.
7. From chapter 5, Passengers per 1000 served in four
hour period inbound 10:OOAM to 2:00 Pm = 80.65 --
2.18 (Headway). Adjusted here by hand at ends of
durve to illustrate curvilinear effect in data.
8. Reduced by standard transit formula: for every 1%
increase in fare there is a .33% decrease in passen-
gers. Hence, the 50% increase in fare would cause
a 16.66% decrease in passengers. See chapter 5 p.M&.
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CHAPTER V
Estimation of Changes in Demand
In this chapter, a review will be made of selected
typical published research on models of modal split and
demand for transit service, emphasizing those which treat
level of service as a variable; a series of hypotheses
will then be presented, prefaced by a theoretical state-
ment on the demand for transit service, and tested statist-
ically. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate both
the need for and the validity of the kinds of hypotheses
developed, in the scheduling process.1
Modal Split Models
Modal split is the proportion of travelers using
each available mode of transportation within a given tem-
poral and spatial framework (for instance, the number of
work trips in Boston made each wakday by automobile, bus,
rapid transit, streetcar, bicycle, motorcycle, foot, etc.).
The study of modal split, and the reasons for it, has oc-
cupied an important place in urban transportation research.
Early metropolitan transportation studies and methods
either ignored or were unable to handle the effects of qual-
ity of service on modal split. In effect, they assumed that
the relative quality of service would not change over time.
For example, Chicago2 , Pittsburgh, 3 and Vancouver4 based
their modal split predictions on car ownership, population
density, intensity of land use and distance from the Central
Business District. Leo F. Schnore5 has suggested that the
size, density and age of a city explain present modal
Table 1
Summary Comparison of Various Approaches To
Modal Split Problem
Factors Included
Demographic Size
Proponent
In- Transit
Excess Cos
& Time,
& Geographic _&_Ag come Svc. (gen.) Time Cost Comfortet'
Chicago
Pittsburgh 3
Vancouver4
Schnore'
Detroit 6 (No Modal Split Eq.)
Twin-Cities 9
Levinson & Wynn
Adams
Mortimer
Delaware Port13
Smith x /
Martin, Memmot
& Bon- 15
Penn-Jersey16
Peat-Marwick17
Charles River 2 0
x x
x x
/ Means recognized as a factor but not included in determining
Modal split
split. (Detroit did not even study modal split). These
models do show variations in modal choice based on the
postulated variables. The models are probably valid
-given that the level of service is held constant.
It is, of course, possible to show the symmetry
between growth in automobile registration and decline in
transit riding. There is no question that many mass-transit
passengers have been lost in the last twenty years to the
superior service qualities of the automobile, including
some very hard to define psychological and sociological
qWuantities. But holding the above variables constant and
changing the quality of transit service does alter the
modal split. This has been documented for major service
changes, such as the introduction of rail rapid transit
into areas previously without it. Of the riders using new-
ly opened rapid transit lines, 37% in Boston and 26% in
7
Chicago were former automobile travelers. Smaller, opera-
tional changes in service, such as frequency of service or
fares, can also produce changes in modal split, as a num-
ber of Federal Mass Transportation Demonstration Experi-
8
ments have shown.
Few people would question the statement that quality
of service in a public transportation Erstem also affects
the demand for transit service. Opinion becomes more
diverse, however, in assessing the quantity and signific-
ance of increased patronage. How many additional riders
will be attracted, where will they come from, will the
cost of improving the service be compensated for; how
much of a difference will the shift make in the design
and use of alternate transportation facilities, and in
the viability of the core area of the city?
The 1963 Twin-Cities Transportation Study9 recog-
nized the role of transit service quality, but foundmo way
to express it. Herbert S. Levinson and E. Houston Wynn10
included a formula for the effect of transit service, but
it was not considered an important parameter. Warren T.
Adams11 used a "Transit Service Ratio" as one of his fact-
ors; this was a composite measure of vehicle miles, average
speed and terminal factor for the entire city.
More recent attempts to measure the effect of
quality of service on modal split have been adaptations
to public transit models of time diversion curves used in
highway assignments. William J. Mortimer1 2 derived such
relationships for the Chicago area, le found through a
sample survey that time was the important factor in 42%
of modal choice decisions. Mortimer determined that if
transit were twice as fast as the automobile in Cook County,
85% would go by transit to the Central Business District;
if equal in time, 62% to the C.B.D., and 42% for all trips;
if half again as long as automobile time, then only 35% of
C.B.D. trips and 18% of all trips would be by transit..
The Delaware River Port Authority1 3 derived such curves
for several cities, and then made one for their own area.
Time is not the only variable confronting the travel-
er. In Mortimer's study, almost 60% of the respondents had
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other reasons for choosing their modes of travel.
Wilbur Smith, in his work for the National Capital
14
Region recognized cost and comfort (as well as frequen-
cy, directness and speed) as important, but assumed them
to be equal on all modes and used simple time-ratio curves.
Smith made an attempt to relate time ratios to income of
users (with the obvious result that time is worth more to
those with higher income). Brian Martin, F. Memmot and A.
15
Bone speak of the effect of cost and time, and of various
16
kinds of diversion curves. The Penn-Jersey study - used
"cost" of travel, along with income, land density and car
ownership to predict modal split.
Peat, Marwick and Livingstonformerly Traffic Re-
search Corporation, has developed a more comprehensive ap-
proach in recognizing and quantifying quality of service
as a main determinant of modal choice, stratified by user
17
characteristics. In their model, in addition to time and
cost, conven ience is measured by summing waiting time
(half the headway), transfer time (half the headway of
the second vehicle), and walking time, for which a form-
ula is used involving walking speed, spacing of loading
points, number of acres of developed land, and number of
miles of transit track or bus route. These are then stratified
by income (see fig. 1 & 2). Income is defined as the most ef-
fective measure of market (user) characteristics; it is sug-
gested that the variables used in earlier transportation
studies are linearly related to income or quality of service.
Of the nine modal split methods documented in a
18
recent Bureau of Public Roads publication , only the
Traffic Research Corporation model uses these measures
of "excess" time. It is interesting to note that re-
search at the Transportation Center at Northwestern
University, although treating only time and cost as
determinant variables, has shown that even income may not
always be important - that, in short, the relative service
19
characteristics may often be the deciding factors.
Charles River Associates of Cambridge has developed
an econometric model, using measures of elasticity and in-
20
cluding "excess" time and cost weights. Separate-elast-
icities by trip purpose were developed for fare, excess
cost, line haul time and excess time. (see table 2).
The model was calibrated on origin and destination home
interview data collected for the Boston Regional Plan-
21
ning Project in 1963. An additional feature of this
model is its ability to generate new trips (as opposed
to simply diverting existing trips from one mode to
another) as a result of changes in the service characteristics
22
of a mode.
The use of "excess" costs and times is a step in the
direction of a more realistic portrayal of the process of
modal choice. Parameters such as speed or expected travel
time permit a comparison with automobile transportation, but
do not reflect the essential difference between private and
public transportation: one is continuous, leaving at will
and proceeding without interruption until the destination;
the other is inherently discrete, operating on fixed routes
at scheduled times and thus enforcing delays and transfers.
The inherent interruptions and uncertainties of public
transportation.are not adequately reflected by mean
values of speed, time or cost.
Table 2
Elasticity of Passenger Travel Demand with Respect
to the Time and Cost of Transit Trips
Trip Purpose Cost Elasticity Time Elasticity
Line Haul Excess Cost Line Haul Excess Time
Work -.09 -.10 -. 39 -.71
Shopping -.323 -. 593
Source: Domencich et. al., op. cit. (20) pages 30-31
Even with excess costs and times introduced as
parameters, however, none of the above models is capable
of accurate or relevant predictions in the manner sought
for the methods being espoused here. Being calibrated on
a metropolitan-area wide basis, the models ignore or smooth
over many variations which on a line-by-line or even sub-
area or zonal basis become important enough to invalidate
23
the predictions.
While being useful for the design of a highway or
24
transit route in general terms, they do not give suf-
ficiently precise answers to questions of incremental
route changes, station or stop locations, frequency of
service and so forth, Most important to the transit in-
dustry, they do not directly provide information on the
effects of incremental changes in transit service within
a stable patternof origins and destinations, income dis-
tributions and highway network.
The emphasis in the development of these models
has been and continues to be the search for a compre-
hensive, area-wide predictive capacity involving the
entire transportation system network. The transit in-
dustry, however, needs a method of evaluating individual
changes. This thesis addresses itself to the latter.
Fares and Travel Time
Because so relatively little exploration of the
effect of service characteristics on demand has been done
to date for public transportation, it seems possible to
present their major results fairly briefly. The con-
clusions fall mainly into two categories: the effect of
fares on traffic and the value of time.
The typical, and most widely accepted,description
of the effect of changes in transit fares on demand is the
25
rule developed by Simpson and Curtin Which predicts that
ridership will decrease according to the following equation;
where Y is the percent net change of traffic and X the per-
cent fare change
Y == -0.30X - 0.80
with a regression coefficient, R = 0.92. The coefficient
of X, which indicates the rate of loss in ridership due to
fare changes, is known in the transit industry as the 'shrink-
age ratio' or the 'loss ratio'. Repeated analyses for a wide
range of American cities have demonstrated the general valid-
ity of this formula for contemporary urban mass transportation
in the United States.
Experience derived from rare increases on major transit
systems since 1952 suggests a lower loss ratio, however, In
a survey of 11 cities, the ratios as low as 0,08
(Baltimore) were observed with values below 0.20
being common (San Francisco, New York, Boston, Phila-
delphia and Salt Lake City). Overall an average loss
ratio of 0.22 for big citieswas registered. Curtin
himself has thus recommended using 0.20, that is Y =
0.20X, as a planning estimate. Likewise, the recent
25% taxi fare raise in New York City resulted in a 4%
26
loss in traffic. This corresponds to a shrinkage ratio
of 0.16, similar to Curtin's revised estimate.
27
Furthermore, as Schneider points out on the
basis of his-analysis of experiments in Los Angeles
with special fares for senior citizens, the Simpson
and Curtin formula does not appear so useful in pre-
dicting the results on individual routes or for dif-
ferent classes of riders. It was observed in effect
that the elasticity of demand with respect to price was
significantly iHgher for elderly people than for the sys-
tem as a whole. G e6ter, in other words, than as predicted
by the Simpson and Curtin formula.
There is thus no one market for mass transit. The
demandsfor a system's services are an aggregation of the
equilibrium points established by the needs of diverse
categories of riders; workers and shopper, rich and poor,
school children and retirees. Some of these differential
relationships have already been identified, as indicated
previously in Table 2. The general trend that peak hour
ridership was less affected by fare changes than off-peak
demand was also recently observed in New York City.28
This same study gave evidence of a significant
difference in the impact of the fare change in low-in-
29
come groups. The threefold greater decrease in rid-
ing in the low-income areas is further confirmed by
annual revenue tabulations for the first year after
30
the fare rise, on both rapid transit and bus lines.
In contrast, virtually no change in riding was ob-
served at rapid transit stations in the Central Busi-
ness District turnstile registrations on the Broadway
BMT Subway (excluding interdivisional free transfer
31
stations) declined less than .05%.
In this situation, a single formula may be use-
ful as a means for predicting overall system ridership,
but it is inadequate as an explanation of the detailed
causal relationship between transport supply and demand.
Travel time is also an important determinant of
modal choice, as suggested by table 1. It is usual
practice, sanctioned by the Federal Bureau of Public
32
Roads for example, to account for the effect of time
by imputing to it a monetary value of some sort. J. F.
33 34 35
Wardrop, Stanley L. Warner, Lowden Wingo and Leon
36
Moses have all researched this "cost" of time, to name
Just a few.
Several recent studies indicate how the value of time
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is generally estimated. Thomas for example, investigated
the behavior of industrial workers at 8 localities in 5
states and recommended valueing time at the rate of $2.82/
hour/person. The analysis is based upon what seems to be
really a fairly special market: commuters of above
average income ($9200/family). If the demand of this
group is in fact relatively inelastic, as it appears,
then it is not appropriate to generalize from them.
In particular, these valuations are probably not suit-
able for an analysis of urban mass transit.
Other studies of the value of travel time, even
the most recent ones, are not much different. Lisco,
for example, has done an extensive analysis of the be-
havior of commuters in Skokie, Illinois, a small, upper-
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middle-income suburb on Chicago's North Side. He re-
ports a margin'al value of time between $2.40 to $3.00
an hour. But he also suggests that these figures are
most appropriate for commuters with incomes between $10,
000 to 17,000 a year, incomes above the national average.
In fact, for lower income brackets - those that often pre-
dominate the central city and are major users of downtown
mass transit services - Lisco indicates that appropriate
values of time may be from $0.40 to $0.78 for people with
incomes between $4,000 and $6,000.
Mass Transit Demonstrations
The immediate and most striking feature of the
federal .Urban Mass Transportation program is its diversity,
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as McGrath points out. As of the beginning of 1967, about
$440 million of federal and local money has been spent and
some 125 federal contracts ranging in size from 14,833 to
$23,420,000 have been let. Each city has been forced to
determine and deal with its own needs as it sees them.
Each project is thus not only distinctly individual in
concept but also, as can be seen from their reports, has
proceeded without substantially benefiting from results
obtained elsewhere.
About one fifth of the Urban Mass Transit money
has gone into demonstrations. Fifty-eight projects were
started from 1961 through June 1967, ranging insize and
nature from an attempt to use transit passes ($14,433)
to the operation and evaluation of an over water air
cushion vehicle (over a million dollars) to engineering
and design studies of tracks and rail equipment for the
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (10,529,
40
000$, including supplemental costs). And again, since
so many projects have been running concurrently, it
would have been difficult to develop, let alone use,
the findings of one demonstration for the design of
another - even if it had been directed.
Unfortunately, little information has been devel-
oped from the urban transportation demonstrations. Grant-
ees are obliged to prepare quarterly and final reports. for
the Department of Housing and Urban Development and these
can generally be obtained. These documents make interest-
ing reading and the results of the experiments they des-
cribe are frequently applicable to a number of cities with
similar transportation problems. But, except in rare cases,
the information is not interpreted, it is not translated in-
to useful criteria or guidelines for transportation planners
elsewhere.
low
More tragically, much of the data collected
cannot - even with additional outside effort - be con-
verted into practical functional relationships between
supply and demand. By and large, the demonstrations
41
were not designed to make this possible. They were
intended by their sponsors to solve particular local
problems, not to test whether, for example, there were
perceptible interactions between population density and
demand, or between schedule frequency and demand. Since
this kind of data which would be required to test such
hypotheses was not collected, it is impossible to quan-
tify conclusfons. The information derived has been of
only limited use in developing future service standards.
No general theoretical framework was developed for un'der-
standing, predicting and reducing to the smallest number
of units of measurement the relationship between changes
42
in service and fares, and changes in ridership.
It is a hopeful sign, however, that more gener-
ally applicable studies of the dependency between the
operation of transit service and its demand recently
seem to have been funded. Specifically, in March 1967
contracts were signed for the field test of a mathematic-
al model to predict bus ridership and for the development
43
of an -information system to facilitate management decisions.
Results of these new efforts will not be available until the
end of 1969.
The reason why little has been learned from the
demonstrations is easily adduced. The management of the
mass transit industry is overwhelmingly concerned with
the development of smooth, workable arrangements for
running its services and is not particularly interested
in complicating its planning by worrying about the inter-
action between its operations and demands. Interviews
indicate that, in some major eastern cities at least,
the transit authorities assume that demand is unaffect-
ed by operational changes and need not be taken into
44-
account when determining routes and schedules. It is
not surprising that this apparent lack of concern of the
mass transit authorities is reflected in the demonstrations
which they pr'oposed, planned and executed.
Thus although about sixty four million dollars have
been spent on mass transit experiments of one sort or anoth-
er, the results have been minimal: little knowledge so far
has been transmitted to the profession. Perhaps as Smerk
suggested after his extensive examination of the program,
information vital to the fortunes of public transportation
in Keokuk or Butte is hidden, for instance, somewhere in
45
the vast study conducted by Massachusetts. But these and
other results cannot be useful unless they are systematic-
ally analyzed.
A few studies have explicitly indicated an inter-
est in.developing correlations between the supply and
demand of transit service. These include those conducted
46
by the Bi-State Transit System of Saint Louis, the City
47*
of Detroit, and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transport-
48
ation Authority of Philadelphia. This last is most easily
considered: its eleven findings are mainly qualitative and
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obvious. The first two are, for example: (1) "Location
of in-city destination exerts the principal influence on
the choice of rail carrier wherever competitive rail serv-
ices are available" (You take the line that goes where you
want); (2) "Location of in-city destination governs the
choice of travel-to-work mode from suburban areas" (People
take the line that gets them to work).
The studies for Saint Louis and Detroit are more
interesting. The Bi-State report suggests that it should
be possible to estimate potential ridership by counting
houses and estimating ease-of access along a proposed
route. Ratio& are suggested which do not take income
levels or other characteristics into account, but which
may be valid if conditions similar to those prevailing
in Saint Louis are encountered. They also found that, as
in Philadelphia, ridership was drawn from a narrow zone
around the transportation route, which they were able to
define fairly precisely: about three-quarters of the bus
traffic came from within a quarter of a mile and this traf-
50
fic appears to decrease exponentially with distance. The
Detroit study attempted "to determine the extent to which
passenger usage is affected by the frequency of service on
a given line." At first blush, the effects of additional
51
service were dismal: citywide mileage increases of over
50% increased revenues by less than 10%. But the story
is far more complex because increases by line segment, time
52
of day and day of week varied widely. In addition, since
Detroit's supply of men and equipment was strained to cap-
acity in attempts to meet the special schedules, little or
no slack was available to make up for breakdowns or even
to boost service at times of peak demands when such raises
would presumably have had the most effect. In any event,
system wide averages are not particularly informative and
specific modes of operation for identifiable segments of
the potential ridership should be identified.
Level of Service: A Theory of Trip Price
Level of service is the sum of all the monetary
and non-monetary costs to the passenger of making a trip
on a particular mode: that is, his total trip price. It
can be broken down into the following elements:
1. Frequency of service: measured by headway, in
minutes (interval between buses or trains). The average
wait is often assumed to be half the headway; there is
some indication, however, that the traveler is also con-
cerned with how long he must wait if he misses a bus, and
that this involves a cost beyond that of the simple mean
wait. In addition, the actual mean headway may be greater
53
than the scheduled headway.
Waiting involves two kinds of prices: time prices
and discomfort prices. The data involved in this study
did not permit separation of these prices. They are two
separate components, however, and it should be possible
to determine the proportion of price associated with dis-
comfort by providing a waiting environment almost entirely
free of such discoffoxts as cold, wind, rain, heat, stand-
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ing, etc. - i.e., an enclosed heated shelter with seats.
Future tests to evaluate the discomfort price might include
comparing winter surveys with surveys in May on lines with
long headways; studying the effects of having a bus spend
its terminal time at a passenger loading point, instead of
in a non-revenue area such as a special turn-around loop,
etc.
In general, rides demancdper unit time should vary
inversely with the headway: as the headway increases,
riding should decrease. (Note that increasing the head-
way means decreasing service, and vice-versa). This
general relationship can then be stratified by other
service or external variables. (See the headway vs.
transit usage equations on page /5).
How long a passenger must wait is also dependent
on whether he knows the schedule or not, and whether he
is willing to restrict himself to a schedule, if it is
infrequent. The issuance by the MTA of public time-
tables in 1964, after a lapse of several years, should
provide some clue as to how important such information
is in the Boston area. (see page /70 ).
2. Speed of service: measured in miles per hour,
or total time compared to some alternative. The important
price component in speed is time. However, there are
other prices associated with speed, including the dis-
comfort of starting and stopping frequently, the psycho-
logical effect of passing by other buses or stations, the
improved image of an "express" service, even if it is no
faster than the local.
There is little data in Boston on the effects of
changes in speed. The operating speed of bus lines in the
last five years has not changed substantially, nor of
rapid transit lines. One exception is the elimination
of express services in Medford and Somerville, but the
data in these sectors was too garbled to throw light on
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this problem. New York has more examples of this sort,
due to the elimination of express services on some sub-
way lines, the reduction of running times due to new
equipment (in New York, routes are long enough to allow
noticeable reductions in running time), and the introduc-
tion of special express services.
3. Seats available and number of standees (extent
of congestion-): measured in passengers per square foot,
or passengers per seat, or probability of having to stand.
The price components here are the discomfort of standing
(varying with the length of ride, number of shifts in
speed of vehicle, type of vehicle, weather, age or rider,
etc.) and the discomfort of crowding (varying with simil-
ar factors, as well as with the type of people one must
mingle with).
The time of day will determine in part the pas-
sengerts tolerance to crowding. Tolerance is probably
higher (i.e., permitting greater crowding) in rush hours
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than at other times. Urban dwellers have beentrained to
expect greater congestion in most forms of travel in the
peak hours. However, in the long run this very conges-
tion, on the highway between automobiles, or in public
transit vehicles between people, may result in shifts
in travel patterns. When no alternative mode of trans-
port to the Central Business District (CBD) offers low
/70
congestion (discomfort) costs in the peak hours, travelers
may tend to seek jobs elsewhere, or move within walking
distance of their job. Either move lessens congestion
costs, but the one based on the lower congestion costs
of non-CBD automobile oriented job destinations incurs a
considerable external cost to the city. These losses
could, in thelong run, reflect as prices to the individu-
al urban trip maker.
4. Transfers: measured in total trip time in
transfer, or energy expenditure. It is hard to define
a suitable measure for this price as it overlaps several
others, including time, climbing and walking (which varies
according to whether the transfer is across-the-platform,
between buses, through stairs and passageways; involves
sheltered or unsheltered wats; etc.). In general, the
less transfers a trip requires, the more travelers will
use the service. Frequency of connecting vehicles will
be important.
The change in riding as the result of a transfer
will also depend, of course, on whether there is any de-
sire for through service between the points on two dif-
ferent lines to begin with.
5. Walking: measured in energy per unit time, or
mean distance from nearest stop. Walking involves effort,
time, discomfort, and the prices of these components'vary
according to the length of theplanned trip, the age of
the walker, the weather, whether the walk is pleasant or
not, etc. This study accepted the assumption that most
transit passengers had origins or destinations of mile
/7/
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or less from the bus stop, and did not investigate the
variability of this component.
6. Escalators vs. Stairs: also measured as
energy output, or proportional attractiveness of sta-
tions with escalators vs. those without. Not much
data,is available on this matter (not many escalators
are in operation at non-CBD stations in most cities).
There is also the matter of determining the difference
between having an escalator at either the origin or the
destination point, or at both, to the passenger.
7. Knowledge: the amount one knows about a
particular service or travel route influences his decision
to use it. Many people will avoid the most direct route
to a given point because a less direct route is more fam-
iliar to them. When information can also avoid discom-
fort prices such as waiting (schedule information), un-
necessary transfers (route information), etc., it becomes
an important component of total price. -But measuring it is
something else. There are a number of variables involved.
Perhaps per cent of operating budget devoted to public re-
lations; but this is not a price from the rider's viewpoint.
8. Amenity: measured on a sliding point scale (not
developed on the basis of the data examined in this study)
using the following variables:
a. Orderliness vs. Messiness
b. Colorful vs. Drab
c. Clean vs. Dirty (inside, outside, tunnel, windows)
d. Expensive look vs. Cheap look
e. Courteous vs. Rude drivers
f. Decibel level of noise
g. Foot-Candle power of lighting
h. Well Ventilated vs. Stuffy
i. Well heated vs. Cold
J. Air Conditioned vs. Hot and Humid
k. Smooth vs Jerky ride
1. Underground vs. above ground right-of-way
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list.
The development of such a scale is a major task in it-
self. Some simple improvements in amenity such as new
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cars are discussed later. But it was not possible to
separate the various affective elements involved, as
well as time savings, in the case of new equipment..
9. Direct price: measured in monetary price,
fare, or cents per mile. The effect of price will vary
with distance traveled, thus the latter criterion is pre-
ferred. Fares and -parking fees are the two basic mone-
tary prices to the traveler in urban transit.
The above descriptions of trip prices were classi-
fied by changes in service from the operating point of
view (speed, headway, etc.). Each was seen to have one
or more total trip costs components, which fell into the
following categories:
1. Time - total time of the trip, and time spent
waiting, walking and transferring.
2. Discomfort - of walking, waiting, transferring;
exposure to weather, physical effort (level, climbing or
descending; psychological effect), psychological effects
of stopping, discomfort of standing or crowding, of dirt
and noise; aesthetic, psychological and status appeal; un-
certainty (tension, waiting, safety) and inconvenience, etc.
58
3. Monetary Price. Jason Fane has developed a set
of computer programs translating time and comfort - what he
173
calls "non-money costs" - into economic terms, using
dollars and cents as the common unit of measurement. The
premise of Fane's work, and of this study, is that modal
choice is essentially consumer choice in a competitive
market, thus falling under the laws of economics. The
marginal utility of the various determinants of modal
choice is traded off to achieve an optimum for each con-
sumer.
If the actual economic values influencing modal
choice by consumers making travel decisions could be ac-
curately quantified and stratified by controlled empirical
observation, it would be possible to make substantially ac-
curate predictions using this approach. By translating all
variables into a single unit of measure, our understanding
of modal choice in urban transportation would be greatly
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improved. This is a formidable requirement, as the margin-
al utility of each variable varies considerably with the
user characteristics. For example, a man of sixty will
place a much higher marginal (negative) utility on climb-
ing a flight of stairs than a man of twenty.
The ultimate objective of research in this area is
to determine these values, to find out what the various
components of trip price are worth to the traveler. This
study makes a step in this direction by trying to lend
some statistical base to relationships between transit
usage and these various prices, subject to the statistic-
al limitations of the data. Not all of the components are
reflected inthe data, nor are the measuring devices used
always the best. But it is a beginning, and establishes
174
a base from which to pursue the matter further.
Hypotheses
Several hypotheses were formulated in a preliminary
effort to extract general conclusions from data gathered by
the mass transportation grants, and from such statistics as
are otherwise available or could be collected by private
initiative. Each hypothesis is described qualitatively
and quantitatively and is supported by data for one or
several cities. A summary of the hypotheses is to be found
at the conclusion of this chapter. It is hoped that these
initial findings will lead to further analysis and improved
or revised expressions.
Note that each hypothesis is based on a specific set
of environmental constraints and refers to the specific
qualities of the service change studied. The finding that
an increase in service on a route operating at practical
capacity (see hypothesis number 1) will result in almost as
great an increase in riding is, for example, valid for
situations where there is a heavy flow of pedestrian and
short-distance movement, and for the range of capacity in-
creases observed (28 to 75 percent). Going outside the
range of the observations or combining the quantitative
statements for two or more hypotheses will not necessarily
yield accurate results.
#1:. Increasing service at times of peak demand leads
to high increases in ridership.
Specifically, it appears that when a transit line of
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the type observed (operating on a principal artery with con-
siderable short-distance movement) is operating at "practical
capacity" (defined below), any given percent increase in
service defined in terms of capacity, C (%), yields an
almost equal percent increase in the number of people
carried, Y (%): Y = 0.75C + 0.07 (see fig. 3 and table 3).
Thus a 100% increase in practical capacity would
yield an 82% increase in passengers. Note, however, that
the largest increase in capacity examined was 75%. clearly
this is not an indefinite phenomenon, as there is a limit
to the demand.
Practical capacity, in this context, was operation-
ally defined as the average number of passengers carried
per vehicle at the peak point during the crowded rush hours,
on the above described type of route. This is on the aver-
age always less than total capacity, simply because of
irregular arrivals and loading of passengers.
It is interesting to note that a similar pattern,
with seats being the measure of capacity, was observed on
both commuter railroads and rapid transit lines. In the
Boston area, "The addition of a single car to a crowded
train almost immediately has produced increases in travel
which have absorbed the additional space."63 Table 4 shows
the experience in the Philadelphia area; table 5 shows the
results of a similar improvement in New York on a rapid
transit line.
Table 3
Increase in Ridership as More Service is Provided
on Congested Routes
Location
Detroit 60
Cambridge "
(Mass. Ave.)
Boston 62
Direction
Inbound
Outbound
To Boston
To Boston
To Harvard
No. Station
Vehicles
Before After*
Passengers
Before After*
51 78 1600 2400
55 88 2570 4242
200 270
200 315
8 12 400 570
16 21 1030 1352
* The Mass. Avenue data represents observations on different
days under the same scheduled headway.
Figure 3
Increase in Ridership at Rush Hour on
Heavily Used Routes A
Y= 0.75~ C + o.c>7
b I -- 0C.
./- too
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C Y
% %Y
55 50
60 65
50 35
75 57
50 43
28 32
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TABLE 4
Increase in Ridership on Commuter Rail lines as
More Seats* are Provided
Location
Seats
64 Before
Operation Inbound 3481
Penn-Hatboro Outbound3552
64
Operation Inbound 1493
Levittown Outboundl200
*Through increasing
the trains.
Passengers C
After Before After 0
4623 3330 4737 32.X
4378 3000 4334 23.3
2150 1328 2590 44
2000 1252 2204 66.7
the number and the length of
TABLE 5
Increase in Ridership on Rapid Transit line as
More Seats are Provided
Location Seats Passengers C Y
68 Direction Before After Before After %
IRT Broadway Inbound 4400 99~O 5445 9870O~~ 81.5
225-242 Sts.
This correlation between ridership and service at rush
hours has important policy implications for the designers of
urban systerm, A definite possibility exists that it may be
possible to alleviate peak traffic congestions at the expense
of paying for more men and equipment for the rush hours alone.
The proportions of this tradeoff between larger municipal bene-
fits and the convenience of more balanced transit operations
are not clear. At present the issue is robably only considered
summarily since the decisions lie with the transit operators who
may presum.ably suboptimize their own operations. Yet the ques-
tion deserves to be explored: public resources may in fact be
better spent on the operation of rush hour services than for the
provision of highway capacity to service rush hour automobile
traffic.
Y
44.5
95
76.6
I / yj
The above hypothesis also suggests that increasing
the reliability of service on heavily used lines by more
evenly spaced arrivals of vehicles (eliminating "bunching"
of buses, for example) will produce additional riding. Po-
tential passengers who now walk or take other modes when
no vehicle is in sight (or when they consider it unlikely,
from past experience, that one will soon come) would most
likely be the main source of such additional riding. The
second set of data (from Cambridge) in table 3, illustrates
this kind of situation. Running time on this route was re-
duced in the Spring of 1966, causing a less reliable service
and hence greater fluctuation of headway and load. Daily
revenue tabulations obtained from the MBTA accounting de-
partment confirm the attendant loss. Daily average revenue
passengers for the first two weeks after the change dropped
from 27, 643 to 26,524. Since this was a period of normally
heavy riding (Easter shopping and public school vacation,
just prior to university vacations) on~this line, the real
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loss was probably nearer 1500 passengers per day.
-2. The installation -f through service to rapid
transit stations or major activity areas leads to signific-
ant increases in ridership. In particular, this change in-
creases demand for bus service about 90% during the mid-day
off-peak hours (10:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M.) and approximately
30% during the rush hours (7:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. and 4:00
28
A.M. to :00 P.M.). As indicated before , rush hour traf-
fice is more inelastic than off-peak traffic.
These results were obtained by examination of the
records of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Author-
ity on head counts at peak load points both before and
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after through service wasprovided. The analysis examined the
ratio, R, of the number of passengers carried when there was
no transfer point along the line (i.e., through service) to
the number carried when there was. The hypothesis that the
elimination of transfer points increased riding was accept-
ed at the 95% level using one-sided t-tests (table 6). This
acceptance is conservative because the increase occurred
while ridership over the system as a whole had decreased,
due to a fare increase.
Table 6
Increase in Ridership due to the Elimination
of Transfer Points
MBTA Route Numbers Ratio of Traffic after transfer elimination
(1961 - 1962) to Traffic Before (1960-1961)
Mid-day (10 A;M-2:00 P.M. Rush (7-9.A.M.,
4-6:00 P.M.
54- 3.10 1.66
8 and 13 2.20 1.40
51 2.00 1.33
35, 37, and 50 1.40 1.20
100, 103 and 108* 1.66 1.22
106, 107 and 108** 1.50 1.30
97 and 99 1.40 1.12
96 1.75 1.12
Mean
Standard Deviation
* @ Wellington Square
** @ Malden Square
1.88
0.57
1.29
0.17
The results agree with an analysis of the effects
of providing through service to Manhattan on three subway
lines in Brooklyn and the Bronx (New York City) formerly
operated as shuttles.67 Twenty-four hour turnst'ile regist-
rations on a typical weekday changed by + 125%, + 19% and
- 22% respectively between 1951and 1961.68 The trend on
three control lines in this same period was - 36%, - 46%
and - 51% respectively.69
The policy implication of this analysis seems
reasonably clear: transit operation should be designed
to permit direct service through interchanges for trip
paths where increases in volume could be sufficient to
overcome additional costs, if any. Specific decisions
would naturally rest upon explicit analyses of projected
passenger volumes and costs.70
#3. Ridership is directly related-to frequency of
service. In particular, expressions relating passengers per
thousand inhabitants, P, and the frequency of service
expressed in terms of headway between scheduled vehicles H,
were derived by cross-sectional analysis of data for metro-
politan Boston. The trends deduced were later confirmed
by a longitudinal analysis for the same area (fig. 4).
The behavior of different groups traveling for
different purposes at different times was explicitly
recognized in the analysis. The data was disaggregated
by time periods (mid-day, rush hour, and Saturday mid-day)
which were taken as proxies for different activities, and
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also by the destination (to a feeder station, through a
feeder station to a shopping area, and to the central
business district).7
Seventy-one lines were considered in total and the
sample size for each distinct category ranged from twelve
to thirty-six. Head counts of Metropolitan Transit
Authority passengers for 1960 at the station or shopping
center nodes7 2 were divided by the population of the
service areas as derived from block data of the 1960
census7 3 to obtain an estimate of P, the passengers per
1000 served. The service area in this context is as
defined by the St. Louis study (see p.I, ): the zone
within a quarter mile of each line74 (see table 8). This
data was subjected to a least-squares linear regression
analysis and the results are as shown in Table 7.
The principal features of this analysis can be
illustrated by aggregate expressions for the relation
between ridership and schedule frequency:
P = 117 - 3.8H Rush hour
P = 100 - 2.7H Saturday mid-day
P = 67 - 1.7H Mid-day in week
In these equations, demand for public transportation
is highest at rush hour when it also appears to be most
sensitive to the frequency of service. Similar conclusions
can be extracted by looking at the different kinds of
service. Qualitatively the results agree with what one
might expect. Quantitatively they are rather interesting.
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Table 7
Passengers per Thousand Served, P; as
a Function of Headway, H; Activity;
and Type of Service (Boston, 1960)
Activityv
Midday
(10:00 AM-2:00 PM)
Rush
(4:00 to 6:00 PM)
Saturday
(10:00 AM-2:00 PM)
Service
Type
Feeder
Shopping
CBD
Feeder
Shopping
CBD
Feeder
Shopping
CBD
Feeder
Regression
Equation
51.5
80.7
80.0
96.7
141
121
- 1.16
- 2.18
- 2.10
- 171
- 6.82
- 3.73
- 2.66
- 2.73
-2.62
2 SampleR Size
A ,ivt TveEuto
32
20
16
32
23
16
24
12
13
36P = 54.9 - 1.435 HSunday
(12:00 Noon-
4:00 PM)
87..7
103
120
0.58
0.88
0.84
0.81
0.97
0.79
1.00
72
89
90
/f3
Table 8
Distance Walked to Bus Stop, non-CBD
BOSTON
Cumulative
# people
1 block or less
3 blocks or less
5 blocks or less,
2500
4300
4650
51
86
93
Sample 756
expanded to 5000
Source: p.9 8 , Final 1TC report
CHATTANOOGA
11,742
3,029
.1,704
1 block
2 blocks
3 blocks
4 blocks
5 blocks
6 blocks
181
137
68%
85%
95%
98%
99%
100%
Source: p.10, Hwy Rsch Bd Bulletin 326 (.,.- *1
CHICAGO
RAND data from Chicago Area Transportation Study tapes
show average walk = 2 to 3 blocks. This is longer for
high speed facilities.
Source: Meyer, Kain and Wohl, The Urban
Transportation Problem, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1965, Chapter 8 footnote 5.
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Correlations with observations in other cities, both
large and small, are quite reasonable. In Memphis, for
example, it was found that about two to five percent of the
residents of an area used the bus when headways of between
twenty and thirty minutes were scheduled.7 5 This is well
within the range suggested by the analysis. Likewise, in
Saint Louis, limited express bus operation (eight buses in-
bound 6:30 to 10:00 A.M., eight buses outbound 2:30 to 6:00
P.M.) on several routes produced 5 to 26 passengers one-way
per 1000 population served in segments with no competition
from local routes.76
The analysis also agrees with the results of a
longitudinal analysis conducted using Boston data from the
years 1960 to 1963. Proceeding in a manner similar to
that described previously, the following expressions were
obtained:
P = 95 - 5.3T Mid-day, no change in service
P = 100 - 13.lT Mid-day, change in service
P = 98 - 3.5T Rush hour, no change in service
P = 100 - 7.lT Rush hour, change in service
where P = passengers as a percentage of the original time
period and T = the time period in years.
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Notice that the slopes of both pairs of equations
are greater where changes in service were made.
A graphical representation of the degree of over-
lap of the confidence intervals of the equation pairs is
shown in figure 4. For the Rush period, the "no-change"
interval almost completely contains the "changes" inter-
val, while for Mid-day, there is a large portion of each
interval not held in common. This would seem to indicate
that the service changes have a more pronounced effect on
Mid-day usage than on Rush usage.
It is, however, difficult to isolate homogeneous
samples for longitudinal analysis. In the above set,
only two lines and only three years data gives a set of
only six points, four of which occur after the particu-
lar service change. Since the data fails to allow enough
points to determine a line prior to the bervice change,
the precise effect on usage after the change is virtually
impossible to determine. In addition, although the con-
trol lines experienced no change in headway, one was
changed from a streetcar (through to North Station) to
78
a bus operation (terminal at the edge of the CBD), and
79
another parallels a rapid transit line.
A further corroboration of this hypothesis is worth
8o
noting. A cross-sectional sample of average Sunday revenue
was taken for eight bus lines operating from Harvard and
Central Square stations in Cambridge and Forest Hills Sta-
81
tion in Boston. All except one have no competing transit
service on Sundays, do not parallel rapid transit lines, and
82serve areas of similar income and automobile ownership.
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A well-fitted regression line was obtained with
the equation P 191.5 - 2.71 H. On September 10, 1967,
the Headway on one of these lines (#32) was decreased
from 35 to 20 minutes from 12:00 noon to 8:00 P.M. Ac-
cording to the regression revenue should have increased
42%. MBTA revenue figures show an increase in the first
three months of 23% over the previous spring; as of
85
April 1968, the increase appears to be about 33%. The
use of cross-sectional analysis in estimating changes
over time thus appeais to have some validity. (see figure 5)
Several other hypotheses for which no statistical
tests were performed are outlined below. They are includ-
ed because of their importance in both affecting the out-
come of choices by management as well as the choice of
alternatives; and because of the interesting data or re-
search presented.
4. Congestion and discomfort have significant
86
negative prices to the traveler. C. D. Foster pro-
poses a useful method of measuring this effect. He
notes that in London several routes offer the passenger
a choice of express or local service in peak hours with
a much higher probability of obtaining seats on the local
service. He postulates that the number of passengers
choosing the slower service are a clue to the value placed
on having a seat. He suggests the marginal valuation of
87
the convenience of getting a seat, per mile, is: C= (xV)y,
SA
where x the time saved on the express in fractions of an
188
hour, V = the marginal valuation of time, per hour, y the
percentage of passengers choosing the slower train, S the
length of the trip in miles, and A = the percentage differ-
ence between the probability of getting a seat on the fast
and the slow train.
There are several similar situations in New York.
In a number of cases, passengers actually ride reverse
direction one or more stops to the terminal in order to
88
obtain a seat. Where passengers have an opportunity of
transferring to an express and standing or remaining in
a local, seated, there are never any seats left on the
89
local when it leaves. This would imply that for A=100%, i.e.
100-0, g 100%. In this case, C= (x) Using the
S
Lexington Avenue line from 125th Street to Grand Central
as an example, the appropriate values of x (4 minutes, or
90 38
1/15 hour), V ($2.40/hour, using Liscot s-mean) , and S (4
91
miles) give a value of 4/ per mile for C. It can easily
be seen that this also works out to 4/ a minute as well;
the value of C per minute may be more representative of
the passenger's decision criterion than that of C per mile.
Similar calculations for the non-rush hour, with A = 100-
50, i.e. 50% and y = 25%, yield a value of 2/ a minute;
this probably relates to the fact that standing in a train
in the rush hour is considerably more uncomfortable than
standing in the non-rush hour, when there is room to breathe.
The significance of this hypothesis to policy making
is that passengers should be willing to pay a higher fare
in order to get a seat. This means that premium fare ex-
press bus services might be used in the peak hour in New
189
York to reduce the load on rapid transit lines, and not
increase the deficit. The actual fare collected on such
a service would be reduced by the fares lost on the sub-
way line; but for a 20 or 30 minute ride, even a longer
trip in time by bus would allow a net revenue of 40 or
92
50/ a passenger.
The high value of discomfort may be an important
reason for the congestion on urban highways; the in-
stitution of guaranteed-seat premium fare services may
well alleviate this problem as well.
5. New equipment appears to produce a gain of
between 7% and 11% in patronage. Specifically, IRT
lines in New York receiving new equipment from 1961-64
93
experienced in creases in riding of up to 9%. In Boston
the difference between the system trend and the trend on
the Harvard to Ashmont line in 1962-63,.when new cars
were delivered, was 7% on weekdays and Saturdays, and
94
8% on Sundays. In Miami, system revenue rose 11% from
1963 to 1966, a gain of over four million passengers. The
management attributes this gain to the introduction of new
95
air-conditioned buses; revenue was still climbing in 1967.
Without even considering lower operating costs, a fare of
only 15/' per added passenger would be enough to pay the
96
cost of the buses over twelve years.
The implications for management with regard to both
replacement policies and air-conditioning are that it may
well pay to upgrade the rolling stock before it is worn
97
out, and to purchase air-conditioned equipment, even if
the system itself is paying the capital costs.
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6. Knowledge of scheduled departure times can in-
crease patronage on infrequently run routes by 10%. This
was the experience in Boston, when the issuance of public
timetables resulted in a gain of 5% in average weekday
revenues on lines with 15 minute or longer headways in
the rush hour, as opposed to a drop in riding on the
98
rest of the system of 5%. Similar patterns were observed
in weekend revenues.
Variation of Demand
The demand for transit services varies widely as
the result of a number of external factors. Both in
analyzing the results of changes in service, and in ap-
plying a consistent set of objectives to service planning,
these variations have been accounted for to the extent pos-
sible in this thesis. They are described below to illust-
rate the problems involved and give perscpective to the
interpretation of such data.
Figure 1 in chapter two shows the variation of
revenue by day, Monday to Friday, in 1960 on the Boston
system. Tables 9 and 10 in this chapter show how the
seasons and the weather can affect patronage. Table 11
shows the difference between normal and summer enroll-
ment at the principal colleges and universities in the
Boston area. The variation shown in these tables is
rather modest compared with other influences: late-store
99
openings can double peak-load volumes in the evening hours
(and in New York, with only one such night a week, the con-
tinuous late hours during the Christmas shopping season
bring the number of such nights to 25% of all weekday
/57/
Table 9
Monthly Variation in Usage of Transit in Boston
Average Weekday MBTA Revenues by Month, 1960.
Average
Weekday Revenue
ab % of
Annual Average
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Annual
$119.369
117, 280
123,263
120,343
119,214
116,985
104,262
103,877
111,898
116,229
120,062
132,279
117,088
Note: Holidays falling on weekdays were omitted in
computing the averages.
Source: MBTA (Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority)
Revenue Department, system revenue by day (the
Revenue Department has no official list of monthly
or seasonal variation in riding)
Month
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100
105
103
102
100
90
90
96
99
103
113
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Table 10
Effect of Weather on Transit Usage in Boston
Selected Weekday NBTA Revenues compared to Monthly Average
1960
All days over .66 inches of rain
000 $ Average Revenue
Date Inches Revenue for Month($000)
1/28 .86 106.5 119.4
2/19 1.33 114.8 117.3
2/26 1.34 116.4 117.3
4/5 1.38 -114.8 120.3
5.24 1.02 108.4 119.2
7/14 2.05 92.0 104.3
8/io 0.67 96.3 103.9
9/12 2.95 6 2 .9 a 111.9
9/20 2.13 104.1 111.9
10/20 .94 112.3 116.2
11/1 1.07 113.6 120.1
12/16 1.81 142.7 132.3
12/21 1.18 129.3 132.3
* 10/24 1.14 110.2 116.2
3/4
12/12
All days over 6 inches of snow
19.8 67.8
13.0 65.8.
All days temperature over 900
123.3
132.3
6/27 . . . . . 113.7. . . 117.0
6/28 . . . . . 113.5 . . . 117.0
7/12 . . . . . 101.0. . . 104.2
7/13 . . . . . 97.9. . . 104.2
8/29 . . . . . 99.5. . . 103.9
9/1 ..... 103.2 .a 111.9
9/8 . . . . . 107.5. . . 111.9
Source: Monthly U.S. Weather Bureau Climatological
Reports and Massachusetts Bay Transit Author-
ity Revenue Audits.
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Table 11
Summer enrollment at Colleges and Universities in the
Boston area vs. Spring or Winter Enrollment, 1962.
Educational Institution Normal Enrollment
Boston University
Northeastern University
Harvard University and
College, and Radcliffe
Boston College
Mass. Inst. of Technology
Tufts University
Boston State Teachers College
Brandeis University
Wellesley College
Simmons College
Emmanuel College
Babson, Emerson, Newton,
Sacred, Conservatory, Wheelock,
Lesley, College of Art
Total
Source: American College Guide
Summer
19, 620
19,705
13,515
8,900
6,695
4,585
1,765
1,750
1,735
1,595
1,145
4,075
85,085
8260
1910
4255
2760
1750
930
860
300
150
185
21,360
194
nights); turnstile registrations in New York from Midnight
100
to 4:00 A.M. double on Saturday and Sunday mornings; and
an event at North Station in Boston can triple riding on
101
the streetcar system at night.
Because of these variations, information should be
collected and schedule specifications structured for "homo-
geneous time periods." An example of such a classification
for weekdays on New York's rapid transit lines is shown in
table 12.
Uncertainty of Demand Data
Because of the large number of variables affecting
the demand for transit service, several observations of
the response to a particular kind of service change may
yield varying changes in demand. It may be desired to
know the probability of another change of this kind cre-
ating changes in demand over the range of the previous
observations, rather than simply calculating the statist-
ical mean or best fitted regression line.
There are two simple ways of expressing these
probabilities. One is to multiply each group mean by
its respective probability and to sum the results. The
groups referred to are arbitrary divisions of a total
sample of data, and the probabilities are simply the
proportion of times the data falls in each group. For
example, if a given kind of service change has been ob-
served twenty times, and has resulted in an 11-15% in-
crease in revenue twice, a 6 to 10% increase six times,
a 1-5% increase eight times, a -3% decrease once, and no
change at all three times, then the P(-l to -5%) = .05,
Table 12
Homogeneous Time Period Classification, New York, Weekdays
Period
Early A.M.
A.M. Fringe rush
A.M. Rush
Mid-day
P.M. Fringe rush
P.M. rush
Early evening
Late evening
"Owl"
Hours
5-6:30
6:30-7:30 and
9:00-10:00 A
7:30-9:00 A
10:00A-3:00P
3-4P and 6-7P
4-6
7-10 P.M.
1OP-1:00 A.M.
1-5 A.M.
Further difference between
Christmas shopping per.& other
Christmas shopping per.,
Spec. early dismissal days
and all other
Stores open vs. closed
Friday & Holidays vs. others
For some or all of these, additional differentiation
must be done to account for:
-school in session or out
-summer beach and recreational travel
-summer weekday travel, (lighter)
-snowstorm travel (heavier for first few days)
-inclement weather travel (lighter in mid-day)
-special holidays (Jewish, Bank, etc.)
-special events (parades, etc.)
/96
P (0 change) = .15, etc. The total of the probabilities
times the group means is 4.75%, called the expected value
102
of the revenue increase for a 21st change.
This expected value, however, is simply the mean and
does not relate the fashion in which the observations vary.
For the purpose of choosing among alternatives, it would be
more desirable to present theprobabilities in a table.
Other Sources of Demand Data
The hypotheses presented in the previous pages were
all tested with data gathered by transit systems in the
form of peak load counts or revenue tabulations. Such
data does not, however, reveal anything about the origins
and destinations of the demand, nor does it indicate the
amount of untapped demand. It is clear, however, that the
strength of a route lies in the extent to which it serves
the principal destinations of its prospective users. This
quality has been termed "route generality (the range of
possible destinations which could be reached by transit from
103
some given origin)." While no statistical measures of this
parameter were developed for this thesis, there are two good
sources of data from which it could be measured.
Several transit systems have in recent years taken
104 105
on-board postcard surveys. In Boston, Washington, D.C.,
106
and San Francisco, cards were handed out to riders on a
sample of inbound buses on all transit lines. Riders fil-
led in information on origin and destination of the trip,
modes used to and from the vehicle they were handed the
NNW
card on, time of trip, purpose c trip, stops on and off,
107
and basic socio-economic data (such as automobile ownership.)
Cards were either handed in or mailed incoded and tabulated
by line. The results gave a picture of the travel pattern108
of existing passengers.
One of the suprising results of these surveys is the
diverse destinations of the transit riders on the bus lines.
Central Business District destinations were often in the
109
minority. Such data might suggest that no clear advantage
would be served in running all vehicles through to the Cent-
ral Business District, as opposed to some other locus of trip
destinations.
The absence of certain destinations, large transfer
volumes, etc. are discussed in Chapter 7.
Home Interview surveys cover trips by all modes, as
opposed to postcard surveys which reveal only existing
transit trips. These surveys are generally coded by zones
and subzones, unfortunately not always drawn so as to ident-
ify the effects of either major activities or transit lines
(the same is often true of the coding of the postcard sur-
veys). The information relevant to the transit analyst is
the proportion of trips made by mode between zone pairs. A
low percentage of trips by transit may often, although not
always, indicate a potential for better service. It is
important in analyzing such data that it be grouped accord-
ing to homogeneous time periods, as discussed earlier (p.7).
Care must also be taken to be fully informed of possible
110
errors in the coding.
Future research is suggested to develop statistical
measures making use of these data sources. Their use as
guidelines for scheduling and route planning is discussed
in chapter 7 and illustrated in chapter 8.
A very important piece of data not inferrable from
either peak load counts, revenue audits or origin and des-
tination surveys is the percentage of new riders observed
on an improved service who are new to the system, as op-
posed to diverted from other lines; and vice-versa, what
percentage of riders lost by reduction in service are lost
to the system altogether, as opposed to diverted to other
lines. One of the weaknesses of the Demonstration experi-
ments in Boston was that the new lines carried a low pro-
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portion of new riders as a percentage of the total riders.
A line which diverts riders from other services is not nec-
essarily undesirable, if compensatory reductions can be made
in the other services and the passengers are better served.
But in order to get a true picture of the net operating con-
tribution of a given change, this information should be ob-
tained.
It is relatively easy to find out the former mode of
travel of new riders, through the use of a postcard on-
board survey. Seeking the whereabouts of lost riders is
harder; home-interviews would be best, although postcard
surveys on the services most likely to have picked up the
diversion might suffice in many cases.
Continuous monitoring of the percentage of new or
lost passengers would not be necessary. In time, a transit
system would be able to develop statistical estimations
based on a sampling of service changes. However, it would
always be advisable to sample a vehicle or two as a check.
Other surveys of interest might examine the extent
to which residents of a given area are aware of the transit
service available to them, and their perception of its serv-
ice characteristics; special movements, as to the theater,
etc. on Friday and Saturday nights, and so on. Sample sur-
veys of this sort in a small area might provide fertile mat-
erial from which to generalize.
Conclusion and Summary
The most important thrust of this chapter has been.
to develop and test hypotheses on the effect of changes in
transit service on demand, as a base for further develop-
ment of the proposed method of Schedule and Route Planning
in later chapters and as a base for future research. After
first reviewing previous research on modal split and the ef-
fect of transit service on demand,.a theoretical framework
for the subject was presented. The following hypotheses
were then developed:
1. Y O.75C + 0.07, where Y = percent increase
in riders passing a given point, and C = percent increase in
practical capacity at that point. For lines serving a high
density of short trips on main arteries.
2. R 1.88 rush, 1.29 non-rush, tested and ac-
cepted at 95% level using one-sided t-tests; where R the
ratio of the number of passengers using through service to
the number counted when a transfer was required.
3. P = a - bH (see table 7 for values of a and
b according to homogeneous time period and type of service),
where P passengers per 1000 population living within
mile of a route and H = actual headway.
4. C (xV~y, an equation borrowed from the liter-
SA
ature and tested on New York data, relating the value of get-
ting a seat (C) to the time saved standing (x), the marginal
value of time (V), the percentage of passengers choosing the
slower train to get a seat (y), the length of the trip in
miles or minutes (S), and the probability of getting a seat
(A).
5. New equipment produces gains of from 7 to 11%
in patronage.
6. Knowledge of scheduled departure times on in-
frequently run routes can increase patronage by 10%.
The variation of demand that must be considered in
evaluating these hypotheses and any other observations on
demand for transit was then illustrated, and a method of
handling the resultant uncertainty of the data briefly dis-
cussed. Finally, other sources of data on demand that will
be used in the development of the proposed method are discus-
sed.
The material developed in this chapter will be
applied in chapters 7 and 8.
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CHAPTER VI
Estimation of Costs
The primary purpose of this chapter is twofold:
to develop cost functions for use in illustrating the
proposed methods of Schedule and Route Planning in later
chapters; and to show that the costs of increments in bus
or rapid transit service are less than the average account-
ed cost. A secondary purpose is to demonstrate, to the
extent that the data allows, that certain costs vary in-
versely with the speed of operation. This will enable
more accurate 'evaluation of proposed changes in schedules
and routes.
At the same time, methods for determining the
exact costs for each category (maintenance, power, etc.)
are used which it is hoped can be applied to constantly
changing cost data.
The costs relevant to the model, that is, those
which would be input into a calculation of NOC (Net
Operating Contribution), are the variable cents-per-
mile costs summarized at the conclusion. They will
be used in chapter eight.
The data will be generalized to derive similar
variable labor and mileage costs for bus service in
Boston for use in chapter 7. Because of the lack of
data on the effects of speed in Boston, the mileage fig-
ure will be standard for all the examples in the next
chapter.
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Unless otherwise noted, all data quoted herein on
accounts and costs in New York comes from the New York
City Transit Authority Operatiiig Budget for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1967.
In the marginal analysis (see chapter 3) of sched-
ules and routes, the proportion of costs which are vari-
able (as opposed to fixed) will depend 1) on the view-
point of the decision maker, and 2) on the extent to
which the given change affects quasi-fixed costs. In
the first case, when the capital investmentsare paid by
the city, they become variable costs only from the com-
munity's viewpoint, but not from the transit system's
viewpoint. In the latter case, a small percentage change
in, for example, mileage, may not affect depreciation
rates even when they are imputed to the operating com-
pany, while a larger change involving perhaps a doubling
of mileage would, even without additional rolling stock,
acc'elerate the depreciation rate.
The specific cost categories that cross these
boundaries will be discussed in the course of this sec-
tion. The important distinction to draw at the outset
is that since the model for marginal decision-making is
being developed from the transit company's viewpoint,
the costs which they must treat as variable will be most
rigorously defined. Costs to the community *(as well as
benefits in later sections) will be evaluated but not
given equal importance in the analysis. The relevance of
each cost category to various kinds of decisions will also
be discussed.
The budgeted and/or real costs of the current fiscal
year in New York will be used as a basis for developing
and understanding the cost structure of urban mass transit
equations. The extensive data on the costs of'the publicly
owned urban transit operations in New York available to
this researcher will provide a basis, a groundwork on which
generalizations can be made that will apply to any given
transit system. Most systems, large and small, publicly
and privately owned, keep their accounts and budgets in a
manner similar to that of New York, and incur roughly the
same types of costs. Where there is a difference, as in
the question of depreciation, the practices and experience
of other systems will be called upon.
Since we are dealing with the specific costs of the
New York transit system, a physical description of the
system and its operations, and a description of its ac-
counting and budgeting methods will first be presented.
The major sub-headings of account classifications will
then be used to organize the evaluation of which costs
are affected by marginal variable (incremental) changes
in schedules and routes. After first showing how to com-
pute allowances and fringe benefits into the wage rates,
the account classifications will be broken down each in
turn to separate those costs which will vary under given
conditions. Finally, the specific cost model for New York
will be generalized.
Physical Description
The publicly owned and operated transit facilities in
New York to which all the cost data in this chapter apply
consist of all rapid transit operations (except for the
Port Authority Trans-Hudson line), that is, all subway, elevated
and open cut operations within the city limits; all Brooklyn
and Staten Island bus operations (except for some school serv-
ice and one line in Brooklyn), bus operations in Queens east
of the subway terminals to the city boundaries (including
one line to'the Bronx), and five bus lines in Manhattan. The
remainder of Manhattan and Bronx surface operations (except
for two small lines on the lower east side run privately)
are operated by a subsidiary called the Manhattan and Bronx
Surface Transit Operating Authority. Created as a result of
a strike against the then privately-owned company which oper-
ated these bus lines in 1962, ownership terms are still not
settr-ed in the courts, and cost information is kept separate-
ly and not as easily available, although the chief operating
officers and executive control for the publicly owned New York
City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the latter group (MaBSTOA)
are the same. The bus lines in western Queens are run by sev-
eral private companies.
The magnitude of the New York operation is in a class
all by itself. Annual operating expenses alone, including
the police department of close to 3,000 men assigned exclus-
ively to the transit system (mostly the subways), now exceed
$400,000,000. Capital expenses are paid by the city and,
while variously estimated, well exceed $100,000,000 a year,
chiefly for new cars and buses and modernization of the out-
dated physical plant which on the oldest lines dates back
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some sixty years. Thus the annual cost of the NYCTA opera-
tion exceeds half a billion dollars, to which will be added
in the near future the infusion of state and federal funds
for expansion of rapid transit services through the newly
created Metropolitan Transit Authority.
In comparison, the next largest American system, in
Chicago, which controls all, not some, of the city's bus
3
operations, spends about $150,000,000 a year for operating
and equipment replacement expenses. Similar data for London
Transport, again with a monopoly on bus operations, are about
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$240,000,000. Additional comparative statistics are listed
in table 1.
Table 1
Comparative Statistics for New York,
Chicago and London
New York Chicago3 London
4
Subway cars owned 7,106 1,160 4,124
Track Miles 719.85 210.51 630
Route Miles 236.70 - - - 215
Car Miles per annum 316,000,000 44,349,196 203,094,000
Buses owned 2, 345 3, 333 8,219
Route miles 554.47 952 5,004
Bus miles per annum 67,326,000 111,067,942 298,485,000
To operate the rapid transit network, New York
employs 3,253 motormen, 2,739 conductors, 592 towermen,
1,075 car inspectors, 1,938 car maintainers, 628 car clean-
ers, 2,721 policemen, 4,209 change clerks, collecting agents
and station supervisors, and 1,167 station porters. It buys
over two billion killowatt hours of electricity each year.
To operate the buses, 5,082 drivers, 511 dispatchers, 1,072
mechanics are required. Numerous supervisory and administ-
rative personnel knit together the functions of these various
employees, while other personnel attend to other functions
5
such as maintaining the right of way.
The rapid transit lines are organized in three div-
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isions called the IRT, BMT, and IND. Originally, the Inter-
borough Rapid Transit and Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit lines
were privately owned, while the more recently built (1930's)
Independent lines were city owned. In June 1940, the city7
bought the BMT and IRT in receivership for $317,000,000
and subsequently absorbed several private street car, bus
and trolley bus systems in the city. The only two portions
of original elevated lines left are considered part of the
subway system for most purposes (these are the Third Avenue
Elevated in the Bronx, which used to run the length of Man-
hattan, and the Myrtle Avenue elevated in Brooklyn, which
used to run over the Brooklyn Bridge to lower Manhattan.)
However, many so-called subway lines in the outer parts of
the city are actually elevated structures.
Car equipment maintenance crosses division boundaries.
A series of inspection shops for scheduled inspections and
routine repairs are located at Pitkin Avenue, Bedford Park,
and Jamaica on the IND, 240th Street-White Plains, 239th
Street-Broadway, Pelham Bay, East 180th Street, and Jerome
Avenue on the IRT, Coney Island and East New York (Brooklyn)
8
on the BMT, and Corona on the Flushing line. (See foldout
map in back of thesis).
Major repairs and overhauls are done at two base
shops: Coney Island (same location as the inspection shop)
for the BMT (and Flushing line), and 207th Street for the
9
IND and IRT. Recently, the new IND-BMT cars, intended for
operation through Chrystie Street but now operating on the
Queens IND line, have been assigned to Coney Island base
and inspection shops; and due to an overload at Jamaica
and 207th Street stemming from the increase in age, break-
down and inspections of IND equipment, some older IND cars
are now receiving overhauls at Coney Island.
Buses are maintained, and garaged at six garages in
Brooklyn, two in Queens, one in Staten Island and one in
Manhattan. In addition, a base shop at East New York in
Brooklyn handles major repairs and overhauls on buses from
10
all four boroughs.
Accounts and Budgets
The New York City Transit Authority keeps track of
its costs in two main formats. One is their system of ac-
counts, which is reduced to a monthly published summary
called "Transit Record." The other is their annual oper-
ating budget, which is a detailed itemization of the expected
costs by employee titles and by departments for their fiscal
year, which runs from July 1 to June 30.
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"Transit Record" normally lists breakdowns of
operating revenues, operating expenses and operating
statistics (see App. exhibit 1) for the whole system,
for the rapid transit and bus components and for the
bus divisions by each borough. Data is given for the
current month and the expired portion of the fiscal
year. Twice a year, a six or twelve month listing
of revenue passengers recorded entering each station
and using each bus line for the current and previous
11
fiscal year is given.
The "Cents per Revenue Car (Bus) Mile" figures are
"fully allocated expenses" for each account line divided
by the total mileage. This means that the number includes
fixed and variable costs incurred by the Authority, and is
12
not used as a basis for decision making, but rather as a
measure of performance and a basis for cCmparison with other
systems.
The sub-headings under "Operating Revenues" in the
following exhibit are self-explanatory. The next group
of sub-headings, under "Operating Expenses and Rentals" com-
prises the following:
Maintenance of Way and Structures. This is primarily
a rapid transit expense, and includes replacement of rails,
ties and ballast, roadway and track inspection, repair and
inspection of signal and interlocking equipment, repairs of
tunnels and structures, third rail, power distribution sys-
tems and substations, and repairs (not cleaning) of station
and mezzanine structures. In surface operations, the only
expense in this category is repairs to shop and garage struc-
tures.
2-4~
Maintenance of equipment. This includes repairs to
all rolling stock, revenue or non-revenue (work, garbage
collections, revenue collection, etc.) equipment, repairs
of shop machinery (as opposed to structure), shop expenses
other than structural maintenance (light, power, cleaning),
repairs to substation equipment (again, as opposed to struc-
ture), and all inspection and servicing costs, labor and
material, for all cars and buses.
Power. Only the cost of purchased power (both for
operation of cars and for lighting and heating structures
and stations) plus the labor to man and operate substations
(plus superintendence, a categoy present in each sub-head)
is subsumed here. Maintenance of structures and equipment
is allocated to those accounts, rather than power.
Fuel and Lubricants for Buses is a materials account
only. The costs of administering the fuels and lubricants
are allocated to maintenance of equipment.
Operation of Cars and Buses. Here is accounted the
costs of all motormen (road and yard), conductors, bus
drivers, station employees (clerks, porters, watchmen,
platform conductors), police, car cleaners, towermen and
associated material and supervisory expenses. Note that
cleaning of cars and stations is considered operations ex-
pense, while cleaning of buses is considered maintenance
expense.
Injuries and Damages. This includes amounts paid
for workmen's compensation and public liability, and the
costs of supporting these functions, including the law and
medical departments.
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General and Miscellaneous. The bulk of the expenses
in this sub-heading go towards "fringe" benefits including
pension contributions, health plans, social security, and
for office clerical work in various departments. The
amount listed in Transit Record, however, includes a large
credit (about $31,000,000 for the year ending June 30, 1966)
for payment by the city of police costs.
These sub-headings are detailed more specifically in
the non-published "Financial and Statistical Report." As
an example, the maintenance of way and structures listing
from the latter is presented in Exhibit 2, Appendix. Note
that to reach the total maintenance of way cost figure for
rapid transit listed in Transit Record, the Power struct-
ure maintenance costs must be added.
The annual operating budget is divided into two
sections. The first, called "personal service", lists the
number of employees, basic wage rates, annual budgeted wages
and allowances for each civil service or exempt title, by
department. The second, labeled "projects," shows the labor
and material expenses for various arbitrary functions or pro-
jects within each department. The employees listed in the
personal service section are allocated to the various pro-
jects but without cross-references. To determine how many
of each title are included in any given project, it is nec-
essary to refer to supplementary quota sheets known
as "Allocation of Employees by Section."
To illustrate the relationship between these three
sources, the personal service, project and allocation lists
for the Station Department are shown in Exhibits 3, 4, and
5 in the Appendix.
There are 34 budget numbers, most of which refer
to specific departments. Ninety-six percent of the ex-
penses are budgeted to nine numbers (see table 2).
Table 2: Major Budget Lines, 1967
Rapid Transit Transp. 7,846 employees.
Non-Departmental Exp.(SocSec,Pension,Ins.
Health Plans)
Maintenance of Way 6,153
Surface Transp. (Bus) 5,661
Car Maintenance 4,097
Power 1,072
Station 5,615
Police 2,796
Surface Maintenance 1,530
$62,124,200
56,795,600
54,164,000
49,269,000
40,504,000
38,925,000
37,357,000
34,014,850
17,500,000
These nine divisions account for $390,653,650 of
the $405,317,990 budgeted for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1967. They account for 34,770 of the 36,657
employees. The remaining departments include five with
budgets of from $941,475 to $2,919,800. These are Revenue
(audits and compiled statistics on turnstile registrations
and fare box collections), Purchase and Stores (dispenses
materials to all departments), Accounting, Law, and Special
Inspection (a sort of spy detail assigned to report infrac-
tions, misbehavior and errant workers.)
The remaining departments, with budgets ranging
from $55,000 to $799,960, are: Executive (Commissioner's
offices), Budget, Labor Relations, Public Information &
No.21
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24
34
25
26
31
27
35
Community Relations, Secretaryt s, Medical, Personnel, Pay-
roll, Data Processing, Bureau of Reporting and 5enographic
Services, Concessions, Office of Superintendent-Employee
ServicesSafety Bureau, Office of Controller, Office of
General Manager, Lost Property, Office of General Super-
intendent-Surface, Enginnering, Employees Assigned to
City Departments, and South Brooklyn.Railway Company. The
last is a small freight railroad running between Coney
Island and 36th Street Yards in Brooklyn, at street level
along MacDonald Avenue, with accounted expenses of $259,655
dollars in fiscal 1966, and budgeted expenses of 55,000 in
fiscal 1967.
With each annual budget, a small booklet called
"Budget Data & Transit Facts" is also prepared. It in-
cludes some supplementary data such as annual wage equiva-
lents to hourly rates, salary ranges by years of service,
revenues and expenses over a number of years, etc.
Units of Measurement
There are a number of ways to evaluate the costs
of a transit service. Each has its use, depending on the
purpose of the evaluation. For example, the amount expend-
ed per passenger, or revenue collected per mile, are useful
comparative measures from one line or division to another
to indicate the relative efficiency of the lines.
Since the purpose of this cost analysis is to
determine the cost of increments of service deriving from
changes in schedules and routes, the unit which measures
the changes in service should be the one by which changes
in cost are measured. For computing the labor costs of
"conducting transportation," that is, for motormen, conduct-
ors, bus drivers, dispatchers, platform and yard help, etc.,
the schedule requirements in man-hours or simply men are the
appropriate unit.
For all other variable costs, the changes in car
mileage are both the measure of the service change (for
the company) and the basis for cost evaluation. If a cost
does not change with the mileage operated, but in some
other way, then it will not change with changes in sched-
ules and routes, unless they require changes in capital in-
vestment. These assertions are documented in the following
pages.
Calculation of Real Wage
The real wage paid to a given employee is not merely
his hourly mte on an annual basis. There are two kinds of
additional payments which must be computed to find out how
much one employee more or less will cost. The first is that
class of payment known as "Fringe Benefits." These are in-
cluded under Miscellaneous expenses in the general accounts,
and under Non-Departmental expenses in the budget. This
makes it much more difficult to tell how much the manpower
for any given function costs. It is necessary to transfer
the allocation of these payments to individual wages for
our model.
The basic classes of benefits are pensions (New York
City Retirement Plan), health and hospital insurance, and
social security. These are all based on the payroll wage,
which includes the base wage rate plus allowances for such
items as holidays, overtime, sick leave, etc. (see below).
Workmen's compensation is computed on the basis of past
expenses,having no relation to the wage structure. It will
be left to general and miscellaneous expenses.
Pension payments by the NYCTA are 9% of the payroll,
and will be assumed to be the same percentage for any bloc
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of employees. Health and hospital insurance is $19.05 per
month per employee cost to the NYCTA (slightly higher for
Queens and Staten Island bus divisions). Social security.
paid by the employer is 4.4% up to $6600 (flat rate of
$290.40 above that) annual wage. Although 7% of the NYCTA
employees are not members of social security, it will be
assummed that these are nearly all in annual rated titles
or other positions not subject to variation in quota with
changes in schedules or routes. Workmen's compensation
is computed on the basis of past expenses, and will be
discussed under the Insurance and Damages category.
Thus for an employee with an annual wage of $6599
or less, the real wage is wi + wil3.4% -t- $228.60;
For employees with annual wages of $6600 or more,
the real wage is 1.09wi + $519.
Note that the annual wage wi which is expanded by
the above formulae is not usually the simple wage rate, but
must include the non-uniform allowances (as opposed to bene-
fits) such as holiday allowances, overtime and night differ-
ential pay which can be computed from the annual budgeted
expenditures for these allowances per title.
For example, the average hourly rate budgeted for
the NYCTA's 2,350 road motormen in regular service during
the current fiscal year is $3,673 (the variation on a
given line will be determined by seniority privilege in
the semi-annual pick, and can be assur ed to distribute
as an average over any given schedule or route change).
To the annual budget allowance for these employees is
added $2,434,000 or 13-% of the base wage for allowances.
This increases the base annual wage from $7,670 to $8,705.
Then, 1.09(8,705) + 519 $10,019 real annual wage per
motorman.
Percentage rates for allowances vary among titles,
as some are subject to overtime while others are not, etc.
For example, a car inspector (see maintenance of equipment)
who works five days a week butnot holidays will receive no
holiday and little night differential allowance. In com-
puting costs for marginal service changes, night differ-
ential allowances need not usually be averaged in, since
the time of day to which the change applies is known.
In summary, if the % rate on the base wage for allow-
ances is denoted by P in decimals, then the real wage wi can
be computed from the base wage ri in New York for the bulk
of employees (whose base wage is $6600 per year or mre) as:
wi [(1 + P)rj 1.09 + 519. This is how much it actually
costs the operating company to hire one- more employee at
base wage ri.
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Operation of Cars and Buses
This category refers to the expense of "conducting
transportation," and refers to the cost of motormen, con-
ductors and bus drivers. Other operating expenses such
as station booth clerks are relatively fixed, varying
only if a station or entrance is closed at certain hours;
expenses for maintenance, power, etc. are under separate
categories.
Vehicle operation is the single most important class
of cost which varies with nearly every kind of schedule or
route change. The only possible exception would be the
elongar'tion or shortening of train length, which would
affect mileage but require the same number of road crews.
However, even this entails a change in cost, because man-
power must be supplied at the terminals to shuttle butts
(odd cars) to and from storage tracks or yards, and to as-
sist in coupling and uncoupling the cars.
Most of the costs listed in this category in the New
York City Transit Authority's (NYCTA) accounts do not vary
with changes in service. Railroad change clerks, station
employees (platform men, porters and watchmen), station
supplies, signal system operating expense, and other les-
ser costs remain exactly the same as long as at least some
service is provided on a given line. It should be clearly
understood that in the case of rapid transit services (for
which most of these normally fixed categories apply), no
service for part or all of the day Is an alternative, and
that this does involve changes in some of these costs. The
no service alternative will be treated separately. (See page24))
Towermen and dispatchers may be required or not if
changes in service and routing require or omit the use of
given interlocking facilities to switch trains from one
track to another. The proportional change in cost will
be small, however, in comparison with the change in the
cost of operating crews.
Supervision is in the nature of a quasi-fixed
cost. For substantial changes in service, more or less
personnel may be required at terminals and in the main
office. The ratio, however, of most quasi-fixed costs
to any measure of service both within a given system,
and amongst cities, varies so widely - as will be shown
shortly - that for all practical purposes, most marginal
changes to be considered by an operating company will not
affect the supervisory costs; unless there is a specific
ratio of supervision to employees criteria adhered to.
The policing function is normally not related so
much to schedules and routes as it is to traffic, time
of day and geographic area. However, in New York, where
a policeman is now assigned to every train and every sta-
tion for eight hours of the day, the cost of policing the
system will at least for those eight hours vary in the
same way as the cost of crews for the trains. Because it
is thus both significant and obvious, it will play an im-
portant role in decision making from the trmasit manage-
ment's viewpoint even though the cost is paid by the city.
Motormen, Conductors and Bus Drivers remain as the
primary variable costs. The variation of all these costs
is best measured by computing the personnel requirements
from schedules and service requirements (see Chapter 2)
rather than by a per-mile or per passenger ratio. For the
same reasons, however, that makes this true, a performance
measure of operating cost .per mile or per passenger will
say something about the efficiency of the service. These
reasons are:
1. The faster a train or bus moves, the more
mileage it will traverse in the same time period. Since
the crew or driver is paid by time, the same rate of pay
will cover that much more mileage. If a bus covers a six
mile run in half an hour, the driver-cost-per-mile will be
one-half that of a bus covering six miles in an hour. The
number of drivers required by the schedule, not the mile-
age, will yield a uniformly applicable function. At the
same time, the driver-cost-per-mile will be lower the fast-
er the service, making it advantageous to trim any excess
fat off running times. (Since the total costs will be low-
er, see chapter 7 p.2qi/).
There are, in fact, under given working conditions,
certain "optimum (from the company's viewpoint) running times
which show less cost per car or bus mile than other running
times because they involve the maximum coverage in mileage
by a crew or driver within the given conditions. For a sub-
way line with road motormen not perFormning yard work, marginal
cost per mile becomes least as running time approaches 34, 42
14
58 and 87 minutes; for a bus line, 36, 46, 65 & 93 minutes.
2. A service which tolerates a high percentage of
standees will show a much lower operating cost per passenger
than one which provides abundant seats. Here again the
cost is determined not by the number of passengers but
by the service requirements of the schedule. A low cost
per passenger may indicate an efficient service or it may
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indicate poor quality (high non-monetary price) service.
3. For a given running time, as the time spent in
the terminal decreases, the more mileage is covered in the
same total crew time and the cost per mile goes down. If
changes in terminal time do not enable changes in mileage
because of the creation of non-optimal running times, how-
ever, than they will not affect the marginal cost per car
or bus mile.
4. The number of yard employees required per car
being transferred from terminalOyard or from yard to ter-
minal will vary from one terminal to another, depending
on how long the distance between terminal and yard, how
many cars the platform can accommodate at one time., etc.
This variation will affect the marginal cost per car mile,
In addition, working rules differ on the three divisions
in New York, so that in some cases road crews are avail-
able for transferring cars, at no extra cost per car-mile,
while in other cases separate yard crews must be added to
do so.
5. The longer a train (in New York they vary from
2 to 11 cars) the more mileage it will accumulate on a car-
mileage basis, although the crew size will be exactly the
same. Thus longer trains will normally show less cost per
mile for operation.
It is clear from the above that accurate and fast
determination of the actual changes in operating manpower
requirements of a given schedule or route change is essen-
tial to proper evaluation of all alternatives. Presently
it takes about a day for an experienced schedule maker to
obtain just a rough idea of the requirements of a given
work schedule for one bus or subway line. The applica-
tion of electronic data processing methods would be most
helpful, but for reasons discussed in the chapter on exist-
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ing methods, attempts thus far to develop a suitable com-
puter program have not been adequate to meet the task; nor
will it be attempted in this thesis. Similarly, the rule
of thumb methods for estimating requirements described in
the above referred chapter are rejected. Given, however,
accurate proscription of the crew requirements for each
proposed schedule or route change, the following function
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should be applied to ascertain the operating cost:
Let M, C, D equal the number of motormen, conduct-
ors or drivers required, and wi their respective wage rates-
per year (calculated in the manner shown above); then Mwm
equals the annual cost of motormen, etc.
Maintenance of Equipment
The costs in this accounting category are of three
types: those associated with the existence of shops and re-
pairs and inspection facilities, including most shop super-
vision; those based on time ; and those based on mileage.
Only the last will vary with changes in schedules and routes
(unless additional vehicles and therefore more shop or garage
woo
space and time-based work are involved).. It might be
assumed at first glance that, since the latter is based
on mileage, cost allocation should be easily accomplished.
Unfortunately, this is not so.
The employees in the rapid transit shops and bus
garages who are responsible for inspecting and repairing
equipment are involved in both mileage-based inspections,
time-based overhauls, and repair of defective equipment
brought in off the road. Overhauls and major repairs
are performed at base shops only, but this activity is
also both time and mileage based.
This much can be ascertained: all the inspectors
and maintainers in the regular garages and shops are en-
gaged in mileage related work. They inspect rolling stock
at pre-determined mileage intervals.(generally 7500 miles
for rapid transit),1 9 and handle an additional quota of cars
or buses in any given time period brought in off the road for
defective performance. The proportion of the number of cars
thus brought into the shops that appear for regular in-
spections can be divided by the actual mileage between
inspections (usually somewhat higher than scheduled mile-
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age between inspections) to obtain the inspection cost
component. This assumes that all three types of inspec-
tions and all calls for servicing defective equipment oc-
cupy the same man-hours and materials per car, which is
obviously not true. However, a more accurate picture is
not possible on the basis of the records currently kept
and information available.
The remaining costs for labor and materials in
the local shops and garages would thus be imputed to repairs
off the road, and might be assumed to be the cause of vari-
ation in costs from one shop to another, once differences
in the size of the shop, the number of cars or buses as-
signed and the age and mileage on the cars or buses are
all accounted for. Theoretically, this variation in the
remainder would be assumed to be due to the average speed
oF the cars or buses assigned to the' shop, by this reason-
ning: A higher average speed means less stops per mile
arid/or less time per stop (thus often implying lighter
passenger loading). This means that brakes and door
mechanisms, as well as wear on the engines caused by
accelerations and dynamic braking'and by heavier passen-
ger loads are all less frequent as the speed increases.
Sirice these comprise the major repair calls on and off
the road handled by the local shops, the incidence per
mileage or the severity (i.e. cost per repair) per mile
should be less.
Such assumptions are partially supported by table
3.
In table 3 the IRT division, which has four in-
spection and light maintenance shops, 'is taken route by
route to compute the average stops per mile for each shop.
In other words, on the 242nd Street to South Ferry route,
which schedules 13,407,000 car miles per year, there are
38 stops in the 14.73 one-way route miles, or 2.58 stops
per-mile. Note that the annual scheduled mileage must be
supplemented by "idle" mileage (trains being transferred
between yards and from yards to stations for repair work
or service requirements) and "extra" mileage (for summer
and cold weather extra service schedules, baseball or
Christmas shopping specials, etc.) in order to compute
the total cost per car mile.
The budgeted inspection and repair costs were com-
puted using the real wage formulas and including all mat-
erial costs except those attributable to shop upkeep and
time-based projects such as painting. Labor and material
costs for such procedures as car cleaning, which takes
place periodically when the car is in storage, without
regard to its mileage, are omitted. On systems where car
cleaning was performed on a mileage basis, this cost would
have to be included.
Also omitted are non-shop expenses such as administ-
ration, record-keeping, and road car inspection. The last
refers to emergency inspection and repairs of cars in rev-
enue service which are delaying or endangering the opera-
tion. A strategically placed force of mechanics is deployed
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Table 3
Frequency and Cost of Repairs by Shop, New York
Scheduled
No. Cars
Inspected
and
Repaired
3/1/66-
2/28/67
Budgeted
Inspection
& Repair
Cost
($000)
7/1/66-
6/30/67
Cost
per
Car
Handled
($)
Gost
per
Car
Mile (A)
(M -
Average
Miles per
Inspection
Two Weeks
2/15 -
2/28/67
28,921 4,900
22,662 3,672
60,795 10,438
15,244 2,200
1, 070
782
2,074
493
$ 214
213
3 .56
3.31
198.50 3.28
224 3.25
Concourse
& Pitkin
Jamaica
Coney Isl.
E. New
York
N.A. - N.A.
N.A. N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
21,339
21,776
7,536
3,952
2,004
1,423
1,219
941
94.20 2.95
65.40
(C)
162
238
3.36
2.41
New 9350
Old 1900
2150 (C)
8300
5.20(D) New 7900 D)Old 2850
(A) Includes non-revenue mileage (transfer for repairs and storage) and non-
scheduled service mileage (beach and snowstorm service).
(B) Includes 180th Street and Jerome in spection shops.
(C) Older equipment getting four times as many inspections as newer
equipment in other shops, with no apparent effect on expenses.
(D) Here, however, older equipment (forms bulk of fleet at this shop)
does affect costs.
Avg.
Stops
per
Mile
Annual
Revenue
Mileage
(000)
7/1/66-
6/30/67Shop
240th St.
Pelham
239th St.
(B)
Corona
2.25
2.38
1.65
2.00
8200
7900
9750
7950
at signal towers throughout the system for this purpose,
with another group patrolling the city in automobiles.
These men are positioned according to the passenger and
train congestion, and frequency of breakdowns affecting
service. They are fully utilized only during the rush
hours. The amount of slack at other times, and the low-
er density of trains and passengers, would make any con-
sideration of the variation of road car inspectors with
mileage academic.
The apparent differences in cost per car mile in
table tdce may be due as much as the size of the shop
(measured in number of cars handled per year) and the
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age and peculiarities of the equipment as to speed. For
example, the oldest equipment on the IRT in revenue serv-
ice, outside of the handful of Third Avenue el cars housed
at 239th Street yard, are the R-12, 14,.and 15 cars in use
on the Broadway line and assigned to 240th Street yard.
Put in service in 1946 and 1947, these 350 cars comprise
more than half the cars at 240th shop - which has the
highest cost per car mile for routine maintenance, even
though it does not have the highest number of stops per
mile.
Repairs may also be a function of exposure to
vibration and contamination with steel dust as mileage
is accumulated, or related to passenger loading. In any
event, the data do not allow statistical determination
of the way in which inspection and light maintenance costs
vary according to the speed on the route, although better
now
information might. The previously computed costs per
car mile of equipment maintenance are not the full
costs: to these must be added the additional costs of
major repairs referred from the local shops to the base
shops. The base shops perform all major overhaul work
which is time based in some cases (painting or seat re-
placement, for instance) and mileage.based (although not
always scheduled by mileage) in others. They also per-
form repairs referred from inspections and road failures.
The work force at the base shops is flexible, be-
ing used for overhaul and project work when road failures.
and inspection referrals are light, and concentrated on
repairs when necessary, always giving first priority to
providing sufficient cars for scheduled service. In 1966,
due to various causes, maximum effort was being focused on
repairs with some overhauls being slowed down.
While it is safe to assume, after deducting labor
and material applicable to supervision, shop upkeep, paint-
ing, etc., that the remaining costs are due at least in
part to time-based projects, there is no way of ascertain-
ing what part are. Who is to say, for instance, whether
replacing the air-brake piping in 40 cars is the result
of millions of miles or 30 years of service; or what pro-
portion of a car maintainer's time is spent doing this.
Thus any split will be arbitrary. The data for the two
base shops are: 207th Street: Labor (computed as pre-
viously described from quota sheets) $10,913,000; Materials
4,329,000; Mileage 230,000,000; Coney Island: Labor 4,449,000;
$4,449,000; Materials 1,234,000; Mileage 86,000,000.
Costs per car mile are 6.631 and 6.61t respectively.
Arbitrarily defining the mileage-variable part of this cost
as 5t/mile, and adding to it the previously computed (Table
3) inspection and light maintenance costs gives a combined
cost per shop varying from 7.41. to 10.20( per car mile.
Bus Maintenance Costs
These costs are no more suggestive of the effect of
average speed on maintenance cost than are the data on
rapid transit costs. Transit Record lists the costs by
borough, as shown in Table 4 for the fiscal year 1965-66.
Borough
Manhattan
Brooklyn
Queens
Staten Isla
TABLE 4
Bus Maintenance Costs per Mild Relative
to Speed of Operation
Avg. Miles Avg. Mainten. Sche
per Hour Cost per Mile Mile
5.86 23.64t± 4,
7.18 27.45 39,
8.42 21.83 14,
nd 10.44 21.64 8,V
duled Total
age,1966-67
321,000
872,000
673,000
503,000
The costs in Table 4 include base shop and administra-
tive costs allocated by mileage. If the budgeted garage
expenses only (excluding base shop and administrative
expenses) are divided by the mileage, the descending order
according to average speed reads smoothly at 21.4, 16.7,
16.8, and 15.4 cents per mile--although there is still little
difference between the latter three. (Average speed in
miles per hour includes terminal time, being the total
revenue miles divided by the total revenue hours; running
speed is thus somewhat higher.)
The exact lower cost per mile of maintenance using
the same procedure developed earlier for rapid transit main-
tenance costs shows even less conclusive results (see Table
5). The procedure as before was to first compute the labor
cost, including allowances and benefits, of employees
engaged in inspection and repair based on or related to
mileage; then add materials costs. Exhibit 6 in the Appendix
lists the calculations for the Manhattan bus garage.
In addition to labor costs and material costs (which
exclude tire rental at le per mile, and diesel fuel oil,
discussed under Power and Fuel), Table 5 shows the average
speed for each depot. This was calculated by first deter-
mining the average speed per line, using maximum running
time (usually scheduled for 12 to 16 hours of the day) and
route mileage data; then multiplying each line's speed by
its mileage; then dividing the totals for each depot.
These are the costs that will actually vary with
Table 5
Variable Mileage Cost Per Depot
Average
Scheduled
Running
Depot Speed
Manhattan
Brooklyn
Fifth Ave.
East N Y
Crosstown
Fresh Pond
Flatbush
Ulmer Park
Queens
Jamaica
Flushing
Staten Island
7.20 mph
8.48
8.62
8.74
8.76
9.46
10.10
10.35
11.45
14.45
No. 1966-67
Of Scheduled Labor
Bus Mileage Cost
Lines (000) ($000)
5 4.320.7 495.7
6991.3
7378.3
3701.9
6579.9
8136.4
7084.5
7400.8
7271.8
8603.4
625.3
615.3
336.4
585.8
645.8
576.5
655.3
625.3
652.8
Material Total
Cost
($000)
Cost
($000)
69.3 565
128.4
82.5
50.4
115.4
106.5
120.7
92.6
125.2
182.4
753.7
697.8
386.8
701.2
752.3
697.2
747.9
750.5
835.2
Cost in
Cents
per Mile
13.05
10.80
9.46
10.45
10.65
9.37
9.84
10.10
11.35
9.70
changes in mileage due to changes in routes or schedules.
As Tables 4 and 5 show, there is only a slight correlation
with speed. The reason for the persisting lack of clear
difference according to speed outside of Manhattan lies in
two areas. First, the age of the equipment assigned to each
depot tends to distort the extremes of the data: The bulk
of the Staten Island fleet operating at the highest speeds
is comprised of the next most ancient equipment in the
system (1956), while 90% of the mileage in Manhattan at slow
speeds is accomplished by relatively new equipment (1963).22
The effect that equipment age can have is shown in
Table 6, which lists costs fully allocated as computed by
the Authority for maintaining each type of bus for two
months (July and November) of 1966. Note that emphasis
apparently shifted from attending to older equipment to
attending to newer equipment in this period. . .
TABLE 6
Maintenance Costs
Type Bus
GMC5101
MackC-49
GMC5106
GMC5106
GMC5301
GMC5301
GMC5301-
GMC5301
GMC5303
Flexible
Flexible
No. Owned
Nov.1966
172
318
209
121
190
305
130
175
350
165
190
by Type of Bus
Year in
Service
1948
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Assign*
2/3B 1/3Q
1/4B 3/4SI
SB kQ
all B
2/3B 1/3Q
B(a few M)
all B
all Q
%Bl/3M,
rem. in
Q&SI
all B
%B Q
Type -Bus
GMC5101
MackC-49
GMC5106
GMC5106
GMC5301
GMC5301
GMC5301
GMC5301
GMC5303
Flexible
Flexible
Nov.1966
Miles /Bus /Mo.
765
2690
1460
2220
2400
2090
2560
2790
2810
3030
3150
Maintenance
July 1966
Cost/Mi. ()
Nov. 1966
87.02q
18.89
19.01
13.88
15.73
19.40
9.68
9.68
8.61
5.87
3.73
14.88e
16.38
15.78
13.64
16.76
17.63
13.89
13.79
9036
7.45
5.74
*The Assign column refers to the assignment of the buses
to the various boroughs, shown as fractions of the mileage
run by each type in two or more boroughs. Brooklyn a B,
Queens - Q, Manhattan : M, Staten Island = SI.
r m1. A
Since the newer equipment is used more intensively,
the chances are that any additions to mileage, particularly
in peak hours, will be operated by older equipment at a
somewhat higher cost; although how this would affect the
computed costs on the previous page is difficult to say,
since most depots contain a mixture of vehicle ages.
The costs per mile listed above are for the most part
higher than those on the previous page because they include
the Base shop costs. This shop, located in East New York,
does all major repair work for all four boroughs, and incurs
computed real variable costs of $4,310,800 per year (1967),
or 6.4e/bus mile. Thus for Manhattan, the total variable
cost of maintenance per bus mile would be 13.05 4 6.4 -
19.45 .
Unfortunately, the Base shop does not do an equal
proportion of major repair work for all boroughs. Staten
Island in particular, being somewhat removed from the Base
shop, and only recently becoming accessible by other than
ferry, shows a proportionately larger budget for engine,
transmission, etc. parts than would be expected from looking
at budgets for other depots.
This is the second reason for the muting of the
reduction of maintenance costs with increase in speed in the
data. The flexibility necessary for efficient operation both
in assigning maintenance tasks and in assigning types of
busses to the various depots makes determination of the
cost of an added or subtracted mile on the basis of the
data presented here at best only an approximation, at worst
an educated guess. As in the case of rapid transit car
maintenance, the overlaps which cloud the distinctions
necessary could only be cut through by a detailed analysis
of the maintenance experience by speed for each vehicle
type. This would certainly be 'feasible, but would require
some additional accounting classifications.
For purposes of the model, then, the computed costs
per mile by depot, plus the computed base shop cost per
mile would be considered the variable maintenance expenses.
Power and Fuel
Power is presently supplied to the NYCTA under several
different contracts by Con Edison. Most of the power used
to run the trains is delivered either to a NYCTA power plant,
which funnels it to various substations, or to the substa-
tions directly. For these services, Con Ed bills the
Authority monthly, at a "composite" rate of 1.37e/kwwhr.
for substation delivery, and 1.290/kw-hr. for plant delivery
(rates for the Rockaway line, split between Con Edison and
Long Island Lighting, are somewhat higher). The total cost
of this delivered power is budgeted at $26,670,000 for the
current fiscal year, about two-thirds of the power department
budget (most of the rest is consumed in maintaining and
operating the substations and cables).
The "composite" rate is made up of three components,
which Con Ed lists separately in their contracts and on their
bills. These are the "demand" portion, the "energy" portion
and the "fuel correction" portion of the "composite" rate.
The "demand" charge is based on the peak usage of power in
the peak half hour each month, and comes to one-third to
one-fourth of the total cost, depending on the contract.
Since the system is operating at practical capacity during
the peak half hour, no marginal change in schedules or routes
will affect this part of the rate, unless-it involves a
reduction in service at that time, hardly a likely possi-
bility in New York.
Table 7 gives the demand and energy rates for plant
and substation delivery:23
TABLE 7
Electric Power Rates, New York Subways
Plant Delivery Contract (IRT & BMT Div.)
Charge Rate Monthly P
$1.1875 per kw.
Energy
Fuel Correction
0.855(, per kw-hr.
0.097( per kw-hr.
eak & Annual
Consumption Bases
296,000 kw/4hr. in
July to
325,000 kw/ hr. in
Jan.
1,275,886,000 kw-hrs./
yr.
The range in peak consumption is due to the use of
heaters in the winter and the somewhat reduced passenger
volume in the summer months.24
Substation Delivery
Demand
Energy
Contract (IND Div. & Rockaway Line to
Broad Channel)
$26,205 for the 174,000 to 197,000
1st 20,000 kw. kw/%hr.
$1.25 per add'l. kw.
$2,834.60 for the 705,141,000 kw-hrs./
1st 250,000 kw-hrs. yr.
0.90c0 per add'l. kw-hr.
The volume of power consumption is of such magnitude
that no attention need be paid to the graduated rates for the
first 20,000 kw. or 250,000 kw-hrs. in computing the cost of
marginal changes in power consumption.
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Demand
A'
The cost (energy portion) of an added or removed car
mile can be computed on an average basis by simply dividing
the annual kw-hrs. by the annual car miles. In both con-
tracts this comes to 6.3 kw-hrs. per car mile, or 5.4c and
5.7 z per car mile respectively. However, this says nothing
about how the cost varies with speed and loading. The
average cost will vary with the weight of the car and of its
passenger load, the distance between stations, the type of
rolling stock and the weather (heaters and fans). The
information necessary to make these computations for New
York's rapid transit lines is given in Exhibits 7 and 8,
Appendix.
For example, let us assume the following timings as
representative and, using the data in Exhibits 7 and 8,
compute the power consumption: . .
TABLE 8
Power Consumption, Grand Central
to Brooklyn Bridge Stations, IRT
Time"
Local:
GC to 33
33 to 28
28 to 23
23 to 14
14 to Ast
Ast to Bleek
Blk to Sprng
Spg to Canal
Can to BkBdg
Lights, etc.
Total 29,571
Express:
GC to 14
14 to BkBdg
Lights, etc.
Total- 16.350
Kw-Hrs.
(incl.stop) . Accel.
14 min.
1
1
14
1 '
1
1
1
_1
11F
3.384
2.696
2.696
3.384
3*384
3.384
2,696
2*696
3.384
27.704
Kw-Hrs.
Motion
Assume seated
load, 15 seconds
.5 coast & brake,
15 seconds sta-
tion stop, no
grades
1.5
1.5
11/60 x 2.0 kw/hr. - .367 kw-hrs.
kw-hrs. x .855. a 25.28/3.14 miles
3
4
74
3.384
3.384
6.768
- 8.05e/mi.
4.166
5.166
9.332
7/60 x 2.0 kw/hr. = .250 kw-hrs.
kw-hrs. x .855 - 13.98/3.14 miles a 4.55 /mi.
. Thus the cost per car mile of running local, making
all stops in this route segment, is nearly twice that of
running express.
The fluctuation in the cost of fuel per bus mile is
largely related, as most automobile drivers well know, to
the amount of traffic congestion and number of stops
(reflected in average speed) and to the age and type of
vehicle. For the year ended 6/30/66, the following results
were obtained:
TABLE 9
Fuel Cost by Borough
Fuel Cost
Borough Mi./Gal. Mi./Hr. per Mi.(0)
Manhattan 3.67 5.86 3.01
Brooklyn 3.77 7.18 2.78
Queens 4.12 8.42 2.57
Staten Island 4.92 10.44 2.12
It should be noted that precise calculation of the
fuel costs on a given route cannot be accomplished in the
same way as was done for rapid transit, because the varia-
bility in number and length of stops, traffic congestion
and driver control introduce far more variation in bus
operation than exists in rapid transit operation.
Records by borough are kept on the fuel cost by type
of bus. The same trend of cost inversely related to speed
reveals itself where a given type and age bus operates in
two or more boroughs. Table 10 gives the data for fiscal
1965-66. . . .
TABLE 10
Fuel Cost by Type of Vehicle
In
Fuel Cost In In In Staten
Type Bus Year Per Mi. (c) Manhattan Br Queens Island
GMC 5101 1948 3.14 2.99 3.44
MackC-49 1956 2.17 2.64 2.02
GMC 5106 1957 2.56 2.74 2.35
GMC 5106 1958 2.56 2.56
GMC 5301 1959 2.50 2.53 2.44
GMC 5301 1960 2.71 2.92 2.70 2.27
GMC 5301 1961 2.61 2.61 2.76
GMC 5301 1962 2.29 2.29
GMC 5303 1963 2.49 2.71 2.46 2.33 1.96
Flexible 1964 2.67 2.67
Flexible 1965 2.58 2.68 2.43
(See also Table 6 for additional data on assignments and
maintenance costs by bus type.)
Notice that the GMC TDH-5303 model buses delivered in
1963, used in all four boroughs, show a steadily decreasing
fuel cost with increasing speed, due to increasing miles per
gallon. (The price per gallon of fuel is the same in all
boroughs.)
The cost of oil was included in the maintenance tables.
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Maintenance of Wa
We enter here into the categories of costs less clearly
related to such quantities as car miles. While many of these
would seem in theory to be a function of the quantity of
service rendered, in actual practice they appear to vary
little, if at all, with additions or subtractions in service.
In the case of maintenance of way, several approaches are
possible to ascertaining the marginal costs of service or
route changes.
Maintenance of structures such as garages, shops,
stations, tunnels, buildings, etc. as well as administrative
costs and cleaning functions are obviously independent of
either service or passenger traffic. A. Scheffer Lang and
Richard M. Soberman26 suggest a correlation between ton
miles per mile of track per year and the cost of maintaining
the mile of track. However, their data compares gross
budgets from different cities, introducing the possibilities
of different standards, physical conditions, etc. and does
not probe the basis for the expenses listed. It appears as
though New York, at least, shows little sensitivity in its
expenditures for the maintenance of track, ties, ballast,
signals and electrical structures to changes in car or ton
mileage. There are several reasons for this.
For one, the ratio of track wear to mileage operated
is small. Normal track life varies generally from 7 to 20
years with a range of 1.4 to 29.3 million ton miles per hour.27
The ratio of track wear to increase in ton mileage is thus
about 3:20. Where track is replaced more often, it is not
because of ton mileage, but for other reasons. Track on
curves, for instance, requires replacement often every 12 to
18 months.
Ties vary in life from 15 to 20 years. Ballast is
replaced more often, but largely because of factors which
foul the ballast, such as floods, steel dust, weather.
Furthermore, the replacement schedules for the road-
way elements are not based on mileage of any sort. They
are based on inspection-revealed need.27 - Records are not
even kept of the dates of replacement of rails, etc.
In the case of rail replacement, for example, three
methods of inspection are used. Every three months a Sperry
rail detector travels every track in the system checking for
hidden flaws and defects. Broken rails are replaced immedi-
ately, flawed or misaligned rails scheduled for appropriate
action. Twice a year, a team of expert track bureau officials
rides a train over the system to test the ride. Finally,
trackwalkers report various conditions and defects found
along the right of way.
Another reason for the lack of sensitivity of costs
to changes in car-miles is that a large proportion of the
track and signal labor force is stable. This is because
much routine inspection work involves the dismantling and
putting together of apparatus which, were it to be repaired,
would merely require the replacement of a part in the already
dismantled apparatus (this is especially true for signals). 27
Another reductive factor in signal maintenance is that the
relays are activated with the passage of each train, not
each car, so that lengthening or shortening of trains on the
same headway will not alter signal repair.
Then too, we are talking of changes which represent
only a small bite in an already impressive set of data. One
line like the Flushing IRT line operates about fifteen
million car miles per year, of which 7,000,000, or nearly half,
take place in the peak 20 hours a week. Put another way,
of 118,200 tons per peak mile of track each weekday, 63,000
occur in the five peak hours. The most lavish increase in
service on the line, providing seats for all passengers
except when maximum service (every 120 seconds or less) is
provided, without increasing headways to any station, and
extending express service all day until midnight, would
increase car mileage by only 8% per year.
More significantly, the change in labor and materials
r----- - .. a
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quotas in the budgets for the World's Fair operation on
this same line, which required 40% more mileage per year
(6,000,000 miles) were entirely for train crews, bus drivers
and dispatchers, and three road car inspectors later shifted
to another point on the system. No changes were budgeted
in any other department (except for station department
employees, which was a traffic-related cost) including
maintenance of way, equipment, power, injuries and damages.
There is apparently a considerable flexibility in the
existing system.
This flexibility may be due to the size of the opera-
tion, of course, and may thus be unique to New York. 2 8 In
the light of the existing data, however, it must be assumed
that the effect of any marginal service change on maintenance
of way costs is negligible. This would not refer to changes
in schedules involving capital investments such as changes
in speed; but we are not dealing with capital investments
here.
There are no maintenance of way costs in bus operations
to the operator. Tax relief is universal among publicly
owned bus systems, with only rare exceptions, so that any
street repairs are paid by the city or its occupants. How-
ever, it is doubtful that the operation of buses on a street
materially affects the cost of repairing and maintaining it,
with the possible exception of a lightly traveled, non-truck
street with heavy bus traffic, such as might be found around
a bus garage. For all practical purposes, however, there is
no variable cost for surface transportation in this category.
Injuries and Damages
This category falls into a group of costs properly
related to the number of passengers carried, rather than the
mileage operated, with the exception of bus traffic accidents.
Other quasi-variable costs in this group include those of
the station department and police. The provision budgeted
each year for claims and accident costs is based on the past
year's experience, but the amount that is actually spent is
a function of the passenger traffic.
The budget for the Law Department plus the reserve
for Public Liability can be considered the applicable costs.
These were budgeted at 7,920,000 dollars for the current
fiscal year. The equivalent accounted listing for the pre-
vious year is $8,926,000, including non-variable administra-
tive and related expenses of other departments. Here again
the accounted breakdown shows decreasing costs with increas-
ing speed in the various boroughs when the unit of
measurement is the bus mile. Since vehicle injuries rather
than passenger injuries may dominate the costs in surface
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operations, it might be appropriate to measure the latter
using vehicle miles, while measuring the costs in rapid
transit operations as a function of passengers.
The data for surface operations list:
Borough Cost per Mile
Manhattan 9.28(b
Brooklyn 6.22c
Queens 3.17o
Staten Island 1.960
The remaining five million dollars allocated to the
rapid transit operations imputes a cost of 0.380 per passen-
ger carried. Many passenger accidents take place in the
rush hour, because of the extreme congestion and density
of movement at those hours; thus the cost per passenger
added or subtracted at other times, when most schedule and
route changes would take place, is probably much lower.
Unfortunately, the necessary secrecy shrouding this area
of cost (claims may take as long as ten years to be settled)
prevents a more revealing analysis of the data. The follow-
ing observations, however, can be made:
-60% of the rapid transit accidents do not occur on
board the cars.
-Where extra mileage or faster scheduled speed means
less congestion, the accident rate would probably be lower.
-Faster acceleration and deceleration rates on newer
NNW
equipment are causing passenger injuries.
-A low-income passenger is less likely to have the
time: , money or inclination to claim damages.
Depreciation and Other Time-Related Costs
In theory, it would seem as though significant changes
in mileage would affect this category of costs, not through
additional capital investment, but through faster write-offs
or more frequent repairs. In practice, however, the criteria
applied here are similar to those discussed under mainten-
ance of way costs. The life of a bus or subway car is
independent of its annual mileage consumption, the latter
being adjusted to through changes in the cost of equipment
(or structure) maintenance.
One measure of this independence is the fluctuation
in annual mileage per vehicle amongst major transit systems,
and more importantly, within the New York system: . . .
London
Paris
Chicago
Boston
New York
NY:
TABLE 11
Annual Mileage by City and Line
Annual Mi./Bus Annual Mi./Car 29
44,917 76,432
25,000 38,000
35,200 38,200
24,100
29,000
241-WP line
Woodlawn
Pelham
242-Broadway
145-Lenox
Jamaica BNT
Flushing
East-Dyre
Myrtle Ave.
44,500
59,300
53,400
50,500
44,000
43,600
42,300
38,000
34,900
28,000
The cars on all the above New York lines are considered
to have the same life (except the last, which is using older,
rehabilitated cars).
The life of a rapid transit car in New York is now
considered to be 35 years. This is based on a recommendation
made by a consultant in an internal (unpublished) report
dated 1961. It is unlikely, however, that the recommendation
was based on mileage considerations, as it did not specify
any variation in life according to mileage.
Prior to 1961, the life of a car was considered to be
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50 years. One of the primary reasons for the lower life
revision was a reduction in maintenance procedures during
the 1950's; another was the fact that the city pays for new
cars, while the Authority pays for maintaining them.
A look at Table 3, page,236 will show how expenditures
increase for older equipment. Inspections of older cars,
for example, must be done three or four times as often as
those for newer cars. There is thus a tradeoff between
increasing maintenance costs with age and the cost of buying
a new vehicle. Just how this tradeoff is related to
mileage cannot be deduced from the available data.
Furthermore, as was demonstrated earlier, the most
lavish increase in mileage would, in most cases, be only a
small increase over existing operations. -Within the range
of values exhibited in the above table, any such variation
is more than adequately covered.
The costs such as depreciation and maintenance of way
which are time-related when referred to schedule and route
changes within an existing system are, of course, relevant
considerations in discussing capital investment or system
expansion. In this case, the first costs are sunk invest-
ments.30 It costs a certain amount of money to buy a
vehicle good for X years, or to maintain a section of track
for operation at Y speed. Once this basic.investment is
being provided, however, the fluctuation in mileage or
usage will have little effect on such costs.
Thus from any point of view, the operating company's
or the community's, the costs of additions to or subtractions
from service within an existing system--the restructuring of
a given arrangement of fixed capital--will lie largely in
operation, power or fuel, and equipment maintenance. To the
extent that there is a change in passenger revenue, certain
other costs such as injuries and damages will also change.
Cost of No Service
One alternative change in a schedule or route is to
eliminate it, for part or all of the day. If this takes
the form of closing a station at night, or eliminating non-
rush hour service on a bus line, or shortlining (turning
some vehicles short of the farthest terminal), the changes
in cost will be reflected in the variable costs analyzed
earlier. However, if peak vehicle- requirements are reduced,
or capacity requirements reduced, or an entire line shut
down, then other costs come into play. This is not likely
to be the case in most schedule and route changes, but
might occur for instance in rearranging bus routes to
coincide with the opening of a new rapid transit line.
The vehicles thus eliminated will at some point either
Mk 
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represent non-capital investment availability of equipment
for additions elsewhere, or reduce the need for as many new
buses over a given period. They might be sold, used. Unless
a significant portion of the fleet is involved, the oldest
will be disposed of first. This means that there is a sav-
ings equal to the cost of that many new vehicles. If the
company uses bonds to purchase equipment, the savings will
be amortized over the usual life of the bond. If, as in
New York, new equipment is generally paid for out of city
funds, the money will probably be diverted elsewhere, perhaps
to some rehabilitation project on an older rapid transit
line.
Where a rapid line is eliminated entirely, maintenance
of way and structure (stations, track, etcz.) becomes
entirely variable and must be determined for that segment.
Summary
The cost functions developed for incremental changes
in service in New York are recapitulated in Table 12. . .
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TABLE 12
Summary, Variable Costs, New York
Category Rapid Transit Cost Bus Cost
Operating Labor
Equipment
Maintenance
wj (l+P)ri 1.09 4 519
where r - base wage rate
P % base wage for allowance
wi= real wage
$10,019 per year for
motormen, fiscal 1967
7.41 to 10.20 15.77 to 19.45C
per car mile, depend- per bus mile,
ing on speed, age of depending on
vehicle, size of shop. same factors.
Statistical functions relating
cost to these factors could not
be determined with available data.
Power or Fuel
Maintenance of Way
Injuries and Damages
Depreciation30 (for
peak hour incre-
ments only)
Local 8.054/mi.
Exp. 4.55c/mi.
See Tables 7Awl
None
0.38(/passenger
$40.60/non-hol.
weekday
per vehicle
1.96 to 3.44,
per bus mile,
depending on
speed and age
(page j
None
1.96 to 9.281
per bus mile,
depending on
speed.
$14.30/non-hol.
weekday
per vehicle
:41/ I
Thus for increments of service not requiring additional
equipment, the marginal cost is the cost of the operator, if
any, plus 11.96 to 18.25e/mile and 0.38(/passenger in rapid
transit service, or 19.69 to 32.17e/mile for bus service.
The low numbers would be for new equipment operating at high
speeds and serviced at one of the larger depots.
Comparing the mileage costs for the included accounts
(categories) to the "fully allocated" costs for the same
accounts in Transit Record, for fiscal 1967, we get:
Account Rapid Transit Bus
Category Computed Allocated Computed Allocated
Equipment
Mainten-
ance 7.41-10.2 14.11 15.8-19.5 21.22-24.86
Power or
Fuel 4.55-8.05 11.06 1.96-3.44 2.28-3.25
Injuries or
Damages (per Pass.) (per Mi.) 1.96-9.28 2.07-9.07
Total 11.96-18.25 25.17 19.69-32.17 25.57-37.18
(All costs are expressed in cents per mile.)
Rapid Transit costs in these categories are thus com-
puted at about 60% of the allocated costs, while bus costs
range from 77% to 86% of the allocated costs. Note that in
the bus costs, fuel and accident costs are pretty much the
same; the difference is in the equipment maintenance account.
It is probable that these percentages could be applied
to other systems, or to growing costs on New York's system,
to obtain the appropriate factual cost data for .increments
of service.
Boston
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority does
not publish anything like New York's Transit Record. Their
annual reports do not list the annual vehicle miles operated.
The difficulty of obtaining detailed cost information in
Boston31 required reliance on the MBTA's official variable
cost figures, 32 which are less than the fully allocated
cost for the account categories, but which do include such
charges as maintenance of way.
The hourly wage rate for bus, streetcar and rapid
transit operating personnel is currently about $3.75 an
hour. When all allowances, etc. (except overtime) are
included, this comes to about $5.25 an hour. This is about
the same real wage as is paid in New York. (Note that the
cost per mile, however, need not be the same if the sched-
uled speed is slower or faster.)
The variable mileage costs for bus and rapid transit
operation in Boston are given as 43, and 69e respectively.
The fact that these are double or greater the costs in New
York does not mean that fixed costs are necessarily included.
(See Footnote 31). These figures were used throughout
Chapter VII in computing costs of alternatives in the
examples on the Boston system.
Footnotes
1. Adhering to the standard system of account classifica-
tion established by the accounting profession.
2. The costs of new equipment have been partly paid in
recent years by a bond issue and federal monies, thus
bringing the city's contribution down somewhat.
3. Annual Report) Chicago Transit Authority, 1966, p. 24.
4. Annual Report, 1965, p. 50-51 (assuming one 1968 Br.
pound : $2.40).
5. 6,153 employees for maintenance of way (rapid transit).
The total personnel quota for fiscal 1967 was 33,861.
6. Recently renamed divisions A and B with the opening of
a new link between the BMI' and IND in November, 1967.
7. New York City Board of Transportation, Report for the
three and one-half years ending June 30, 1949, p. 91.
8. The Flushing line is a hybrid line: it is considered part
of the IRT, is IRT gauge, but sends cars for major
repairs and overhauls to Coney Island via a physical
connection to the BI because there is no connection to
the IRT mainlines.
9. Contract R-38.
10. The New York City Transit Authority, it will be recalled,
does not operate buses in the Bronx except through its
subsidiary. See page21(6.
11. See Chapter II, pages r447.
12. Or should not be: that is what this chapter is all
about.
13. In the absence of any information to the contrary;
unlike Social Security, there is no upper limit to the
salary base from which this. is calculated.
14. These times, added to the minimum required lunch, sign
off and report times, most closely approach eight hours
worked for eight-hour pay. For a further discussion of
work program efficiency, see Chapter VII, pageSEf.
15. See Chapter V, page //l7ff.
16. Chapter II, pages <245.
17. See Chapter IV, page ),for an alternative formulation.
18. Based on interviews with car maintenance personnel
during 1966.
19. Based on examination by the author of daily car mileage
and car status reports.
20. The data on inspections and mileage were obtained
through special permission of the Car Maintenance
Department.
21. For example:
Avg. Stops No.Brake Failures, Car Miles/
per mile Shop 3/66-2/67 Failure
2.38 Pelham 86 278,000
2.25 240th 158 193,000
1.65 239th 339 188,000
The higher number of brake failures at 239th Street
in spite of the lower average stops per mile was due to
a problem at the time of compatibility between two brake
systems. The cars experiencing this problem were
assigned to 239th Street.
22. Based on New York City Transit Authority equipment
assignment listings.
23. Data supplied to the author by the Power Department.
24. See Chapter V, Table 9.
25. Courtesy Department of Schedules and Traffic Studies;
modified slightly (1/2 minute reduction) by author's
observations.
26. Urban Rail Transit (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 71.
27. Data supplied by Maintenance of Way Department.
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28. Boston's Harvard to Ashmont line, for example, requires
less than one-fourth the rolling stock and runs even
less car mileage and ton mileage.
29. Data from Department of Schedules and Traffic Studies.
30. J. R. Meyer, J. F. Kain, M. Wohl, The Urban Transportation
Problem (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), list Capital Recovery
Factors on page 178. Based on $30,000 per bus and
$140,000 per car (air conditioned), this comes to $14.30
per non-holiday weekday for an added bus ($3580/year)
and $40.60 per non-holiday weekday for an added rapid
transit car ($10,200/year).
The reader will note that the cost functions developed
in this reference are not used in this thesis because
they are concerned with the "cost of providing comparable
urban transport services by different kinds of technolo-.
gies" (p. 171), focusing on rush hour average costs;
while this thesis seeks to analyze the marginal costs at
different hours of the day of non-comparable services by
the same technology.
31. Due in part to Boston's embarrassing distinction of
having.the highest costs in the country. Compare this
table of total system costs excluding depreciation or
fixed charges (all data are from fiscal years ending
between December, 1966 and September, 1967):
City Fully allocated costs per vehicle mile
Rapid Transit Bus
Boston $1.78
New York $0.911 $1,332
Chicago 0.814
Cleveland 0.705
Note that New York operates a much higher percentage of
bus mileage on heavily congested streets than does
Boston, or almost any other city for that matter, which
accounts for the high figure for its bus operations. The
figures for its Queens and Staten Island divisions,
which more closely approximate conditions in Boston,
Chicago and Cleveland, were $1.21 and $0.98 per bus mile
respectively.
32. Communicated to the author by Mr. J. Kelly, Assistant
Treasurer, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.
APPENDIX
F'
TRANSIT RECORD
RESULTS OF OPERATION FOR JUNE, 1967 A ND TWELVE MONTHS EXD JUNE 30. 1967
RAPID TRANSIT
Per Cent of Month of June
Operating Per Revenue
NIevenuz Car Mile
97.22
2.14+
.00+
.44
100.00
18.77
17.18
11.19
36.27
1.96
17.15
102.32
.0
102.54
(2.54)
.10
(2.44)
35.99
33.553
Per Cent of
Operatingl
Revenue
-9.33
.61
.04
.00 +
.02
100.00
.71
17.81
1.91
48.93
3.5915.38
8.33
.02
88.35
41.65
.11
11.76
37.53
49.29
89.991.98
.49
.00+
..00+
.40
92.36
17.3815.90
10.36
33.57
1.81
15.87
94.89
.02
94.91
(2.33)
.09
-(2.26)
33.31
31.05
967
Amount
$23.538.287
-5 28.44
48.719
831
110
103,654
$24.211.041
$4,545,244
4,! 60l,38
2.7018,392
8.781.117
473.214
4.152.280
$24.824i.743
0.11
$24,827.25%.
($613-.o1)
$24.828
($590,787
8.713.614
$8,122.827
236.70
719.85
877.694
26.137.644
216.644
129.125.560
4.90
1:425,100
114,623.719
4.583.056
2.041.264
.407.356
Month of June, 1967
Cents
Per Revenue
Bus Mile Amount
150.33
.93
.06
.00+
.02
15.34
1.07
26.95
2.90
74.06
3.43
23.27
133.68
.02
133.70
17.64
.16
17.80
56.80
74.60
$8.332.870
51,463
3,445
1031.196
$8.409.079
S59.113
1,497.23)
160.90
4.114,900
302.007
1.293.086
$7,427,707
1,375
$7.429.082
$979,997
$8.810
$981807
$3,15t.154
$4.144.961
858.99
348,522
3.35..140
9.h6%
1,399.478
4.01
733.384
39,289.897
1.532.103
862.938
5.32,995
denotes deficit.(a) See note (a). page 7.
REVENUES AND EXPENSES
OoERsAriN Rtvrr.u :-
Pasecnger Revtnu- .
. .  . .
.
. . .Advertising and Other -Privilege, .............
Rent of i u.l4-n and Other r.pcerty ..........
Rent of Equipmct ........ ......
ither Reta ......... . ...
Mce:anes ............ ...... ...
Total Operating Rvente .. ......
OPKERATt. Exrxsses AND RintarS:
)Inintenancet or a';%i and i tt ructures .. .
maintenance of Equipment .....-.- .. .. .
Kn er ............... . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Operation of Cars ..............
Injuries and Damnaes ............. . ...------
General and Miscellaneous ..........................
- Credit from City for Transit Pohce Service .---.. ..
'otal Operating Expenses ............ .......
Operating Rentals .................... ..
Total Operating Expenses and Rentals.
IxcoMI rnoM OreArioN ........................
NON-OVRIATING INcoM .:
Interest .......................................
icwss or Rcvesets Orte. Exem ... .. . --.
Extraordinary Income (a) .......................
Excess of Rasrxtas Ovra Excrsas .................
MISCELLANEOUS OPERATING STATISTICS
Miles of Route or First Track .....................
Miles of Running Track (Ex. Car Ilcuses. Shops & Yards)
Number of Car Trips s Round) . . . . .......
Revenue Car Miles ..................................
Non-Revenue Car Miles ..............................
Kw. firs. for Operation of Cars ......................
Kw. Hrs. Car Mile .............................
Revenue ar flours ........................
Revenue Pa-engers ................... . .
Revenue Passenger Averages:
W eek Days ........................ .............
Saturdays. .......................... .........
Sundays ....... ....... ....... .. .. .....
Holidays ...................
BUS
REVENUES AND EXPENSES 0
OesuATINo REVENURs:
Passenger Revenue ................................
Advertising and Other Privileges ........ ...----
Rent of Buildings and Other 'roperty ..............
Other Rentals .....................................
M iscellaneous .....................................
Total Operating Revenues ........................
OrRAtrxo Excesses AS RENTaL.s:
Maintenance of Way and Structures ............-----
Maintenance of Ftuipmnt ..........................
Fuel and Lubricants for Imes ......................
Olperatto of Houes .................................
Injuries and Damages ..............................-
General and Miscellaneous ..........................
Total Operating Expenses ............. ,..........
Operating Rentals ..................................
Total Operating Expenses and Rentals .............
INcoME Fo OFIAtIO .............................
NoX-OrFsAtssa INCOug:
Interest ...........................................
ExcEss or RF.VxrEsi Ovs F.xpensrs .................
Extraordinary Income fa) .........................
Excess or Rivest-as Ovsa Exerisys .................
MISCELLANEOUS OPERATING STATISTICS
Miles of Route (ExcI. Dupl.) .........................
Number of Bus Trips (Round) . . . . .......
Revenue littis Miles .... . . . . . ....
Non-Rvevrnue ts Miles ..............................
Galilon, of Die rl Os. for Operation of ttees ..........
Bus Miles per Gallon of Dietel Oil ...........
Revenue us fours ..........................
Revenue Pasengers .............
Revenue Passenger Averages-
W eek Days ................. , ....................
Satterdays .........................................
Sund s -..... ..... ..... ........ .......... ,....
Holidays ... .......... ;.................... ......
Tuelve lmothe Foiled June It). 19#,7
Per Cestof Itis
Ope1ratitr Per revenue
Rcevnue Car Mile Amount
.114
II
04
4t44i.44i~
19.21
46.).)
12.03
2.10
.94.14
4I3.2o1
144,7.1
1444,7,
46.74.)
.70
.19
4
16-39
4.4
114)3.
I77i
.08 .47
3.23 .75
,3.5 5 
2 0
4
52 .3.70"
~44 ,2
5.i7
4.41A
2.4 1 .7 1 2
-21
7,29, 41
34 4 2i7
Twelve M.onth, Eided June 3ot
Per Cent of Cent
Oerating Per Revenue
Revenue Bus Mdile Amount
99.21 138.01
-73 1.02
.05 .06
.00+ .4m41+
.01 .02
100.00 139.11
.74 1.0218.88 26.27
2.04 2.84
54.49 75."
3.73 5.19
16.00 22.23
95.78 133.23
.02 .03
95.80 133.26
4.20 5.85
.09 .. 11
4.29 5.96
3.44 4.79
7.73 10.75
19 1.1172.2t7
41,154-4
$91 79
j.i'i;
44i07 it
271339 5
434.29,..4
13,97s4
167.434..,44
14SO579
48716.38
$37.452
$.~ i, t114
$7,i09, 4.1
558.49
g,541,75.,
45,99)2.4 7i
423,4316,630.03.8
3.98
434.249.02 4
4,434.444
314.5053
486.38
722,452
-'aol,
August. 1967
~7~2
BEH TOR CITV TRANI AMR17f
copaativa tatomaat of Cporatin3 V ponses by Function
For FLnca1- tear Endzd Jcce 30, 1966 end 1965
RA?ID 7m15SIT
K&Ai.AMMcE OF UAY AUMD 4MtCIS
Superivaene!
alrs............................
Eraglss .............
aia.............................
TIe .. i i..................... .Rail rrc -- omz.....a....#s
uin2g oaf ............................
Cuxerd Wail ...
ccil ork ....... ................
Re1 e an T a. Pt o
.a~ e .. .. ..Otr Leor .'v ..... nd.0 ..
Crcniz cft nt rc
Re a r . . . .... .. . . . . . . . .
Veint I a ng .. ..... *.. .......
L~ci .......... 4.......... .......
D....n.......
Ventilatil z
~cyhlZa of Brtc: 'aee m: &:
PCtOof Fir im em -
OC,=-: %Zccollccanr Way Eggs- .tcca .. ....
OmacEng:: 1.
A 1c'. t c
Ed t a ..... .. ...... ....
.. ...c.. . I - #... ..
63.Sic's L= ...... a....c.
Jur ;.y T-t7 .......
Dcathb 4n "cr.*1y .....
Rico. rcA , ,:............. . .
' -eo
or3
FcaYar Pade En
Ju-a 30
0,713,739.15 f 677,176.40 036j.52.75
65,052.54 50,024.25 15,035.28
C-7,336.87 is,33 ( ,5 .9)
5- 3.9 4, .22 2 47
674:v9(VC C08.530.15 6,001
26z!12.13 51,0096 100,' 1 !
246,313.4.9 172,029.92 74n3 S ,!
7 V 26O 6 's.2 .21 ZUR'
- . . . - - - e e
725 - /.00CI 69 2 li 9 r
C 7 92 6535 (29 4 13)
54~2fl4. #4U3. .L. .. 3
5,12.6 5 4 2C3 .
4..1l U9 ./ .14 ( . 49L
9 ,7 6'/ 7
27,7 5.23 44 .3 to673)
S G 05 7 3,
GS 20.~ 6 e 3 6 )
77.' 6 47,3267 3 9 r~
-Z~~~ ~ ~ 0 .2J 5 7'.
- .
6 0 3 - 3 : 37 36 09o7 -
- 1a .. - ,L- 91 t
4.7
(201.2)
(10i)
7,.1
2 1.
.6 %
30.1
(29.0)
13.7
2019
(13)
10.9
43.2
5.7
13,4
(,2)
12L.7
600 3
1.1
(o2.7)
(192.2)
2.9
S-'-A
2 LO
I
- t
5 S- . ~. 2.. -. -~ - -
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OPERATING BUDGET - FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30. 1967
DETAILS OF PERSONAL SERVICE
Rate
STATION DEPARTMENT,
No. of Emp4s.
Full Part
Time Time
BUDGET 31
hnaLarnaJ2LysA
I -Clerk (Grade 5) X .................
2 Clerk, Supervising (14) ............
Annual Increments ............
3 Clerk, Senior (10) .... .........
Annual Increments ...............
4 11.rkk(7) . ...............
Annual Increments ............
Inspector of Service (Safe$) ..........
6 Stenographer (8) ................
Annual Increments ............
7 Superintendent. Senior (Stations) ....
'8 Superintendent (Stations) ............
9 Supervisor, Station ................
Special Assignments .............
Annual Increments ............
10 Super-4 sor, Assistant Station ..
Overtime (500 hrs. at $3.80/hr.) ...
Annual Increments ...... ........
31 Typist (7) ......... . . ..... .....
Annual Increments ..............
Total Annual Employees
Actual
8. 250
6. 950
240
5.990
5, 530 (5, 54 3)
5.030 (5, 078)
110
4, 830 (4. 892)
4, 240
90
9. 152
4.470
4. 180
90
5. 300
1-3. 225
10, 848
9. 92-5
9, 537
8, 506
214
8, 183
7, 926
7.409
6. 895
1, 900
1,943
4,650 (4.725)
85
(a) Coordinator of Cleaning.
- 56 -
1..
Line
NO. No. Title
Pay-Hours
(Weekly.
Payroll1
Budget
Allowance
8;z
14. 1
50
402
4
2
2
3
2
16
(a)
144
2
132
9
1
22,711
9. 222
27.456
8, 740
15. 300
13. 225
198, 753
1.140,017
4.810
-
-. 1.462. 624
r-
r
[
ii
[1
i:i
3(coi'+.)_
OPERATING BUDGET - FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1967
DETAILS OF PERSONAL SERVICE
PUrI
I
1]I
KI
~; jiII11
Rate
No. of Fmpls.
Full Part'
Time Time
Pay- Hours
(Weekly
Payroll)
St.a.ion.......rt t en ud et 3eLcnt nued_)
HuritL..mpjayes
Collecting Agent ......... ........
Extra Holiday Allowance ........
Overtime ..... ... ..........
Night.Differential (189.084 hours) .
16 Maintainer. Turnstile . ..........
17 Over.time ...................
Railroad Clerk . . . . .........
Extra Holiday Allowance........
Overtime . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
Night Differential 5.04-f. 140 hours).
Railroad Porter . ... . . . . . . . . . . . .
Special Assignments . . . . . . . . . . .
Extra Holiday Allowance . . ......
Overtime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Night Differential (1.432.068 hours).
aiotal Hourly Employees
Total for Department . . . . . . . . . . ..
Less: Estimated Accruals & Rounding
Net Personal Service . . . . . . . . . . . .
OFFICE OF GENERAL
~nru. I Emloy xe
Clerk (Grade 5) X ...............
Salary Adjustments ..............
2 Clerk, Supervising (14) ............
Annual Increments ............
3 Clerk. Senior (10) .................
Annual Increments ............
4 Dispatcher, Chief Surface Line .....
Dispatcher, Surface Line ...........
(b) for Summer Season. 7/1 to 9/15/66 and 5/1
(c) 1 for Secretary's Dept.; 11 for Police Dept.
Averaze
3. 222
3. 673,
2. 923.
2. 800
98
2
4. 149
1.145
(c) 12
203. 840
5.704
50,,570
4. 160
240
(0) 18 8.642.712
216,872
558,022
(b) 10 2.388.544
24,960
60.952.
- 89.332
5.406 28
28
12 245 908
SUPERINTENDENT-SURFACE, BUDGET 33
Aetual
10, 850
200
6.950
6.470
1360
5. 990
S.390 (5.413)
120
3
2
2
1,.729 1
11. 12 I
8.764
to 6/30/67.
Line
No,
12
13
14
15
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Title
Wi
A
L1~
2
~j]
K1
~zi
budget
Allowance
656,772
18, 378
162.937
5. 673
15.280
882
25.262.647
.633,917
,.631,098
151, 324
6. 687. 923
69. 888
170. 666
250. 130
42.962
35 760,477
37.223,101
64, 101
37 159 00
11.050
ZO. 730
17.513
22.88
96,.404
71/,
L
-
~k~tiBjr
OPERATING BUDGET - FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30. 1967
DETAILS BY PROJECTS
Labor Material
ii
I
1,
I
2
I
api
LOST PROPERTY DEPARTMENT, BUDGET 30
Supervisory & Administrative
Operating Payroll for 2 employees ....... 14,492
Stationery, Printing & Office Supplies .
Free Transfers (Surface) .............
Machine Tickets (Rapid Transit) .........
Rockaway Special Refund Tickets ........ _
Total - Supervisory & Administrative . ... 14,492 1
2 Lost Property
Operating Payroll for 11 employees ............ 68 660
Printing (books; postcards &
Lost Property forms)
Bags & Locks .........................
Miscellaneous Expenses ................. ____
Total - Lost Property .............. 68,660
Total for Department ................ . 83 152 1
Less: Estimated Accruals & Rounding ... k52
Budget Allowance - Lost Property Department . 83,000 1
STATION DEPARTMENT. BUDGET 31
I Supervisory & Administrative
Operating Payroll for 66 employees ........
Stationery. Printing & Office Supplies .....
Miscellaneous Expenses ..............
Total - Supervisory & Administrative ....
2 Procurement & Distribution of Supplies
Operating Payroll for 19 employees ... ...
Stationery, Printing & Office Supplies.
Materials & Supplies ....................
Total -. Procurement & Distri-
bution of Supplies.*..*..'..*
Operation of Stations
A - Supervision
Operating Payroll for 153 employees ......
B - Transportation of Revenue
Operating Payroll for 98 employees ........
107
14.492
,750 750
26.000 126,000
6,200 6.200
150 150
33. 100 -- 147. 592
68,660
2.000 2.000
400 4U00
75 75
2,400 75 71,135
35.500 75 218,727
-5 -
35, 500 75 218. 575
431.831
2.600
431. 831
2. 600
1,700 1.700
431,831 2,600 1,700 436.131
132,070
132,070
243,227
132, 070
225 225
125 125
350 
- 132, 420
--- Z43. Z7
843. 0
Proj.
No. Description Other Total
OPERATING BUDGET FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30. 1967
DETAILS BY PROJECTS
Proj.
No. Description Labor Material Other Total
$$ $
Station Departmentk Budget 31J(continued)
3 Operation of Stations (cont.)
C - Collection of Revenue
Operating Payroll for 4, 100 (18) employees
Stationery, Printing & Office Supplies .....
Money Bags & Seals ............ ........
Replacement of 50 change booth stools .....
Replacement of 50 Shur-lock Presses.
Purchase of 68 plastic station benches ......
Washing & Repair of Money Bags ..........
Total - C: Collection of Revenue .......
D - Cleaning & Elevator Operation
Operating Payroll for 1, 149 (10) employees
Cleaning Material .......................
Miscellaneous Expenses .................
Total - D: Cleaning & Elevator Operation
Total - Operation of Stations ...........
4 Maintenance of Token-vending Machines
Operating Payroll for 2 employees .......
Total for Department .................
Less: Estimated Accruals & Rounding
Budget Allowance - Station Department ......
27, 381,074
13,035
43.000
650
325
10,540
8,050
27,381.074
13.035
43. 000
650
325
10, 540
8.050
67, 550 8.050 27,456.674
7.174,977 7. 174, 977
115.000 115,000
2,750 2,750
7,174,977 115,000 2,750 7,292,727
36,643,038 182,550 10.800 36,836,388
16, 162
37,223, 101
-- -- 16,162
185. 500 12,500 37,421.101
64, 101 15-564, 101
37,159, 000 185, 500 12, 500 37, 357, 000
OFFICE OF GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT-SURFAQE, BUDGET 33
Supefvisory & Administrative
Operating Payroll for 50 employees ........
Stationery, Printing & Office Supplies . . . . .
Miscellaneous Expenses ...............
Total - Supervisory & Administrative ....
2 AFE's Required
Replacement of passenger automobile #345
3 Provision for Excess Employees . . . . . . . . .
Total for Department ..................
Less: Estimated Accruals & Rounding ...
Budget Allowance - Office of Assistant Gen-Budgt lo nce eral Superintendent-Surface
422, 940
422, 940
4,000
4, 000
-- 2.500
9152 --
432,092
92
6,500
422, 940
4,000
825 825
825 427,765
-- 2.500
-- 9,152
825 439.417
S- - - 92
432,000 6,500 825 439,325
()denotes part-time employees.
- 108 -
27,381, 074
"~~~~4-,>-.-~~~~~~2 7.. . . . - .~.- - ... <. ~
5-
NEW YORK CITY TRANZST AUTHLRTY
AMlocatio Employees by Sections -16667
Annual Emp.ls.
Clerk (Grade 5) X
Clerk, Supervising (14) .
Cerk, Senior (10) 0 0 000
Chni-k 7) .
Iaspector o serv'ice (SZ1es)
Stenographer (8) . . . . . . .
Superintendent, Sr. (Station) .
S Agrintendae %_Station
Supervisor, Station . . z . . .
Special AssigsAnment
Supervisor, Asst Station .
oit(7)
Sub-total - Annual EmpL
Collecting Agent ....
Maintainer. Turnstile
* 4
2
4
2
19 I
(a) 1
144
181
98
4. 14.9
Railroad Clerk ......... b8
Railroad Porter ....
pecial As sijment
Sub-total -.Hotirly Empls.
Total
0'
1
2
4
2
5
1
45 1
*0
44C6
LO0
3
7
-
1 6
136
153
CeN). *9
1001 18
(b 10)
5v406 45
5,587 66
428)
1 145 P 81I- 
-I - I
12
19 153
98
98
4, 100
4, 100
(a)
(b)
(c)
Coordinator of Cleaning.
For Sumxer Season 7/1 to 9/15166 and 5/15/to 6130/67.
1 for Secretary's Department, 11 for Police Department.
Budget Department
June 10, 1966/jh
_ .7 I ~< -~ 1=
cc
0:E4
Od CS
".4
U
I -I
1,137
12
1. 149'
1, 149
.- 09
12
Oeration-o Statio2ns
iq I
1,131
Exhibit 6
Calculation of Maintenance Cost, Manhattan
Depot
Of the 81 employees, 51 are engaged in mileage-variable
work. The titles and computation of real wages are:
Bus Maint. A $3.64 hourly, $7600 annual + 5% allowances
($380) = r. (adj .) 1.09 + $519 = w.
Bus Maint. B $3.653 hourly, $7624 annual + 13 1/3 allowances
($1016) = r. (adj .) 1.09 + $519 = w. $9845
Bus Maint. Helper B $3.015 hourly, $6295 annual, + 16% allowances
($1006) = r. (adj.) 1 .134 + $229 = $8374
1
Multiplying w, by # employees,
Coin Box Maint. + 1
Materials (omitting garage e
cleaning material
costs)
9183 x 3 =, $ 27,549
9845 x 38 374,000
8374 x 10 83,740
+10,389
495,679
xpenses,
and fuel
69,300
$564,979
Dividing by 4,321,000 miles we get 13.054 per mile
(compared to 21.4 budgeted shop cost or 23.64 total
allocated cost).
$9183
1179
EXHIBIT 7
Acceleration and Steady Motion (Top Speed) Power Consum
Assuming Level Track for All R-Type Equipment:ZJ
0
(All Nos. Amperes per Second*)
IRT
Average for: Loaded
First 12 Seconds 385
12-20 Seconds 310
20-28 Seconds 245
28-36 Seconds 190
36-44 Seconds 140
Max. Speed
(45-50 mph) 100
*Per motor pair, of which there
Stationary or Coasting Costs in
Empty Loaded
310 410
250 330
200 260
160 200
130 145
100 100
are two per car.
Kilowatts/Hr./Car:
IND-BNT
Empty
335
270
215
170
130
100
Motor Generator
Lighting
Compressor
Sub-Total
Heating
Total
.4
1035
.25
2.00 -
11.25
;4
1.8
.25
2.45
15.00
13.25 17.45
Fans N.A. N.A.
Thus to calculate the power consumption, first calculate the
amp-secs. consumed according to the characteristics of the
route section in question, multiply by .6 to convert amp-secs,
to kw-secs., double to get the rate per car, divide by 3600
to convert kw-secs. to kw-hrs., add the stationary costs
and divide by the mileage traversed to obtain the actual
power cost per car mile.
EXHIBIT 7 (continued)
It would be advantageous .to reduce these calculations
by making up a table for the given system (see Exhibit 8).
Exhibit 8
Cumulative totals, kw-hrs. consumed in acceleration
Time
Elapsed
0-20 sec.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
IRT
Empty
1.905
1.972
2.039
2.105
2.172
2.239
2.305
2.372
2.439
2.492
2.545
2.599
2.652
2.705
2.759
2.812
2.865
2.899
2.942
2.985
3.029
3.072
3.115
3.159
3.202
SetLd
2.021
2.091
2.162
2.232
2.302
2.373
2.443
2.514
2.584
2.640
2.696
2.752
2.808
2.864
2.919
2.975
3.031
3.075
3.119
3.163
3.208
3.252
3.296
3.340
3.384
IND-BMT
50% Stn
2.138
2.212
2.286
2.360
2.434
2.509
2.583
2.657
2.731
2.789
2.848
2.907
2.965
3.023
3.082
3.140
3.198
3.243
3.288
3.333
3.378
3.423
3.468
3.513
3.558
Load
2.365'
2.446
2.528
2.609
2.691
2.772
2.854
2.935
3.017
3.080
3.143
3.207
3.270
3.333
3.397
3.460
3.523
3.570
3.616
3.663
3.710
3.756
3.803
3.850
3.896
Empty
2.059
2.131
2.202
2.274
2.346
2.417
2.489
2.561
2.632
2.689
2.745
2.802
2.859
2.915
2.972
3.029
3.085
3.128
3.171
3.214
3.257
3.300
3.344
3.387
3.430
SetLd
2.173
2.248
2.323
2.399
2.474
2.549
2.625
2.700
2.775
2.834
2.893
2.952
3.011
3.070
3.130
3.189
3.248
3.292
3.337
3.381
3 .426
3.470
3.515
3.560
3.604
50% Stn
2.288
2.367
2.446
2.525
2.604
2.683
2.762
2.841
2.920
2.982
3.043
3.105
3.167
3.228
3.290
3.352
3.413
3.459
3.505
3.550
3.596
3.642
3.688
3.734
3.780
each additional sec. = .0333 kw-hrs. at maximum speed
Armed with plots or checks of the number of seconds of acceleration,.
maximum speed and coasting-braking-or standing between and in each station,
the above table, with the addition of the stationary in-service costs will yield
a more exact picture of power costs per car mile, although ignoring certain
variations such as grades.
Load
2.520
2.607
2.693
2.780
2.867
2.953
3.040
3.127
3.213
3.280
3.346
3.413
3.480
3.546
3.613
3.680
3.746
3.794
3.842
3.891
3.939
3.987
4.036
4.084
4.132
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Directive Criteria and Applicable
Alternatives for Change
Introduction
In Chapter IV, a model of Schedule and Route Planning
was set forth. Making use of the hypotheses on demand
developed in Chapter V, and the data on costs presented in
Chapter VI, this chapter will elaborate on the decision-
making phase (Part II) of the model. Using the data.on cost
and demand, the process of evaluating alternative changes
will be illustrated with examples for each State variable.
The State variables as defined in Chapter IV describe
the existing (and changed) state of the transit service. The
State variables are Frequency, Speed, Comfort (Scheduled Load),
Actual Load, Actual Headway, Actual Running.and terminal
Time, Work Program, Mileage, Demand, Transfer Volumes, and
Unserved Trip Patterns and Activities. One or more "Initial
Directive Criteria" must be applied to each State variable to
determine whether that variable should or should not be
changed, according to the terminology of the model.
Thus, in adopting a systematic approach to the sched-
uling of its routes, a transit system will first want to
decide on a set of Initial Directive Criteria (i.e., measures
of adequacy) for each State variable. These Initial Direc-
tive Criteria (IDC) will in each case be sub-obj.ectives
designed to come closer to the larger system objectives
already decided on. This chapter will, for each State
variable, identify and quantify one or more IDC, and will use
these criteria (along with data from Chapters V and VI) to
generate and evaluate alternative changes in the "control"
variables (Headway, Running Time, Terminal Time, Vehicles,
Route and Control/Supervisory) designed to bring the State
variables in line with the objectives of management (as
reflected in the IDC).
Frequency of Service
This refers to scheduled mean headway. Foremost among
the iDC for this variable is: Is this the best headway, or
would a greater or lesser headway be closer to satisfying
the system objectives? If the system objective is giving
the best service possible at a break-even or better point,
the procedure of generating alternatives would resemble the
example in Chapter IV. Alternatively, the objective may be
to earn a fixed percentage profit to cover overhead, or to
tolerate a deficit if at least x people ride the bus per
trip.
For each possible objective, the only way to find out
if the frequency is satisfying the objective is to range
over a number of different headways and compute the results
on whatever costs and revenues are being considered. There
is no way of knowing if the present frequency of service is
the best, no matter what the objective, unless the effects
of alternative frequencies are simulated.
Frequency is directly transformed by changing the
Control variable "Headway." The effects of each alternative
Headway would not, however, be confined to the State vari-
ables Frequency, Work Program, Mileage and Demand (which
further transform into the Cost and Revenue measurements
necessary to evaluate the extent to which the change meets
the stated objectives). The Control variable function for
Headway is Headway - c(Running Time + Terminal Time)/Vehicles
(see Chapter IV). This means that to change Headway either
Running Time, Terminal Time or the number of vehicles must
be changed, singly or in combination. In addition, Headway
itself has other effects, for example on Load--which in turn
may affect Actual Load--and this too may be significant.
Thus there is a choice of not only what Headway is
best, but also of what is the best method of changing the
Headway. Carefully explored, such alternatives may show,
for example, that in a given case using an added vehicle to
increase the Running Time or Terminal Time with the same
Headway, rather than using an added vehicle to decrease the
Headway, will be the better move.
Because of these interrelations between State vari-
ables, either directly or via the interlocking effects of
the Control variables, it may also be that although Headway
(i.e., Frequency) might be found optimum for the desired
objective(s), an examination of some other State variable
will reveal an inadequacy best corrected by or permitting a
re-evaluation of changes in the Headway. For example, in
looking at either Speed or the Terminal Time component of
Work Program, it may be found that there is excessive Ter-
minal Time, and that the only cost of decreasing the Headway
within a certain range is the mileage cost. Under these
altered circumstances, the optimum Frequency may no longer
be at the previously decided point.
The "best" or "optimum" (or simply, a "better") Head-
way in terms of the stipulated cost-Revenue balance (or any
other criteria desired, including maximum ridership without
regard to cost) will not be the only IDC applied to Frequency.
Two other IDC should be: Minimum or maximum desired Headway,
and scheduled connections. In the first case, management
may decide that no line should operate on greater than a
twenty-minute Headway, regardless of any other criteria. This
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would be a service-to-the-public kind of objective not
amenable to any rational testing. It would require reducing
headways on any lines presently operating on greater head-
ways, as was done for "owl" (1:00 to 5:00 AM) subway service
in New York in 1957.
The scheduling of connections between feeder bus and
rapid transit lines, or between two bus or subway lines
where large transfers take place, may often require adjust-
ments to the "optimum" headway. The adjustment would be
made by either reducing or increasing the headway of one
line to match the headway, or some multiple of the headway,
of the connecting line. In addition to this alternative,
the headway of the other line might be adjusted; or both may
be changed. With data on the effects on 'emand of "missed"
vs. scheduled connections, a new "optimum" point could be
calculated.
This new optimum point may not be the same as the
optimum without considering connections, because the
increased NOC (see Chapter IV for discussion of NOC a Net
Operating Contribution) previously achieved may be offset
at the uniform headway by the increased cost of additional
service on the connecting line, if the headway on the con-
necting line is decreased. Thus where several feeder or
connecting lines are involved, the sum NOC of all the lines
would be the relevant IDC to be maximized under the general
objective of maximum return.
As an example to illustrate the above discussion of
Frequency, consider the case of the three bus feeder lines
terminating at Forest Hills-Arborway on the Everett to Forest
Hills MBTA line in Boston on Sunday (see Figure 1). These
three lines operate to Cleary Square via Hyde Park Avenue;
to Dedham line via Washington Street; and to Charles River
Loop via Center and Spring Streets, on frequendies of 20,
20 and 25 minutes respectively.1 Let us assume a system
objective of maximum service at maximum NOC.
Calculations using the method illustrated in Chapter
IV, the relevant regression equation for Sunday revenue
2(P a 191.5 - 2.71 H), and an assured marginal contribution
of 23t per revenue passenger,3 the alternative cost revenue
comparisons (based on costs developed in Chapter VI) show
the.optimum headway for each line (maximum NOC) to be just
what is now being run: 20, 20 and 25 minutes respectively
(see Table 1 and Figure 2). At these points, any increase or
decrease in frequency would result in a net loss (negative
marginal NOC). Within the range of headways examined (see
Table 1) they are global optimums.
The rapid transit line runs at a 12-minute headway,
however. If coordinated schedules are another IDC, then
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Table 1
Net Operating Contribution for Alternative Headways,
Sunday
Passen-
gers
Head-
way
6
7 1/2
910
11
+12
15
20
22
24
25
30
33
35
36
40
per
1000
Line 32*
Pass.
Rev.
175 752
171 736
16414 707
162 697
159 684
151 650
137 590
132 568
126 1/2 545
123 1/2' 531
110 474
102 439
96 1/2 415
94 404
83 357
Cost NOC
908
734
559
517
475
398
343
328
344
329
273
259
245
238
203
(-156)
2
148
180
209
252
(257)
240
201
202
201
180
170
166
154
Line 34*
Pass.
Rev.
625
611
587
578
568
540
490
472
452
437
393
364
345
335
296
Cost NOC
1003
810
618
571
525
438
378
363
366
350
301
285
270
263
224
(-378)
(-199)
(- 31)
7
43
102
(112)
109
96
87
92
79
75
72
72
Line 36*
Pass.
Rev.
897
877
843
830
815
774
702
676
648
633
565
523
494
481
425
Cost NOC
1171
945
720
667
612
566
478
458
405
388
352
333
316
307
261
(-274)
(- 68)
143
163
203
208
224
218
243
(245)
213
190
178
174
164
TOTAL NOC Now
At Optimum
At 20 min.
At 24 min.
614
614
593
540
Extra cost of going
to 10 or 11 min. Hwy.
Extra crew 84
Mileage
on Rapid Tnst.
82
166
* 1967 Service Areas: Line 32
34
36
18,655
15,500
22,230
29/
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clearly the above headways are no longer optimum. Going to
an 11, 10 or 7-1/2-minute headway on the rapid transit line
would cost more, in terms of NOC, then going to a 24-
minute headway on all three bus lines (see Table 1). It
appears that any adjustment to coordinate the headways
would reduce NOC from the optimum level originally calcu-
lated (without scheduled connections being an IDC), and
that a uniform 24-minute headway on the bus lines reduces NOC
the least. 4  However, data on how such coordination affects
demand might show that this, or some other alternative,
actually increases NOC.
The frequency of service, i.e. the scheduled headway,
need not be uniform over a given route. This introduces an
additional alternative into consideration'. Some vehicles
can be "shortlined," that is, turned short of the full length
of the line at an intermediate terminal. Thus a service may
be defined by more than one headway, according to the portion
of the route involved. Where service required to meet a
load, or calculated as having maximum NOC, serves an outer
portion of route with only a small part of the total service
area, this would be desirable. It would also be, and is,
effectively used on routes with frequent service in peak hours.
There is no a priori way of judging its value, however, with-
out again calculating the alternatives and their effects.
In the previous example, line 34 to Dedham line has three-
quarters of its service area in the first half of the route
length. The doubling of the previously determined optimum
headway over this half of the route, from 24 to 12 minutes,
would raise NOC by $1.50 for the day. This is a case where
at least on paper the introduction of a shortline makes more
frequent service viable where the same service the length of
the line would cost the company more. The example is a con-
venient one, although in reality part of the service area
affected is served jointly by this line and the Charles
River Loop line (#36), and coordinated schedules would pro-
vide 12-minute service to this portion at rqo extra cost,
leaving only half the service area of line 34 to benefit from
the shortline--and, consequently, making the shortline unwise.
There are other alternative solutions involving the
manipulation of other State variables; these will be illus-
trated as each State variable is discussed. The above
calculations were based only on manipulation of the variable
"Frequency.
Speed
The State variable Speed is an absolute measurement,
looking at the scheduled speed of a line (but not the
Now-
performance speed in comparison to the scheduled speed: this
is the purpose of the State variable Actual Running Time).
Thus the appropriate IDC would be either a minimum accept-
able speed in miles per hour, a maximum acceptable speed
(the legal speed limit, for example), or a speed consistent
with the movement of non-transit traffic on the street.
Two Control variables can be altered to effect changes
in Speed if any of the IDC are not met. One is Running Time;
but before any change is made in Running Time, the State
variable Actual Running Time must be examined. Clearly if
the Actual Running Time corresponds to the scheduled Running
Time, any change in Running Time to affect the Speed will be
a change on paper only, and will not accomplish its intended
effect in actual practice. If, however, it is discovered
that inadequate or excessive Running Time is the cause of high
or low scheduled Speed, then Running Time can be used to
change the Speed by changing the appropriate number in the
equation Speed . Route Mileage/Running Time.5
Route is the other Control variable affecting Speed.
A low speed may be due to traffic congestion on a particular
street, or to overly close spacing of stations on a rapid
transit line. In the first case, diversion of the route
during the hours of street congestion to a nearby parallel
street (or off a crowded expressway onto a. local street) may
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be a solution if the existing route does not pick up or dis-
charge many passengers on the affected portion. In the
second case, discovery of an inadequate speed may prompt an
investigation of the effects of closing some of the stations
at. certain hours, or of running express service.
Route mileage can be lengthened or shortened to
achieve the desired speed, where terminal time and not run-
ning time is the excessive component. This would be done
when a given headway, for reasons such as coordinated con-
necting headways, is not optimum for the running time; that
is, requires excess or tight terminal time (see example).
Here again, the secondary relationships between the
variables bear consideration. If Speed is to be altered
by changing Running Time, secondary effects may be felt in
Demand or in Actual Running Time (see discussion under that
heading). In addition, a change in Running Time will require
a change in either Headway, Vehicles, or Terminal Time. 6 if
Running Time is to be reduced with no increase in Terminal
Time and no decrease in Vehicles, then Headway must be
reduced and this will in turn change the State variable
Frequency.
Thus there exist alternatives not only of ways to
change Speed (via route or running time changes), but also of
ways to change the relevant Control variables. Each will in
turn affect the existing balance of the system State and may
call for changes in several State variables to achieve a
new optimum point. Thus each must be evaluated.
Referring again for an example to the three main
feeder lines serving Hyde Park, Roslindale and West Roxbury
on Sundays in Boston (Figure 1), an analysis of the minimum
scheduled round trip running times (including terminal times)
and the round trip mileage per route 7 shows average speeds
of 11.9, 12.1, and 10.9 miles per hour respectively. There
may well be good reason for the lower speed on the Charles
River Loop line, but let us assume that none is found, and
that lowering the round trip minimum from 48 to 44 minutes
raises the average speed from 10.9 to 11.9 miles per hour.
Table 2 and Figure 3 show the revised calculations
with labor costs revised to reflect the new running times.
Optimum headway is now 15, not 25 minutes. Note that at a
15-minute headway in Table 2, the cost has been increased by
$102 over the 25-minute headway in Table 1, while revenue
has increased by $141. This same $39 gain is reflected in
comparing the respective NOC's.
To illustrate the manipulation of Route to affect
Speed, consider the line from Clear y Square, under the
constraint of coordinated headways. The scheduled round trip
time is 48 minutes, 13 more than the permissible minimum,
Table 2
Recalculation of Table 1, Line 36, New Running Time
Headway Rev. Cost NOC
6 897 1094 (-197)
7 1/2 877 884 (- 7)
10 843 674 169
11 830 624 206
12 815 573 242'
15 774 490 (284)
20 702 478 224
22 676 396 280
24 648 379 269
25 633 363 270
30 565 329 236
33 523 312 211
35 494 296 198
36 481 287 194
40 425 245 180
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reducing average scheduled speed to 8.6 miles per hour. An
extension of this line into the Fairmount section of Hyde
Park, presently unserved on Sunday, would add over 7,000
people to the service area,8 and raise average speed to 12.9
miles per hour. Table 3 and Figure 3 show the new optimal
headway to lie at the desired 24 (or 25) minutes, and show an
improvement of $135 in NOC at the coordinated 24-minute
headway.
Other extensions are possible as alternates; the
choice of which area to serve is considered under the State
variable "Unserved." The Dedham line via Washington Street
bus line could also be extended either via Washington Street
to VFW Parkway or via Centre and Grove Streets. The effect
would be similar.
The use of a 23e fare in these calculations assumes
that the marginal rider attracted or lost is lost not only to
the-bus line but to the system in its entirety. The rise and
fall of NOC thus indicates how much revenue would be added
or subtracted for a given change. Since the changes con-
sidered are on the bus lines only, it seems fair to allocate
any additional revenue entirely to the bus line, when no
change is required in service on connecting rapid transit or
surface lines. The total revenue accruing to the bus line on
the basis of ten-cent fares, however, is throughout Tables 1,
I 2c~Q1
Table 3
Recalculation of Table 1, Line 32*, Route Extension
Headway
6
7 1/2
10
11
12
15
20
22
24
25
30
33
35
36
40
Rev..
1070
1042
1004
989
971
923
837
806
772
754
672
622
589
574
507
Cost
1262
1018
776
718
660
596
512
491
436
417
379
359
340
330
281
NOC
(-192)
24
228
271
311
327
325
315
336
(337)
293
263
249
244
226
* New Service
New Total NOC
Area 26,455
At Optimum
At 20 min.
At 24 min.
694
661
675
>i
2 and 3 less than the variable cost of operation.
The real effect of maximization of NOC is thus, in
these examples, to minimize loss rather than maximize
profit (at a ten-cent fare). For this reason, the IDC of
maximum service at break-even or better is not relevant to
the examples considered; the break-even point is never
reached.
Although the above examples do not readily lend them-
selves to the alternative of express service, this is one
other way of altering the Speed of a line. It is essentially
a variant of the use of Running Time to increase Speed, in
this case by by-passing a given number of stops and thus
reducing the scheduled Running Time. Express service may
often be provided in conjunction with a shortline (see
page 2q-), with the full route-length vehicles operating
express in the area of the shortline operation.
Express service may also be desirable even where no
significant time savings is effected, if it segregates a
large point to point movement without adversely affecting
the frequency of regular service. The psychological advan-
tage of express service to the passenger, in terms of both
the by-passing of stops, and the omission of the discomfort
associated with constant starts and stops, is probably as
important as the time savings in determining the demand for a
Now,
service. While insufficient data were available in Chapter V
for statistical analysis of this factor, the application of
the method of schedule analysis being proposed throughout
this thesis would eventually require such information in
order to consider this alternative intelligently.
Load
Load is the State variable representing the load
factor in the vehicle, a ratio of either passengers/vehicle
to seats/vehicle or passengers per vehicle to total capacity/
vehicle. Presently, as described in Chapter II, the scheduled
load factor is an average over a time period of from 15 min-
utes to an hour; and the system criteria for load factors are
not consistently applied.
The IDC for the load factor on any given line would be
the extent to which the load factor meets some stipulated
policy factor. The management should decide. on what kind of
loads they are willing to tolerate, depending on the time of
day, kind of riding, etc., and apply this standard uniformly.
If the management is willing to settle on such a criterion,
there is no point in applying it haphazardly. Exceeding the
desired load factor would militate against whatever values
the management sees in their objective; operating at less
than the specified load would be a waste of resources.
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There are two larger goals that management can consider
in deciding on what load factor -they wish to maintain. One
is that of NOC; the load factor should be decreased so long
as the marginal NOC is rising. This method will not always
guarantee, however, a load factor providing seats for all in
non-rush hours, which might be an objective of the system.
For example, an optimum headway calculation for the Arlington
Heights to Harvard Square line on Sunday, in the same manner
as described under the discussion of Frequency in Chapter IV,
shows the maximum NOC at 22 minutes. (Table 4 and Figure 4.)
9
However, the load factor at a 22-minute headway is 76 passen-
gers per bus. In order to achieve approximately a seated
load, twice as much service. must be run, at a lower NOC. An
11-minute headway is, in fact, the present service.
The other major goal would be to provide seats for all
passengers, or a maximum load factor, depending on the time
of day. There are several ways of approaching this criterion.
Presently an average load factor is used as a ipeasuring stick.
This guarantees that no matter what the load factor: 1.0
(seats for all), 50% standees (1.5 or 150% load), or any
other number: the passenger will not experience the stipulated
factor. This is because the ratio of passengers per seat as
an average over a given time period does not take into
account the variation in loading arising from variations in
Table 4
Net Operating Contribution Constrained by Load
Factor Line 79, Sunday*
Pass. Avg.
Rev. Cost NOC Load
5 1/2 1545 1465 80
"6 1530 1410 120
7 1/2 1495 1139 356
10 1440 948 492
11 1418 803 615 47
12 1390 806 584 51
15 1320 676 644 60
20 1200 581 619 72
22 1155 510 (645) 76
24 1108 533 625
25 1080 510 570
30 963 423 540
33 892 401 491
35 845 415 430
36 822 403 419
40 726 344. 382
* Service Area 38,000
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headway and fluctuations in passenger traffic and the dis-
tribution, in rapid transit, of loading over the length of
the train.
There are two basic kinds of disturbances in the even
flow of passengers and vehicles. The first is random, due
to diverse causes not under the control of the operating
transit company--traffic congestion, weather, the laws of
chance. To the extent that these variations are purely
random within a homogeneous time period,10 a poisson table
would be a useful tool for predicting the frequencies of
deviations.11 That is, if an average arrival rate of 40
passengers per given time period is scheduled for a 45-seat
bus, this table says that one out of every three buses will
have standees, and that fully ten per cent of the buses
over time will have load factors over 150%.
This is not merely a hypothetical situation. A typical
MBTA survey, for example, shows just such a pattern of varia-
tion, due to variations in headway and passenger arrivals, even
in a short period of a few hours. A four-hour sample of the
inbound Grove Hall buses at Dudley station in Boston on
Saturday, June 2, 1962, shows 19 buses with 775 passengers,
or 41 per bus. 12 This average is constant through the four
hours. Six of the buses have standees; of these, one had 75
passengers, well over the 150% load rate. (During this same
period outbound, two buses had loads over 67 passengers.)
The implications of this kind of variation are clear.
Management must first decide not simply what load factor
to use as an IDC but what percentage of the passengers they
wish to experience the stipulated load factor. In the above
example, 360 of the 775 passengers, or 46 %, rode on buses
with standees (9 to 30 standees). It is not likely that the
passengers on this route believed the service provided seats
for all.
Where a seats for all policy is adopted, it should be
clear from the above that the average scheduled load must be
considerably less than a "seatedload." It may be desirable
to derive this required reserve from observations on the
individual lines concerned, developing what Doolittle calls
a "diversity factor"13 for each line, rather than use the
poisson tables .
The second kind of disturbance is one caused either
by predictable influences on passenger traffic: a late-store
opening night, a ballgame, a heavy snowstorm, a school
holiday, etc.; or by controllable deviations in operation,
such as a late vehicle. A variation of the latter kind would
be the uneven distribution of passengers over a rapid transit
train, again a fluctuation within the control of the
management.
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The operation of the same schedule for varying con-
ditions of passenger demand cannot possibly enable uniform
adherence to whatever standard management stipulates for
loading. Yet major systems such as New York pay surprisingly
little attention to such variations; annual cordon counts,
for example, may be taken on some lines on late shopping
nights and on others on normal evenings. Further, a differ-
ent pattern will be followed each year from line to line.
Similarly, average loads are scheduled by train in New York,
although the variation in loading throughout the train may
be substantial; middle cars will often have a 200% load
factor while end cars have seats at the peak point.14
If the management is interested in applying whatever
set of objectives they feel is best consistently, and not
haphazardly, then it becomes important to distinguish
various kinds of demands in the same way that the data on
demand collected must be classified and analyzed (see
Chapter V.). The specific conditions influencing demand will
determine, from line to line, the need for separate schedules
to maintain the desired load factor. A line serving a major
university and linking it to one or more other university or
entertainment areas may experience a sharp increase in usage
on Friday and Saturday nights;15 this same line may experi-
ence a surge of riding on the day before a holiday, and
MMMMMMMMM1P
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sharply reduced riding during the holiday. None of these
trends would be seen on a residential feeder line.
Similarly, habitual deviations in service (discussed
further under Actual Running Time and Actual Headway) or
the dispersal of passengers through a train are factors
which the transit company can and should control if it wishes
to be consistent in the application of its objectives.
Blaming the higher load factors in the center cars on the
passengers' unwillingness to disperse through the train
accomplishes nothing. The tendency to cluster towards the
center of the train is due to the placement of station
entrances and exits. The solution, if the scheduled average
load factor is desired in each car, and not merely on paper,
is to run shorter trains more often.1 6
Such a solution will, in cases where additional man-
power is not available (see discussion of Work Program),
cost more. The management may decide, based on what informa-
tion is available to them on the sensitivity of demand to the
probability of finding seats, that it would be better to run
longer trains with standees in the center cars. What is
important, and sought for as the outcome of the application
of the method proposed herein, is that a clear, measurable
evaluation of these alternatives is possible, and that the
state of the loading in the trains is pictured more
realistically for the decision-makers.
Finally, in addition to deciding on what load factor
is a desirable objective under varying conditions, and on
what percentage of passengers should experience this load
factor, the IDC should also address itself to the question
of duration of the stipulated load: that is, for how long
or over what length of route and time is management willing
to operate the load factor. Obviously a maximum load which
occurs for only a few minutes can be set at a higher rate
than one which lasts for a major part of the journey, from
the passenger's viewpoint. This same consideration should
apply to the operating company's thinking.
Doolittle notes that
In order to furnish ten passengers with seats for
a mile trip, it may be necessary to run a car with
seats for forty passengers five miles. The two
hundred seat miles furnished for ten passengers
miles may impose a burden on the service that is
not to the best interest of the patrons as a
whole.17
He thus suggests that the relevant figure to be considered
is not seats and passengers but seat miles and passenger
miles. There is, however, an alternative solution to this
problem. While it may be unwise to provide 200 seat miles
for ten passenger miles, a more equitable load distribution
may be achieved by the use of shortlines. In other words, it
may not be necessary to run the additional seats the full
3/0
length of the line. 18
In deciding on the load factors to be scheduled, it
would be well for the management to be aware too of the way
in which diverse but less measurable factors affect the
passenger's perception of an adequate level of comfort. In
the same treatise quoted above, Doolittle summarizes the
results of surveys in Milwaukee and Cleveland which showed
that the maximum load factor passengers would tolerate
. . was thought to be greater in winter than in
summer; for a short ride rather than for a long one;
when the majority of passengers are male rather than
female; professional men rather than laborers; and
teamsters rather than tannery or glue factory
workers.(p. 207)
Before closing the discussion of loading, it should
also be noted that heavy loads (high load factors) may be a
cause of higher accident rates, and thus of claims for
injury and damages. Statistical investigation of this effect
would probably be most fruitful. It is clear that there is
a greater hazard of slipping, pushing, etc. in a crowded
vehicle or on a crowded platform. In addition, it is harder
for a bus driver to see the rear exit in a crowded bus.
The latter was probably a prime reason for the high
rear-door accident rate (doors closing on exiting passengers)
that prompted a number of transit systems to equip their
buses with passenger-operated rear doors--although the
C3, ~--
passengers emphatically dislike these, particularly the
kind which require pushing open and not merely stepping on
a tread.
Actual Headway, Running Time and Terminal Time
Scheduled Frequency and scheduled Speed are controlled,
as discussed earlier in this chapter, by scheduled headway
and scheduled running time. However, a measure is needed of
the actual performance of the schedule on paper, since the
headway and running time will vary for reasons similar to
those described above in discussing variations in actual
loads.
If the scheduled running time is either too loose or
too tight, measurements of the actual running time will
reveal this. At present, where the runnifig time in New York
or Boston on subway or bus lines is tight in rush hours,
resulting in erratic headways (due to the lack of recovery
time along the line) and occasionally late terminal departures
(where terminal time is insufficient to recover time lost
along the line), there is a tendency to not adjust the run-
ning or terminal time because of the additional cost; similarly,
where running time is too loose in the non-rush hours, it is
often not tightened because of the lack of identifiable cost
savings.
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In the rush hour, or in any situation of congestion,
the loads on the vehicles are sufficiently heavy so that
perturbations in the scheduled running time will affect
headway and load adversely, as described in Chapter II.
Chapter V discusses the effects of such disturbances in
service on demand and strongly suggests that the variation
in revenue may often be a relevant consideration.
For example, the data on the Harvard to Dudley bus
line of the MBTA in Chapter V19 show a daily revenue loss of
$150 (1,500 passengers x 100). It would be difficult to
ascertain how many of these people chose to use the subway
stations along the line instead; and conversely how many
reverted to other modes who formerly used the line as a
feeder to other bus or subway lines. Assuming that these
effects balance out each other, the loss of $150 a day is
self-contained and the result of the less reliable headway
due to the shortened running time. In reducing the running
time, no mileage was saved, but three drivers and three buses
in the morning and evening peak hours were saved.
Observations by the author indicate that in the morning,
restoring one bus would be sufficient, but that in the even-
ing peak, all three should be returned to achieve the former
reliability of service.20 This would require one bus, 2 1 two
straight run drivers (available for additional work in non-rush
hours) and one swing-run driver, or $143 per day.22
Thus it appears that the IBTA may have not only
increased trip costs for some of its riders, but also may
have incurred a loss itself. The need for evaluating the
variation in actual headway and running time arises from
existing situations where it is desirable to know in advance
the probable effect on revenue of changes in the schedule
which would affect the actual measures. The variation in
running time determines the amount of reserve to be allowed
in running time and/or terminal time to maintain the desired
percentage adherance to scheduled headways, loads and running
times.
Acceptable limits to the frequency of and variation of
departures from scheduled running time would constitute an
IDC, and can be measured by:
1. Frequency distribution of lateness at various
points--i.e., number or percentage of trains on time, number
of trains or buses one to three minutes late, number of
vehicles four to six minutes late, etc. A similar distribu-
tion to the left (early trains or buses) would also be
appropriate in applicable situations. Figure 5 is an example
of such a distribution. It is based on fifteen scheduled
arrivals at Flatbush and Nostrand Avenues, Brooklyn, on a
major bus line operating from downtown Brooklyn for Thursday,
May 7, 1964, and constructed from New York City Transit
Authority survey summaries. 23
Figure 5
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For comparison, Figure 6 is a chart for the seven
scheduled arrivals from 8:40 to 9:20 PM on the same day.
Thursday is late-store-opening night in New York, and the
congestion on the main shopping artery which this route
serves creates a substantial deviation in actual running
time. This illustrates the importance of classifying such
frequency distributions by non-homogeneous days of the week
and time of day. Note that at this hour, the scheduled
running time is 35 minutes, as opposed to 41 minutes in
Figure 5.
Figure 6
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This information could also be recorded as variations
in running times, rather than in arrival times. For the two
examples shown above, the variation on the first would
encompass 40 to 47 minutes on a 41-minute scheduled time,
and on the second 41 to 45 minutes on a 35-minute scheduled
time.
It is important to know when and where this variation
occurs. The route being used in this example has five on-
line checkpoints, as well as the two terminals. Present
procedure is to compute the average running time over the
period of each scheduled running time. This relays insuffi-
cient information for the method proposed. For example, on
Saturday, the average for each portion is often computed
over 12 hours, although actual running time may vary con-
siderably within this period.24  In the above example, the
geographical as well as temporal location of the variations
is relevant. Time may be lost in certain areas, and not in
others. 25 Thus a second IDC would require the limits to the
variations to apply to homogeneous time periods and route
segments.
Why time is lost, or gained, in actual running time
over scheduled running time, is often an important question.
In the second example above, the average demand at the peak
point on the line leaving downtown Brooklyn, is about 12
~37
passengers/minute from 8:30 to 9:50 PM.26 The scheduled
headway increases during this time from every four to every
7-1/2 minutes, producing large fluctuations in loading (the
actual headway varied frorm 3 to 12 minutes). On the four
buses with loads of from 48 to 55 passengers, the mean run-
ning time for this stretch2 7 was 8-1/2 minutes. On the
eight buses with loads of from 76 to 92 passengers, the mean
running time for the same stretch of route was 12 minutes.
Since the loads varied throughout this time period, it seems
likely that the actual running time could be reduced by
decreasing the scheduled headway (as an alternative to
increasing scheduled running time to correspond with actual
observations).
Another way of structuring this in-formation is to
record the range of arrival times at selected points over
the course of a week, a month, or a year, for each scheduled
interval. If the normal flow of traffic allows a train or a
bus to make a trip in 27 to 30 minutes, how often will it
take less than 25? More than 35? More than 40? How much
variation will there be from day to day? Will it take 27
to 30 minutes four out of every five days, or only two out
of every five days?
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Predictability of Deviations
It is important to know the extent to which variations
in arrival times and running times are the result of specific
causes, and the extent to which they are completely random.
This will indicate whether it is possible to measure expected
variation of delay, and thus incorporate it into the
schedule. If, for instance, the variation is described by
a Poisson distribution,28 the task of measuring variation
of delay is easier than if no such distribution fits.
On a rapid transit system, most of the variation in
running time in non-rush hours is due to mechanical failures
of various sorts; the system has sufficient capacity to
handle sudden surges or ebbs of passenger flow. On the sur-
face system, a mechanical failure on one bus will not hold
up those behind it (unless high passenger/seat ratios produce
crowding on the doubled interval). Delays are due more to
external conditions, which are more predictable than are
breakdowns.
For example, the main arterial streets and river
crossings in Boston and Cambridge are often more congested
on Friday afternoons than other afternoons.2 9 The causes
vary from concerts at Symphony Hall to weekend ingress and
egress of college and university students, and the effects
are measurable. Bus lines operating on these arteries should
maintain separate scheduled running times on Friday afternoons,
to avoid excessive costs the other four days, and inadequate
service on Friday. Running time data should be.analyzed
separately in conformance with this fact.
"One-shot" changes in running times are also often
predictable. More running time should be allowed during a
snowstorm, in a street under repair, on a day when there is
-a demonstration, etc. The precise determination of how much
running time should be allowed can sometimes be based on
previous experience, while other times must result from
educated guesses.
The actual running time and actual headway are inter-
locked, as the above examples show. There is another kind of
variation not discussed above, however, that is more directly
a headway problem, although arising out of disturbances in
running time. This is the problem of on-time departures from
a terminal. On a rapid transit system, this is measured by
the frequency and extent of "flex" schedules, that is, of
rescheduling terminal departures on larger headways due to
late arrivals. For example, if arrivals on a scheduled three-
minute headway are known to be 12 minutes late starting with
a 7:58 arrival, and then close in to on time with an 8:34
arrival, the flex would look like Table 5. . .
Scheduled
Arrival
7:40
43
46
_49
52
55
58-
8:01
04
07
10
13
16
19
22
25
28
31
34
TABLE 5
Hypothetical "Flex" Schedule.
Actual Scheduled
Arrival Leave
7:48
51
54
V 57
V 8:00
l 03
8:10 06
12 09
14 12
16 15
18 18
20 to Yard
22 22
24 26
26 30
28 to Yard
30 34
32 38
42
The flex schedule creates riding conditions not pro-
vided for in the normal schedule--more crowded during the
early part, less traffic towards the tail end. These condi-
tions may prevent adherence to scheduled running time on the
return trip. (In cases where there is no terminal capacity--
for example, to hold a train 13 minutes in the case cited
above--then trains must simply leave late.)
Where late arrivals are due to controllable conditions,
such as predictable surges in loading, the correct solution
may not be increases in terminal time. However, in most cases,
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Flex
Leave
7:52
56
8:00
04
08
12
15
18
21
25
27
30
33
36
39
Vi'
such as delays resulting from equipment failure, the schedule
solution would be increasing terminal times--requiring one
or more additional trains for peak service.30 The appro-
priate per cent of times the operating company is willing to
resort to disruptions of service to passengers and late
departures is another IDC and will dictate the appropriate
terminal time (subject to terminal capacity). Such a deci-
sion, however, requires additional information, including:
1. The per cent of time service must be disrupted or
headways lengthened so that the passenger:
a. Believes it happens frequently, and
b. believes it is the normal situation--along
with the attendant loss of revenue (this can be compared to
the number of advertising exposures neces'ary to reach X7 of
the market).
2. The cost of providing more reliable service by
lengthening terminal times. If trains are scheduled to lay
up in the yard while crews have longer terminal times, the
cost may be zero. If there are no trains or crews available,
however, the cost will be significant.
3. The cost of late arrivals, late departures, and
flex schedules in overtime, late inspections, lack of avail-
able equipment and crews at return terminals.
On bus lines, with no communication along the route,
even if there is a dispatcher at the terminal, there is no way
of knowing how late buses will arrive. The consequences are
irregular departures. If there is a half hour gap arriving
at a terminal due to a delay along the line, and neither
running time nor terminal time compensates for this, there
will be a half hour gap leaving. (This sometimes happens,
for example, at Park Street, Government Center or North
Station in Boston, because there is no terminal time
scheduled.) "Flex" schedules are thus not possible, and
sufficient time must be allowed at the terminal to leave on
time the per cent of times desired, as discussed earlier.
The result of inadequate running time or terminal
31time, coupled with late arrivals, is described in Chapter II.
It is the "bunching" or queuing of buses. The same effect
can also occur due to abandoned vehicles or trains. When a
scheduled interval is removed from service because of an
accident, breakdown, or shortage of vehicles, the actual head-
way at the point of removal is twice the scheduled headway.
As with late departures, this can result in further deviation
from the scheduled running time and headway due to the exces-
sive loading on the next vehicle. And, as is the case with
late departures, additional vehicles, although perhaps not
men, would be required. 3 2
Recent developments in two-way radio communication
hold promise for the reduction of variations in headways
on bus lines. In New York, as a result of a successful
demonstration on the Lexington Avenue subway,33 .all buses
and subway cars are being equipped with two-way'radios linked
to a central console for each system.34 In Chicago, a
demonstration of an "automatic bus monitoring system" is
underway.35 In St. Louis, two-way radios are being installed
on all the buses.36 Such systems should be a future con-
sideration in alternative solutions to the problems discussed
above.
One important application of wayside communication
would, for example, be the more effective use of "gap"
vehicles. These are vehicles stationed along a route or
at a terminal in excess of the schedule requirements, for the
purpose of filling in gaps in the scheduled headway. There is
usually no way at present for buses stationed as gap vehicles
to know when and where perturbations are occuring over a line,
or how severe these may be. With radio communication between
each bus on a line and a central console, or even directly
with the gap bus, the gap vehicle could be dispatched with
certainty into a spreading headway gap, and saved from
unnecessary trips where the deviation is not as bad as it
appears at the point where the gap bus is stationed. This
would sometimes prove an effective alternate to increasing
terminal times. 3 7
Accuracy of Running Time Observations
The actual running time can be observed by checkers
standing in the street or on platforms, or by checkers riding
the vehicles. In the discussion on this subject in Chapter
II,38 it was pointed out that the former method does not
reveal where running time is being lost or gained through
the driver's efforts at maintaining schedule ("slow" running
or excessive speed), where it is being lost or gained because
of traffic or passenger loading, and so on. It is not
unreasonable to expect vehicle operators to cloak excessive
running time by slow running when checks are being taken.
However, on other days these same operators will, for the
most part, run at normal street speed (or full traction
power) and be ahead of time, where scheduled running time is
loose.39
Slow running creates an impediment to other vehicles
on the street, and hence a less safe situation as automobiles
and trucks attempt to pass the bus, or tailgate it. On both
surface and rapid transit lines, slower operation is more
costly both in manpower and mileage costs.40 The slower the
operation of a line, the smaller one might expect its passen-
ger market to be. Slow running, which is never done uniformly
by all operators, contributes to "bunching" of buses, as
discussed in Chapter Ii.4l Thus there are compelling
reasons for obtaining an accurate measure of actual running
time.
Work Program
The work program or run schedule divides the operating
schedule into runs for the required number of crews (see
Chapter II). While the formula given in Chapter IV is
useful for preliminary estimates of entire schedule changes,
there is no specific formula that can substitute for a specific
analysis of the work program in evaluating incremental service
changes. The determination of added or subtracted manpower
costs is discussed in Chapter VI. What is of concern here
is the evaluation of the work program itself, in terms of
the nieasures of efficiency suggested in Chapter IV. These
measures would constitute the IDC for Work Program.
Two of these measures--percentage of paid hours actu-
ally worked and excess of terminal time, lunch, etc. over
minimum required, indicate the amount of slack available for
additional service in a schedule. This slack may not be
correctable through more efficient run-cutting. The cause
is usually either a running time not optimal for the eight-
hour work day, lunch and report allowances included; or a
predetermined scheduled headway in off-peak hours not
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requiring the full utilization of all the operators required
in the peak periods. The optimal running tines listed in
Chapter VI for lowest per-mile operating cost,42 for example,
represent the most efficient use of the operator's eight-
hour day. But if a rapid transit route has a three-hour
round trip time, only two daily trips can be achieved and
some slack will have to exist.
The value of analyzing these measures of efficiency is
that the location of such slack may suggest either a change
in route, through shortlining (see discussion under Frequency)
or extension, or a change in headway to achieve either lower
costs or, for the same number of operators, higher revenues.
The example earlier in this chapter. (Table 2), arising from
the application of the IDC and alternative solutions to
Speed, could just as easily have arisen from a consideration
of the Work Program. Under the original schedule, there was
considerable slack in terminal time (which ;in turn was the
cause of the lower average speed); the route extension
required no additional men for this reason.
Where contract work rules permit--indeed, analysis of
the Work Program may suggest to the management that an effort
should be made to include the possibility in the regulations
if it is not now there--runs on a given line with spare
pieces of time left over might be used to operate other lines
or short shuttle runs. Any such improvements would involve
only the mileage costs, and would thus be more likely to
produce a positive marginal NOC (assuming the sensitivity of
revenue to a given change is known). The men might also be
used, where possible under contract, for platform or street
supervision or passenger guidance, incurring no cost at all.
Similarly, such analysis would reveal where better
service might be provided outside of the peak hours at only
the additional mileage cost. In the case of rapid transit
operation with multiple-car trains, it may suggest an alter-
native of operating shorter trains more often, at no
additional cost at all.
As an example of the evaluation of Work Program effi-
ciency, consider the schedule and work program shown in the
Appendix in Chapter II. The total paid hours for this line
on the weekday schedule in 1966 was 570.16 (for motormen,
excluding board tricks). 43 Of this number, 13.66 hours were
for overtime or spread penalty,44 and the remainder for 69
eight-hour's-pay-guaranteed runs plus one special run paying
four and a half hours. Yet the actual hours worked, including
lunch time, sign-on and sign-off was only 423.9.
The thirty-seven runs with lunch hours were entitled
to a minimum of 21.6 hours of lunch time.45 They were given
44.9 hours, making the average lunch hour more than twice the
required minimum. Thus the total number of hours available
for additional train operation (without considering generous
time allowances for terminal movements between Dyre Avenue
and East 180th Street) comes to 155.9 hours.46
Using only part of this available slack,47 it would
be possible to schedule a shortline from 149th Street and
Third Avenue to South Ferry, on a ten-minute headway making
the combined express headway on Lexington Avenue in the
midday 3-1/3 minutes instead of the present 5 minutes from
9:30 AM to 2:30 PM. Table 6 shows the runs used for this
additional service, their present and proposed actual working
hours, and the scheduled intervals assigned to each.48
Here is a case where not only is it possible to reduce
the standee loads along Lexington Avenue without running
extra seats the full length of the line,49 but to do it
without any additional labor cost beyond the 27 minutes in
overtime.
Another measure of efficiency is the amount of overtime
reported daily beyond the scheduled overtime. An excess of
non-scheduled-overtime would indicate that either running
time or recovery time is insufficient. It may, for example,
prove necessary to have lunch hours twice the minimum
required, as noted on the previous page, in order to allow
sufficient recovery time from rush hour delays to avoid
Table 6
Assignment of Extra Midday Shortline Runs, Lexington Express
Hours worked
Proposed
20
21
30
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
46
47
48
49
50
62
Assigned trips
(leaving 149th Street)
Run No.* Actual
Now
7:39
7:59
5:44
4:21
4:54
4:23
4:40
4:33
5:10
4:35
4:39
3:57
5:34
6:09
4:03
4:49
4:18
4:19
5:22
5:48
4:49
5:38
* From IRT Division Work Program File # 3 - 1743A
+ Extra trips achieved by shortening lunch hours and eliminating
deadhead layup times (trains used in extra service).
7:39 +
7:59+
7:15
6:58
7:42
7:03
7:44
7:22
7:41
8:11
6:17
7:09
7:10
7:50
6:30
6:40
7:24
7:12
8:07
7:32
7:28
8:09
9:27
9:57
11:57
9:37,
12:07,
9:47,
10:17,
12:17,
1:47
11:17
1:57
1:17,
.12:57
12:2 7
10:37
10:47
1:07,
12:47,
10:27,
2:17
10:07,
12:37
10:57
1:27
11:07
11:37
1:37
2:35
2:27
2:07
11:47
11:27
23c
overtime payments and late departures.
Smaller changes, involving one or two trips, will
often be suggested by analysis of the work program. The
schedule specifications should never be considered fixed.
The whole process becomes much more flexible when analysis
of the work program is used as feedback into further modi-
fication of the operating schedule. For example, it may
turn out, through evaluation of the work program, that a man
is available to run a half hour headway for an additional
hour on a low-density line that goes to hourly service at
night. The essentially free labor on the extra run may
make the difference between the extra mileage cost and the
extra revenue (marginal NOC) small enough to warrant sched-
uling the trip.
Transfer Volumes
The most common Initial Directive Criterion for deter-
mining whether any change in service should be made as an
outcome of analysis of this variable would be the minimum
volume or percentage of transfer necessary to warrant a
change. Both measures are relevant, because a high percentage
of boarding passengers having transferred from another line
may still be a low volume. For example, about 20% of the
passengers arriving at Arborway-Forest Hills station in Boston
on the various feeder bus lines transfer to the Arborway-
Huntington streetcar line,50 and comprise over 90% of the
passengers on the car line leaving the terminal. But the
number of passengers per vehicle is small, and a through
service would not be warranted.
Because of the diverse destinations of passengers on
any given line, as is seen in the postcard surveys (which
are the best source of information on the destinations of
transferring passengers), small transfer volumes at any
given point on a line would be more common than not, except
at certain terminals, such as feeder stations. A small
end-to-end transfer movement would be easier to accommodate
through combining services than would an on-line volume.
In the above example, a combination of the Huntington line
with a principal bus feeder operating on similar headways in
the rush hour and multiple headways of the car line in the
non-rush hour would be feasible were it not for the techno-
logical non-compatibility of the lines.
The principal aim of analyzing transfer volumes is to
determine where through service or rerouting might serve a
greater number of passengers and reduce the need to transfer.
Why do this at all? Many in the transit industry will argue
that combining or through-routing two lines will be infeasi-
ble because traffic congestion reduces the reliability of
MMMM 
I I
longer routes, and the meshing of headways will produce too
much service on one or the other of the lines. 51
The statistical tests of data on the effects of through
service in Chapter V showed that the institution of through
service produced significant increases in riding.52 Even
where the transfer volume is small, two end-to-end lines
operating on a 12 and 15-minute headway respectively would
most likely attract more than enough additional riders on a
combined 12-minute headway to offset the additional cost.
If one line is on a 30-minute headway and the other on a 12-
minute headway, a combined headway of 24 minutes with a
shortline to fill in the 24-minute headway on the present
12-minute route would be a suitable solution.
The shortline vehicles would'have the same load factor
at the peak load point as the through vehicles if the through
riding being serviced by the combination was bound for des-
tinations prior to the peak load point, as was the case in
the example cited above. This, however, is one factor that
must be analyzed. It is less likely to be the case on a
subway line to downtown:,for example, the 145th Street-Lenox
shortline on the Broadway-7th Avenue express in New York has
lower load factors at the peak load point than the through
service from White Plains Road, because many of the latter
riders are bound for or beyond the peak load point.53
It should further be noted that in avoiding the through-
routing of services, a transit system will end up with many
short routes, with a greater proportion of the total vehicle
time being spent in terminals. The combination of two lines
may often wholly eliminate two intermediate terminal times,
thus compensating in part for the headway differences.
As for the reliability of the service, certainly there
would be no problem in non-rush hours on most lines; keeping
two lines separate while traffic is heavy may be a feasible
compromise. However, the increased variation in running time,
headway and load resulting from a longer line would be no
different from the present variability of these factors on
existing lines operating through congested areas, in rush
hours and at other times as well.54 The placement of a
starter (dispatcher or street supervisor) at the original
intermediate terminal points would effectively place the two
line segments on the same reliability basis as they operated
on when separate. The dispatcher would regulate the departure
time of buses coming from either direction by holding them
to their scheduled time (the buses would have a few minutes
on-line recovery time). Only major traffic jams or street
blockages would then adversely affect the reliability of
service on the second line. The increase in riding due to the
through service would probably pay for the dispatcher. If
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the bus drivers were properly trained and given the incentive,
they might even dispatch themselves.
This last point bears some thought. On most bus lines,
there are no dispatchers at the terminals to start the buses
off on time; but they leave, for the most part, on time when
they know they will be penalized for early or late departures
(not, of course, for late departures outside their control
due to the lack of terminal recovery time for late arrivals).
Most cases in New York, for example, of late departure from
terminals are due to congestion at the bus garages and the
late arrival, as a result, of put-ins from the garage to the
terminal.55 The drivers usually leave on time from the
terminals because the importance of doing this has been
stressed to them. It is probable that the management could
obtain equally good results by stressing the importance of
on-time departures on-line, as well as other techniques to
narrow gaps in service during periods of congestion; it may
not be necessary to impose the sanctions used in Cleveland,
either.56
On-line transfer volumes to crossing or connecting
lines present less opportunities for through service. Where
one line is at its terminal and the other gives to it large
numbers of transfer passengers without replenishing its own
load, through-routing of alternate buses might be feasible,
particularly if the terminal line operates on approximately
half the headway of the donating line. An example of thig
might be the transfer from the 1st and 2nd Avenue bus lines
in Manhattan to the 49th-50th Street crosstown bus line at
all hours of the day. As many as one-third to one-half of
the passengers coming from north of 49th Street on the 1st
and 2nd Avenue line transfer to the crosstown line and vice-
versa.5 7 Since the peak load point on the 2nd Avenue line
is at 57th Street, the buses operating -south of 49th Street
may well have only about half the load at the peak point;
every other bus from the north might thus turn into and
continue down 49th Street to the west.
Analysis of load data at other points along this line,
however, indicates that the loads on the 1st and 2nd Avenues
route are replenished at the peak point in the opposite
direction during much of the day. Thus any vehicle diverted
crosstown on 49th Street would have to be replaced on the
return trip. This means that the through route would require
additional vehicles operating north of 49th Street. Further
analysis of the 49th-50th Street route data also shows that
an almost equal volume of passengers transfer from the
opposite direction lines on (for westerly movements) 1st and
3rd Avenues.
In evaluating such a case, it may also be useful to
know the destinations of the transferring passengers. The
Second Avenue line does not provide free transfers to either
the 57th Street or the 42nd Street crosstown lines. If such
transfers were permitted, the transfer volume nright spread
out more evenly over the three lines and make through-routing
down 49th Street less feasible. This would depend on the
percentage of passengers now transferring at 49th Street
who are ultimately bound for destinations in central or west
midtown above 53rd Street or below 46th Street. Such infor-
mation would have to be obtained from a postcard survey.
As would be the case for any of the other state vari-
ables, Transfer Volume must be evaluated by homogeneous time
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periods. It might turn out that, for example, a much
greater proportion--60% or greater--of Second Avenue line
passengers tranfer to the crosstown line at night, because
of the concentration of entertainment activity on the west
side in that area. A through service of alternate buses at
night only would then be suitable consideration. The need
for a special route to serve a school or industrial plant
might be discovered in this way. Or, a heavy transfer volume
might result from a special event, such as a ballgame or
parade.
Unserved Origins and Destinations
There are two sets of data from which IDC's can be
formed for this variable. One is information on existing
routes and schedules and on existing population and activity
concentrations. Without specific information on the trip
patterns in terms of origin and destination link volumes, it
is still possible to evaluate the "route generality" of a
line.5 9
Since most passengers on bus lines come from one-
fourth mile or closer,60 it is a logical corollary that only
a small proportion of a population living greater distances
that the quarter mile from a bus service (or one-half to two-
thirds of a mile from a rapid transit line) will go anywhere
by transit, particularly if they have access to automobiles.
Thus one IDC may be that wherever a distance of .8, or 1.0
miles or greater exists between services, a new route should
be considered. Whether such a route is implemented would
depend on the population density, number of cars per house-
hold, focus or dispersal of trip destinations from the area,
etc. At the same time, it may be worth considering abandoning
a service which is an eighth of a mile on either side from
other lines and not a strong line. Here again, the decision
must rest on alternative possibilities of rescuing the service,
such as extensions or route modifications, as well as the
567'
extent to which it serves a different set of destinations
from its neighboring lines.
Hours of service would be another piece of information
from which IDC's could be formed. Simply, the lack of ser-
vice in the evening or on Saturday or Sunday on any route
serving a residential area, or activities such as entertain-
ment or hospital facilities might call for an analysis of
the effect of providing service. Frequently such service
lacks on newer routes (that is, routes established since
1945) because of a reluctance on the part of management to
provide service in these hours unless pushed to do so. The
sight of a vehicle with only a few passengers on it at night
is disturbing to most transit operators, and they wished to
avoid the possibility of adding to their deficit, particularly
where the new services served communities or areas of high
automobile ownership.
Yet the provision of such service, particularly in a
feeder operation, need not be a loss proposition. For example,
in early 1965, after pressure from residents of the area,
evening service on weekdays only was instituted in Boston on
the Wakefield and Truman to Mattapan bus line, as an "experi-
ment." The route is paralleled for about 45% of its service
area by another line to Wolcott Square from Mattapan. On
Wednesday, January 13, 1965, the Wolcott line registered 140
passengers inbound and outbound at Mattapan from 7:00 to
11:00 PM. Three months later, on Wednesday, April 28, the
new service alone had added 117 riders. By June 7, 1967
(also a Wednesday), with riding on the Wolcott line up to
182 passengers (probably in part due to the combined headway
providing 20-minute instead of 40-minute service along River
Street), the new service was carrying 155 riders.6 1
Making the conservative assumption that no riders
boarded at Cleary Square (although there are stores and
entertainment facilities there), that the 155 riders did
not represent new round trips but only new one-way trips
(although 137 of them were outbound, and thus clearly had
gone in prior to 7:00 PM), that the increase of 42 passengers
on the Wolcott line was not due to the service change, and
that the 155 new passengers were paying the average fare of
230 postulated earlier in this chapter (although there is
reason to believe that a higher proportion of evening riding
is bound for downtown Boston, hence paying the 30: fare; the
postcard survey did not continue past 6:00 PM), the MBTA
gained at the very least about $36 from the new service, at
a cost of four hours of labor and 47 miles of vehicle opera-
tion, or $41.62 Because of the string of conservative
assumptions above, it is probably safe to assume that NOC
was actually increased.
The logic of discontinuing off-peak services is also
not entirely clear when the data is analyzed. For example,
in 1960, 713 passengers were counted arriving and leaving
Central Square on the Oak Square (then Faneuil) line. 63
At 23., this would constitute a revenue of $164. Actually,
MBTA data show that the fare rise in 1961 brought virtually
no gain in revenue on Sunday on many lines. 64 Under the
1960 fare structure, the revenue would have been 180 a passen-
ger, or $129.65 Assuming that revenue would not have
increased, the cost, $157, would have exceeded the revenue.
But again, all that would be needed to reach a break-even
point would be some riders on-line, disembarking before the
peak load point (indeed, a Church bus is still run in
Brighton in the morning); a smaller passenger loss due to the
fare increase; a higher proportion of riders transferring to
the subway; or a further increase due to a combined headway
with the Watertown line in Cambridge and Allston (by 1962,
Watertown line patronage on Sunday had dropped from 674 to
400; it is interesting to note that although riding was ini-
tially lighter on this line, it was the other line that was
eliminated).
Service linking important institutional and activity
areas, based on map analysis and data on employment, visitors
(to museums or hospitals), enrollment at universities or
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observations of automobile congestion at such locations,
would constitute another IDC. For example, there is at
present no direct service from Harvard Square to the area in
Boston about three miles distant containing Harvard Medical
School, several major hospitals, Boston University, Simmons,
Northeastern University and Boston State Teachers College,
the Fine Arts and Gardner Museums, etc. A subway trip with
a change through downtown at a fare of 30t or a bus and
streetcar trip at 40 or 50, is required. The commonality of
interests between the two areas, and the high density of
activities in both would almost surely guarantee that even a
l0i fare bus service would prove viable.
When such a situation is located, it is of course
desirable to use other data to corroborate the finding and
to estimate the demand for the service. For example, the
postcard data from the Harvard to Dudley bus line show only
one trip out of some 500 sampled bound for any of these
areas. 66 Clearly no one uses this more expensive, although
somewhat faster alternative. The home-interview survey shows
an even more compelling figure. Out of over 1,000 one-way
trips to three zones comprising a major part of this area
(the volume is probably underestimated),67 only 25% were
made by transit. The modal split to an equi-distant area
served directly by the Harvard-Dudley line was 58%.68 These
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findings seem to confirm the original analysis.
The above example illustrates a principal manner in
which home-interview origin and destination survey data can
be used. The IDC to be applied would be either' a minimum
desired modal split for a given trip purpose or trip destina-
tion (the percentage transit trips should obviously be higher
for trips bound for areas with inadequate parking and highly
dense activities, such as the Central Business District),
depending on income and automobile ownership (again, a
higher modal split would be expected for a low income area);
or, rather than a minimum, a comparative analysis such as
the above: if the split is 58% in one corridor, what can be
done to raise it to that level in another.
As with the analysis of transfer Volumes, in addition
to the percentage modal split, the volume of trips involved
is relevant. A low percentage using transit and a high volume
would merit consideration of a new route or other major
service alterations; a low percentage using transit in a
movement of 100 people might be impossible to raise without
incurring large costs (negative NOC), unless it took place
at one specific time. Further, changing the modal split on a
low volume of trips would have less of an impact on the
external environment as well; that is, on highway or street
congestion.
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Time of day can, as pointed out above, also be impor-
tant. Analysis by homogeneous time periods would be in
order. Trip purpose and the nature of the destination would
be equally important: shopping trips to a planned suburban
shopping mall will be difficult to win over to a transit
service. This is not to say, however, that such trips
should not be analyzed, even if the best modal split would
produce only 5% for the transit system. The important
question, in the end, is not how many trips or what share of
the trips are involved, but rather whether serving these
trips would better meet the stipulated objectives of the
management, be they maximum marginal NOC, break-even, service
to all destinations attracting 5% or more of the trips from
a given area, etc. In the above case, a short rerouting or
extension of a line might bring a higher NOC even for-only a
5% share of the trips, or a few trips an hour. No alternative
should be rejected without first evaluating-its consequences.
Another IDC using origin and destination data may be
total volume of trips, rather than the share or modal split.
That is, even where no trips are made by transit, it may be
specified that any movement between zones or groups of zones
greater than a given volume, and amenable to being served by
bus (or rapid transit) service, would be considered to consti-
tute a deficiency in the State variables. For example, the
Boston home interview data show 2,386 one-way trips daily from
the area in west Somerville and. east Medford centered around
Tufts University to a large shopping complex at Wellington
Circle across the Mystic River some 1.5 to 2 miles distant.69
Only 103 of these trips are made by transit: the complex was
opened gradually since the Second World War,70 and no new
services have been provided in this area in that time. In
order to reach the center, it is necessary to travel all the
way in to Sullivan Square rapid transit station (or out to
Medford Square) and transfer to an infrequently run line
(the headway is 24 minutes).
In any case such as this, the analyst should always be
aware of the fact that providing a direct service to serve
this movement will also provide a link that will be used by
trips to other zones made more accessible. In the above
case, the population served will be able to reach most points
in Medford and Malden more easily through transferring to
other lines running through Wellington Circle; similarly,
the population living in adjacent areas in Somerville and
Cambridge can transfer to the new line to reach Wellington
Circle. The total number of such subsidiary trips in this
case is 2,907 one-way, of which 523 are presently being made
by transit.
As suggested previously, the origin and destination
data might also be used as the basis for additional objectives
on the part of management. Previously the objectives men-
tioned in this discussion centered around either costs (NOC)
or revenues (and thus passengers), quantities directly
measurable from the operation of the transit system. How-
ever, it may also be desired to specify objectives such as
serving any origin-destination trip link or group of such
zonal trip links above a given volume; or serving any move-
ment to a specific destination from an origin area comprising
X7 or greater of all the trips from that area; or providing
direct through service to the single most popular areal
destination for a given population (perhaps excluding the
downtown in cities with rapid transit systems).
In using home-interview origin and destination data,
care must be taken, as with postcard survey data, to be
informed of sources of error, 72 and of the limitations of the
survey. In Boston, for example, as in most other cities,
the interviews asked for all trips made the previous day.
Since interviews were generally not made on weekends, the
higher volume of trips to entertainment facilities on Friday
night through Sunday would not be reflected; nor would
recreational trips during the summer be captured. In addi-
tion, whole new complexes of destinations have arisen since
the 1963 surveys, specifically the Prudential Center,
Government Center and Charles River Park projects.
Sensitivity Analysis
In evaluating alternative changes designed to improve
the State of the system, the sensitivity of the outcomes to
changes in fixed elements or external influences should
always be examined. The probability of a change in these
variables outside the control of the transit management may
sometimes prove decisive in favoring one alternative over
another. While such analysis may not be as important in
dealing with incremental changes in service or in bus routes,
which can be changed again quickly to meet changing external
conditions (as opposed to the design of a capital-intensive
investment, such as the alignment of a rapid transit line),
it still is of value in picturing the extent to which the
success or failure of a given alternative depends on the
stability of the fixed and external variables.
For example, it is clear that a growth in population
would in general be more favorable than a decline in popula-
tion or a stable population from the management's point of
view. If two alternatives are possible, one serving an area
of known population growth, another of known decline, then
the probability of analysis based on present population or
service areas and predicting a break-even point succeeding
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Iwould clearly be higher in the area of population growth.
This need not uniformly be true; it may be that the
stipulated service has no capacity for additional riders,
and that adding service to accommodate new riders as popu-
lation grows will be necessary but uneconomic. Another
important consideration is that the area of population decline
may be a low-income area; political pressures, particularly if
it is a black community, may require placing the service
there, even though it may be--on the basis of the sensitivity
analysis--the less economic choice from management's view-
point. This would be a case of overriding community values,
and there will be many such cases in actual practice. An
axiom of this report, as should be clear by now, is that in
more cases than is now generally believed, what is better for
the community as a whole is often better for the operating
company as well.
Summary of Initial Directive Criteria
Frequency
Optimum Headway table (subject to recalculation on
examination of other State variables)
Minimum or Maximum Headway
Scheduled Connections
Speed
Minimum or maximum acceptable speed
Load
Stipulated Load factor
Direction of marginal NOC
Seats for all or Maximum load factor per vehicle
(as opposed to average)
Per Homogeneous Time Period
Duration of load
Actual Headway, Running Time and Terminal Time
.-Frequency and extent of departures from scheduled
-Per Homogeneous Time Period
-Per route segment
Relation to predictable deviations in external conditions
Percent late departures and disruptions in service
Work Program
Percent paid hours actually worked
Excess lunch or terminal time
Actual overtime
Transfer Volumes
Minimum volume or percent of transferring passengers
subject to replenishment further on and destination of
transfer passengers
Unserved Origins, Destinations, Activities
Unserved population and activity concentrations
("Route Generality")
Hours of service
Unserved linkages of institutional and activity areas
Minimum or comparative modal split (subject to volume)
Large total or directional volume of trips
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Footnotes
1. M.B.T.A. Timetables, Winter 1968.
2. See example in Chapter V, page//F.
3. Based on postcard survey data from 1963 (see Chapter V)
which show 50% of feeder bus riders transferring to
rapid transit, 30% to buses and 20% walking to their
destination.
4. Since no statistical hypothesis on the effect of coor-
dinated schedules could be developed on the strength of
present data, it was assumed that demand would not be
affected by the coordination. While this is an unlikely
assumption, the relative effect on NOC of the alterna-
tives tested would still be the same.
5. Chapter IV, page /4.
6. From transformation equations, see Chapter IV.
7. M.B.T.A. Timetables, Winter 1968.
8. From service area calculations, see Chapter V.
9. Assuming 2/3 of one-way passengers in the peak eight
'hours evenly distributed.
10. See Chapter V, page/K for definition of homogeneous
time periods. Variation over a large time period includ-
ing surges in loading caused by a ballgame, or precipitous
drops in loading caused by a downpour, would, over a
long enough time be random; but there is no point in
scheduling the same service for such widely varying
conditions (see the discussion on homogeneous time
periods in Chapter V).
11. See, for example, Chemical Rubber Co., C.R.C. Standard
Mathematical Tables, ed. Robert C. Weast, 13th Student
ed. (Cleveland, 1964), pp. 418-421.
12. Courtesy of the M.B.T.A. Timetable Department.
13. F. W. Doolittle, Cost of Urban Transportation Service
(American Electric Railway Association, 1916), p. 114-116.
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14. For example, on Saturday, Nov. 27, 1965, a spot-survey of
the Lexington Avenue local from 5:00 to 5:30 PM at the
peak point showed loads on the four trains surveyed of
between 80 and 130 passengers per car in the middle four
cars of the ten car trains, and loads of from 25 to 55
in the outer four cars (each car seats 40).
15. Observations by the author show loading in Cambridge on
the Harvard to Dudley line to be some three times as
heavy on Friday nights as on other weekday nights (the
same schedule is operated on all weekday nights); MBTA
daily revenue tabulations show total Friday revenue on
this line to be 10 to 15% above Monday through Thbrsday
revenue.
16. Op. cit., note 13, P. 117.
17. Nor is this a recent phenomenon: see Bion J. Arnold,
The Traffic of the Subway (N.Y. State Public Service
Commission, Dec. 31, 1908).
18. For example, the peak southbound daily load on the Third-
Lexington Avenues bus line in New York, at 61st Street,
is 14,583. At 23rd Street it is down to 7,126, and by
4th Street merely 2,522 (based on MaBSTOA checks on
March 30, 1967). Presently, of 630 vehicles passing the
peak point, 257 operate all the way 'to City Hall (26
minutes from 23rd Street), 527 operate as far as 6th
'Street, and all but 41 of the remaining 103 operate to
23rd Street (although the load at 42nd Street is 12,445).
Here is a case where substantially less service need be
operated on the outer portion of a line than at its peak
point.
19. See Chapter V, p./7Y.
20. There is less traffic congestion in the morning, and
thus less variation in running time; in addition, the
decrease in scheduled running time effected in the
Spring of. 1966 by the MBTA was greater in the evening
than in the morning.
21. The peak vehicle requirement in Boston is in the morning
rush hour.
22. See Chapter VI for cost derivations.
-i
23. Courtesy of New York City Transit Authority Surface
Timetable Department.
24. The average running time, for example, from Nostrand
Avenue to the next northern timepoint varies from 10.9
minutes from 9:00 to 10:00 AM (with only 11% of the
vehicles exceeding the average) to 13.9 minutes from
2:00 to 3:00 PM (with 33% of the vehicles exceeding
the average). The scheduled running time is 10 minutes.
25. For example, of 41 buses leaving the north terminal from
1:00 to 4:00 PM on Saturday, the average actual running
time to the first timepoint for 26 buses leaving on
time was 11 minutes; for 15 buses leaving late, it was
9 minutes. Most late departures were due to the opera-
tor's preference to "kill" the extra time in the terminal
stand rather than on the street (the scheduled running
time is 12 minutes).
26. Based on New York City Transit Authority survey summary
data.
27. From the north terminal to the first timepoint.
28. See page-Ct.
29. Based on recorded observations-and surveys, 1963 to 1967,
by the author.
30. The cost can be substantial. For example, a "flex"
schedule was operated in the morning on each of the
first 14 weekdays of January, 1967 from Utica Avenue
station in Brooklyn on the IRT subway division. The
delay over scheduled leaving time ranged from 5 to 27
minutes. Two extra trains (minimum scheduled terminal
time increased from 10 to 16 minutes) would have
eliminated only three of these "flex" days; three extra
trains (terminal time 19 minutes) would have enabled 8
days of schedule adherence. Four extra trains would have
been required to cut the number of "flex"days to only 3
out of fourteen. It is not even clear that there is
sufficient terminal capacity at Utica Avenue to handle
the scheduled 22-minute terminal layover time on the
three days when 5-6 minute "flex" schedules were
operated.
31. Pages
32. Operation of a smaller vehicle than scheduled can also
produce perturbations in running time and headway by
carrying an actual load greater than scheduled.
33. New York City Transit Authority, Two-Way Radio Communi-
cation Mass Transportation Demonstration Project, Final
Report, Project NY-MTD-8 (no date, publ. 1968). "The
Authority considers the demonstration a success . . .
it has committed itself to the extension of the two-way
radio system to all of its rapid transit and surface
divisions." (p. 3.)
34. According to The New York Times (May 15, 1968), p. 49,
equipping the 4,200 buses (2,500 of which were already
equipped as of the above date) will cost 7.2 million
dollars; operation and maintenance will cost 1.4 million
dollars a year. The system also provides a public
address system inside and outside of each bus and walkie-
talkies for curbside and patrol supervisors.
35. Chicago Transit Authority, Transit News (March, 1968),
p. 4. In addition to two-way radio communications and
an alarm system, the demonstration will provide for the
electronic transmittal of locations, bus and route num-
bers into computer storage, subject -to recall and visual
display at the control center.
36. 'Metropolitan, 64, 1 (Jan./Feb. 1968), 21-23.
37. A gap bus stationed, for example, at Nostrand and Flat-
bush Avenues southbound on Saturday would have made
21 trips between 10:00 AM and 10:00 PM on the day of the
survey (or two trips an hour to Avenue N and Flatbush)
if continuous information was available to it on approach-
ing headways. These trips would have closed gaps of
from 8 to 18 minutes on a scheduled four-minute headway.
38. Page 37.
39. Based on thirteen years of extensive observations by the
author; see also footnote 25.
40. See Chapter VI; also see discussion of Work Program,
this chapter.
41. Pages All-&
42. Pagen30.
43. IRT Division File # 3-1743A, Motormen and Conductors 1st
Position Daily Work Program, Courtesy New York City
Transit Authority Department of Schedules and Traffic
Studies.
44. See Chapter II for definition of these terms.
45. Based on 35 minute minimum. The other runs were either
trippers (less than six hours work) or swing runs,
requiring no lunch hour.
46. 556.5 less 423.9 plus 44.9 less 21.6.
47. Due to the non-optimal running time and also to the
extensive rush hour scheduled requirements.
48. Care was taken not to assign more than six hours per
block, or less than two hours between the AM and PM
blocks, on the swing runs.
49. See pages /O. The standee loads referred to are a
result of uneven distribution through the train. For
example, on March 31, 1966, the load-factors per hour at
14th Street and Lexington Avenue northbound in the first
six cars of the ten car trains from 11:00 AM to 3:00 PM
were 138%, 144%, 159%, and 160% per hour (according to
New York City Transit Authority surveys). On some trains,
the load factor exceeded 200% in these cars (the last
four cars consistently had seats).
50. Based on analysis of the postcard survey (see Chapter V).
51. According to the late Charles L. Patterson, chairman of
the New York City Transit Authority for about 12 years,
in a letter to Mr. Jason Fane dated November 14, 1960,
"Combining end-to-end lines, in order to create one long
line, is not sound practice, since such action would
result in operating more buses than necessary over the
more lightly patronized portion of the route. This fact,
and the inevitable reduction in revenue which would
follow, would add greatly to operational costs, making
such merger economically impractical."
52. 90% in the non-rush hours. See Table 6, Chapter V.
53. Based on New York City Transit Authority surveys.
54. The Harvard to Dudley line in Boston and the First and
Second Avenue lines in New York are two good examples
of low non-rush hour reliability indexes.
55. Or due to excessive scheduled running time. Based on
examination of New York City Transit Authority surveys
of the B-41 Flatbush Avenue line as well as numerous
observations over the last 13 years by the author.
56. Docking a driver one full day's pay for each minute he
is observed ahead of schedule. See Chapter II.
57. Based on observations by the author.
58. See Chapter V, page-/fC and Table 12.
59. See footnote 103 and page/fe, Chapter V.
60. See Table 8 and footnote 74, Chapter V.
61. Data courtesy of the M.B.T.A. Timetable Department.
62. See Chapter VI for cost data.
63. Based on M.B.T.A. Timetable Department survey, June 5,
'1960.
64. The system as a whole gained 3 to 4-1/2%. Data from
M.B.T.A. Accounting Department.
65. All passengers transferring paid 20t; the postcard survey
data show 80% transferring to either a subway or a bus
line.
66. Based on hand analysis of printout of coded cards for
this line.
67. Due to the coding errors discussed in footnote 3, Chapter
II, and footnote 110, Chapter V.
68. Based on Traffic Research Corporation output tabulations
of zonal trip interchanges by mode, zone 215 to zones
115, 116, 117 and 26, 27, 35, 114.
69. From above output. Zones 228, 229, 230 to 235, 236.
70. Based on an examination of system route maps.
71. From M.B.T.A. timetables.
72. See footnote 110, Chapter V.
CHAPTER VIII
SCHEDULE AND ROUTE PLANNING APPLIED: AN
EXAMPLE: THE B- 3 AVENUE U BUS LINE IN
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK
CHAPTER VIII
Schedule and Route Planning Applied: An Example
The B-3 Avenue U Bus Line in Brooklyn, New York
Introduction
In this chapter, the method of Schedule and Route
Planning developed in the first seven chapters is both
reiterated and illustrated by means of an example. Using
an existing bus route in Brooklyn, New York, a set of
Initial Directive Criteria is postulated; the fixed elements
and State of the route described (based on actual data);
alternative changes chosen on the basis of matching the
State variables to the Initial Directive Criteria; and the
alternatives evaluated in terms of the costs and revenue
estimates based on Chapters V and VI.
By referring back to the model (Chapter IV) and to the
other chapters as noted throughout the text and footnotes of
this chapter, it is hoped that the reader will be able to
better understand how the proposed method works, and what the
various steps actually accomplish.
The specific recommendations and projected costs and
demands are intended to illustrate the method. The reader
inclined to take exception to specific proposals or numbers
should realize that the validity of these specifics is not
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crucial to the validity of the method itself; indeed, one
purpose of this thesis is to suggest areas that are in need
of further research. What is important is not the precise
quantities themselves, but the way in which they are derived
and used.
The B-3 line was chosen as an example primarily for
its simplicity. The weekday schedule requires seven vehicles
and sixteen runs;l annual passenger traffic is somewhat under
two million.2 This makes the route and schedule easier to
manipulate. A more complex and heavily used line, such as
the First and Second Avenue (M-15) route in Manhattan,
although presenting more dramatic problems and solutions,
would require computerization of the analytic and run-cutting
procedures for effective consideration of the alternatives. 3
The First-Second Avenues line requires 103 vehicles and 164
runs daily,4 and carries over 25,000,000 revenue passengers
a year2 (plus a few million more riders on free transfers).
The B-3 line was also chosen because it offers a
number of problems and solutions illustrative of the methods
developed in this thesis. As will be seen as this chapter
unfolds, the B-3 route--according to the Initial Directive
Criteria to be advanced--is deficient in eight of the eleven
State variables. 5
Finally, the B-3 line experienced a service change on
October 30, 1967: rush hour service was reduced from every
7-1/2 minutes to every 10 minutes. The easily available
data on the results of this change in terms of cost and
revenue enabled comparison with the recommended alternatives
and calculated results of the model.
History of the B-3 Line6
The Avenue U line from its inception operated as a bus
line, with one branch to Gerritsen Beach (now the B-31 route,
see map, Exhibit 1 in Appendix), and the other to Flatbush
Avenue and Avenue U. Service to Bergen Beach was provided
by through streetcars from northern Brooklyn in the summer
from 1896 to 1919, after which time it was operated as a
streetcar shuttle, from Avenue N and Utica Avenue to Bergen
Beach (the terminii of the two present eastern branches of
the B-3 route). In 1930, streetcar operation was replaced
by bus operation on this shuttle.
In 1947 the Avenue U bus to Flatbush Avenue was
extended to Avenue N and Utica Avenue. By this time the
Gerritsen Beach route was a separate entity. In 1957, the
Bergen Beach shuttle was combined with the Avenue U route,
creating the present B-3 route.
Description
The B-3 line operates from two east terminals: East 74th
Street and Bergen Avenue (Bergen Beach), and Utica Avenue and
Avenue N. Service on the Bergen Beach branch is provided on
weekdays from 6:50 AM to 7:20 PM, every 30 minutes, and on
weekend mornings and afternoons. Service on the Avenue N
branch is provided 24 hours, with a maximum headway of 30
minutes. The western terminal is at 25th Avenue and 86th
Street (see map and schedule, Exhibits 1 and 2, Appendix).
The B-3 route operates out of Flatbush depot, sited on the
Avenue N branch.
As shown on the map, selected free transfer privileges
are provided. As is the case with other routes, the trans-
fers reflect the franchise agreements within and between what
used to be several private companies. Thus the B-3 buses
bound westward issue transfers to B-41 north, B-31 south,
B-44 Nostrand Avenue north, B-49 Ocean Avenue south only,
B-68 south only, and B-4 south only. Transfers are not issued
to B-36 service south towards Sheepshead Bay, B-44 service
south towards Emmons Avenue, B-2 service north towards Kings
Highway, or to any northward service west of Nostrand Avenue,
or to any lines terminating at the western terminal except
the B-4 south, or to any subway lines. In an eastward direc-
tion there is no transfer to the B-41.
Mileage, running time, and other summary data is
included in Exhibit 2 (Appendix).
The eastern end of the B-3 route operates in an area
of population and activity growth (see description of Fixed
Elements further on). It competes in this eastern area with
five other routes: the B-41 Flatbush Avenue route, which by
virtue of its frequent service receives the bulk of the
passengers (see description of Demand further on); the B-78
Mill Basin route, started about six or seven years ago
(1961-62) as a result of pressure from local community groups,
and not operating at night or on weekends; a route operated
by Pioneer Bus Company from Mill Basin to Kings Highway (the
only franchised, regular service route in Brooklyn not
operated by the Transit Authority, started about ten years
ago after the Authority refused to provide service); the
B-46 Utica Avenue route, which terminates end-to-end with
the Avenue N branch of the B-3 line; and the B-2 Avenue R
route to Kings Highway from Flatbush Avenue and Avenue U. In
addition to these five routes, a sixth route passes through
this area, along Flatbush Avenue bound to and from Floyd
Bennet Naval Air Field and the Rockaways peninsula of Queens.
This route, operated by Green Bus Lines, does not pick up
passengers in Brooklyn northbound or let passengers off in
Brooklyn southbound, once it is north of Avenue U and Flat-
bush Avenue.
The B-3 route thus serves a crosstown function as well
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as a residential feeder function, by being the only funnel
for passengers from all these lines bound for the Gravesend,
Sheepshead Bay and Coney Island areas of Brooklyn. Similarly
on the western end, the B-3 route connects at its terminus
with B-4 and B-34 buses and the West End subway line to
Bensonhurst, Bay Ridge and Borough Park. The western portion
of the line is bisected by three other subway lines, at West
8th Street, McDonald Avenue, and East 16th Street, and thus
does not serve as a feeder (there are no subway lines within
several miles of the eastern portion).
The B-31 Gerritsen Beach route overlaps the B-3 route
from Gerritsen Avenue to the subway at East 16th Street.
Because it terminates at the subway station and provides more
frequent service, the B-31 route carries the bulk of the
passengers bound from the area of overlap to the subway.
The population and land use is further described under
"Fixed Elements ."
*Initial Directive Criteria
For the purposes of the example, Initial Directive
Criteria for each State variable will be postulated. Where
the Transit Authority has defined criteria for a given vari-
able, these will be used. Otherwise, the criteria set forth
will be arbitrarily chosen, with possible reasons for such a
choice noted.
The general objective of the transit company will be
assumed to be profit maximization, subject to the set of
constraints contained in the criteria set forth below. Thus
any change would be called for that would produce a positive
marginal Net Operating Contribution7 or that would correct a
deviation from the criteria listed below.
Frequency
Scheduled Headway should be at,optimal Net Operating
Contribution (NOC).7 From 5:30 AM to Midnight (the latter
time referring to the peak direction of travel) neither the
mainline headway or the headway on any branch should be
greater than 20 minutes (assume that the Authority has found
that a greater headway is never economical for them and that
for the passenger it would be more economic to increase
service on a nearby or parallel route, or provide taxi ser-
vice); from 1:30 to 5:00 AM, no greater than every 60 minutes
(a public service constraint).
Scheduled "skipped" connections between the bus and
subway in non-rush hours at the East 16th Street station are
forbidden. Scheduled connections where possible should be
made to the B-4 and B-34 lines at the western end and to the
subway at East 16th Street.
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Speed
The scheduled speed should be as good or better than
the Brooklyn average, and the same or faster than that of
route B-31 (arbitrary).
Load (Comfort)
The scheduled average Load per half hour should be
150% in the peak hours (7:00 to 9:30 AM, 4:30 to 6:30 PM).
This is--in theory--current practice. However, the maximum
peak hour headway at the peak point should be ten minutes, as
long as a seated load is obtained. (Assume that 150% has
been found to be "practical capacityn8 under regular service).
The scheduled average Load per half hour (per bus on
infrequently run lines where sudden surges occur regularly) in
non-rush hours should be a seated load: 100% (in theory the
current maximum is 115%). This would apply to special load
conditions outside of the peak hours, such as late shopping
nights. (Assume that it has been found not profitable to
have standees in non-rush hours).
The maximum loads stipulated above should occur over no
more than 25% of the one-way length in running time of the
line in the rush hour. Conversely, a load factor of at least
100% should occur over the whole line in the peak hours,
except for the very ends. Load factors at points other
than the peak point should be at least 65% of those at the
peak.
Reliability
The next three variables describe reliability. In
general, the reader should assume that it has been determined
that exceeding the constraints outlined below and on the
previous page produces sufficiently poor reliability to be
unprofitable.
Actual Load
In the rush hours, no more than 10% of the vehicles
should have loads over 175% (75 passengers per bus), per half
hour; in the non-rush hour, no more than 10% of the buses
should have loads over 130% (55 per bus): (Assume that
research has also shown undesirable accident rates at loads
above 175%.)
Actual Headway
On a line with a headway greater than 5 minutes, a
double headway (16 minutes, for example, on an 8-minute head-
way) should never occur. In addition, no actual headway
greater than 1.33 times the scheduled headway should be per-
mitted on lines with greater than ten minute headways. In
non-rush hours, any given headway should be no more than
i NMI
three minutes plus or minus the scheduled headway. These
two limits (plus or minus 3 and 1.33) must occur no more
than 5% of the time.
Actual Running Time and Terminal Time
The Mean observed running time must not be greater than
the Scheduled running time (it can be less if necessary to
satisfy the further constraints listed).
Seventy per cent of all vehicles in a homogeneous time
period9 must have actual running time less than or equal to
the scheduled running time.
At least 50% must have running time equal to or greater
than the scheduled running time.
Terminal time must insure 99% on time departures per
homogeneous time period, with the exception of unusual cir-
cumstances (such as a fire blocking a street, street collapse,
blackout, etc.).
Work Program
The percentage of actual paid hours worked should be
at least 90%; lunch and terminal time excess should be no
more than 20%. If either condition is violated, the runs
should be examined for the effects and costs of changes in
service which would bring the percentages up to par.
Any long swings or pieces should be similarly evaluated
to determine the revenue and cost effects of breaking the
swing or extending the piece run(s) to make straight runs.
Overtime and late reports of any kind would require
reference to actual running time and terminal time data.
Mileage
Daily revenue per mile should at least equal the
variable cost of operating a route.
Demand
The calculated Demand should not differ by more than
25% from the actual demand. If it does, a reason should be
sought; is there a capacity restraint; competing services;
poor linkages?
Demand should increase with population increases.
Recent changes in demand should be analyzed, and the
effects of recent changes in service on demand determined.
Transfer Volumes
For intersecting right angle movements, 40% or more of
a turnover on both lines should be considered for a through
service, when the loads on both lines are not replenished.
For end-to-end transfer movements, 40% or more of a
transfer to one line (where several lines terminate in the
same place) would require joining the two routes or re-arrang-
ing at least one route for through service to a portion
of the other route. Where only one other line terminates,
20% or more of the passengers transferring to that line
would call for considering through service as an
alternative.
Unserved Trips and Activities
A minimum daily volume of 500 one-way trips (250,000
a year) new to transit as a travel mode is required for a
new direct service.
Any origin-destination volume not served directly by
a through transit service but being equal to or greater than
any existing volume served directly (subject to the 500 trips
daily minimum), where the modal split for the presently
served direct service is more favorable than for the non-
direct service, calls for a new route, or modification of
an existing route.
The mode split should be at least 25%. to transit for
transfer trips, 50% for direct trips, 90% for Manhattan.
The next service should be no further than .6 miles
from the existing service; all residents should be able to
reach at least one route within .3 mile walk 24 hours a day,
7 days a week so long as the service area of the route so
defined (.3 miles to each side) is at least 1,500 people per
mile of route. All major institutional complexes such as
colleges, hospitals, etc. should receive service to the door
24 hours a day on at least one route. Major community
activities (schools, shopping, hospitals) should be served
direct from within the community or by convenient transfer.
B-3 Avenue U Route Fixed Elements
1. Movement data:10
Eastern Western
Section11  Section11
Total Daily Trips 66,876 42,754
To CBD (Manhattan) 8,182 9,223
To Downtown Brooklyn 1 2 2,393 1,848
To same zone 19,741 4,602
To adjacent zones 14,044 12,629
To Borough Park,13
Flatbush, Crown
Heights and
Brownsville 8,138 6,406
To remainder of
Brooklyn 8,670 5,680
All others 4,934 3,027
2. Population data14 (updated to 1968):15
Eastern section16 population 8,800; median annual
family income $7,210; percent households with one or more
automobile, 80%.
Western section17 population 15,730; median annual
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family income $6,116; percent households owning one or more
automobiles, 62%.
Gerritsen Beach 18 population 7,600; median annual
family income $6,858; percent households with one or more
automobile, 68%.
3. Geographic and physical structure: See map for
principal geographic features, rapid transit stations, etc.
(map is Exhibit 1, Appendix).
4. Land use and activities:
Major retail strips (small stores) are located on
Avenue U from East 18th Street to Coney Island Avenue (includ-
ing two motion picture theatres) and from McDonald Avenue to
West 9th Street. Retail and restaurant junctions also exist
at Flatbush Avenue and Avenue U and at Gerritsen Avenue.
A series of six-story apartment house developments
exists south of Avenue U between Nostrand and Knapp Avenues,
as well as south of the western terminal of the B-3 line
(where the apartment structures are higher); the remainder of
the line passes through residential areas consisting mostly
of two-family, semi-detached or row housing, with some
scattered single family housing.
Several public schools are situated on the line. A new
junior high school has been built near the eastern end of the
line. No high schools or colleges exist along the line, but
three high schools are sited several blocks north or south of
the line. A major municipal hospital is situated five blocks
south on Ocean Parkway.
5. Population growth and future land use:
Population on the eastern end of this line has been
growing. From 1960 to 1970 the population increased 66% in
this area.1 9 Construction is continuing, mostly of semi-
attached or row two-family housing (50 to 100 people per
gross acre). Some vacant land still exists in Bergen Beach,
with large tracts just north of the B-3 line. Development
is proceeding south from Paedergat Basin.
A major retail shopping center is under construction
just east of the junction of Flatbush Avenue and Avenue U.
Rising south of Avenue U between 52nd and 55th Streets, it is
known as "King's Plaza," and will include two major branch
department stores: Alexander's and Macy's. In addition,
400,000 square feet of rental space is to be available.20
Marine Park, adjacent to and south and west of this
same junction, is undergoing continuing upgrading as a major
recreational area.
Finally, the current $2.5 billion dollar transportation
development program for the metropolitan area calls for exten-
sion within ten years of a subway line to Flatbush Avenue and
Avenue U.
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The Existing State of Route B-3
Frequency
The Scheduled Headway is not at optimal NOC during
the peak hours; it is during the day (see Tables 3 and 4).
The Avenue N and Bergen Beach branches have a 30-
minute base headway. According to the criteria, they must be
either 20 minutes each for a mainline headway of 10 minutes,
or one branch must be eliminated.
Connections are not scheduled in non-rush hours, and
even in "hawk" hours, as stipulated; there are cases of
scheduled "skipped" connections.
Speed
The scheduled speed meets the stipulated criteria.
It is 9.9 miles per hour average (based on actual running
time), or 9.0 miles per hour including the terminal time.
The average for Brooklyn is 7.18 miles per hour.2 1
Load22
The scheduled load in the AM peak period varies from
33% to 195%. For at least a half hour it is 195% average,
and this clearly violates the 150% standard. From 9:00 to
9:30 AM it is only 33%. In the afternoon from 3:00 to 3:30 PM
it is 130% to 155%, violating the 100% standard at this hour.
Occasional school crowds also create loads above the stipu-
lated amount. For the remainder of the day loads are below
the standard on 15 to 20-minute headways.
Actual Load
From 2:00 to 4:00 PM there is a considerable variation
in the actual loading (see Figure 1). Other isolated devia-
tions (as opposed to inadequate scheduled headway) include
5:00 to 5:30 PM eastbound, two (out of three) vehicles with
152 passengers, or 177% each (the third had 28 riders or about
64%); and 11:30 to 12:00 Noon eastbound, one bus with two
passengers and one with 65 passengers.
Actual Headway
In general, actual headways on the' scheduled base head-
way of 15 minutes vary from 12 to 17 minutes, within the
acceptable limits. However, a number of isolated deviations
above or below the limits stipulated earlier in this chapter
occurred through the day. These included:
Double headways eastbound (two-bus bunch) due to late
terminal departures (see discussion on Actual Running Time
following this section) from 8:30 to 9:00 AM and 9:00 to
9:30 AM; from 6:30 to 7:00 PM westbound.
Sixteen and four-minute headways eastbound from 6:30
to 7:00 PM on scheduled ten minutes; eighteen and two-minute
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headways eastbound from 7:00 to 7:30 PM on scheduled ten
minutes; 25 and 5-minutes eastbound from 8:00 to 8:30 PM on
scheduled 15 minutes (due to early departure), and 32 and 8
minutes on scheduled 20-minute headway from 8:30 to 9:00 PM
eastbound.
The 4:40 PM trip from 25th Avenue and 86th Street to
Bergen Beach was abandoned for unknown cause on the day of
the survey, resulting in a 70-minute actual headway on a
scheduled headway of 30 minutes to Bergen Beach eastbound
between 4:20 and 5:30 eastbound at East 16th Street.
Observations also indicate some trips leaving terminals
several minutes ahead of schedule, 23 probably because of the
tight running time (see next page).
Actual RunningTime
Figure 2 shows the actual running time compared to the
scheduled running time by homogeneous time period, for the
Avenue N branch. The situation is similar for the Avenue U
branch to Bergen Beach. Note that this should properly be
done for each timepoint along the line; limitations on the
reader's patience and the author's resources dictated the
choice of only one set of timepoints, hence the terminal
points were chosen for easier understanding of the changes to
be recommended.
71-
I- 
T
41
14iw
a.jc
I-f
S
k
 
1
An analysis of late departures shows-that at the east
end of the route, all (four) buses leaving Bergen Beach
between 8:00-9:00 AM and 5:00-6:00 PM left late. At the
western end, from 7:30 to 10:00 AM, four out of fifteen or
27% left late; from 5:30 to 7:00 PM, four out of nine, or
44%, left late. This reflects the large deviation from
scheduled running time at these hours (see Figure 2). In
addition, the 1:10 and 3:40 PM trips from 25th Avenue and
86th Street to Bergen Beach left late, and the 4:40 trip was
abandoned.
Work Program24
The percentage of actual paid hours to hours worked is
83-1/2%, or slightly below the stipulated minimum of 90%.
The minimum required lunch time (equivalent here to swing time,
as the swings are all under an hour) should be 35 minutes
times 15 regular runs or 525 minutes. The actual is 677 min-
utes, or 30% excess. Note that this excess is of no import,
however, since the paid time does not include this swing
time. There are no swing runs (spread over ten hours), and
one piece run.
Mileage
The present revenue per mile (in May, 1968)26 is 99g.
The present variable cost25 is 96.67e/mile (of which 73.5( is
for manpower and depreciation). Thus this criterion is met,
although just barely.
Demand
Calculated demand deviates markedly in certain cases
from actual demand. Table 1 lists the comparisons. Note
that the match between calculated and actual demand on the
control route, B-31, is quite close for both periods. This
control route has no competing routes in its service area,
which makes it easier to make such comparisons. Note that
when passengers on the B-41 route at its terminus, which
intersects the B-3 route, are added to passengers out of
Bergen Beach on the B-3 route, a much closer correspondence
to calculated demand is obtained.
The implication of this combined result is that, while
the B-41 route on a 3-minute or better headway now accounts
for 218 of the 290 passengers--although the B-3 route on a
30-minute headway is less of a walk for two-thirds of the
service area--the potential for the B-3 route on a more fre-
quent headway is considerable.
The low response on the Flatbush Avenue to Gerritsen
Avenue portion in the rush hours is probably due to the capa-
city restraint, as well as to the B-2 route one-fourth mile
away which operates to an express station. Conversely, in the
Table 1
Calculated vs. Actual Demand
B-3 and Adiacent Routes
Time period
4:00-6:00
PM
10:00 AM
to 2:00 PM
Route Section
Bergen Beach
Branch to
Flatbush Ave.
Flatbush Ave.
to Gerritsen
B-3 + B-41 at
Bergen Beach
Control route
B-31 (Gerrit-
sen Beach)
Bergen Beach
Branch to
Flatbush Ave.
Flatbush Ave.
to Gerritsen
Control Route
B-31
29Service area
6500
2320
3570
7600
6500
2320
7600
27 28Calculated Actual
* Riders # Riders
240
290
168
263
885 986 .
101
111
442
149
417
*The Bergen Beach Branch operates on a 30 minute headway. The
equations used 27 were calibrated for a maximum headway of 17 1/2
minutes. At 30 minutes, these equations show 0 riders.
The Avenue N Branch has no easily defined service area; it serves an
area bisected by other routes, which are more direct. At least part of
its patronage is transfer riders from these routes.
midday, the higher actual demand is due to a school crowd of
about 50 people between 12:00 and 12:30 PM.
Patronage of the B-3 route has not increased with the
population growth on its eastern end(see description of Fixed
Elements). Riding has been stable for eight years, and has
shown a downward trend for the last two years due to the fare
increase and the change in service.
Effect on Demand of Service Change
Exhibit 4 (Appendix) shows the details of the changes
in demand and costs associated with reducing rush hour service
in October of 1967 from a 7-1/2 to a 10-minute headway. Both
revenue audits and headcounts show a 3.4% decline in passen-
gers from May of 1967 to May of 1968; in the same period the
control line showed a growth of 3%.
Depending on whether the Authority's figure for loss
of passengers (-3.4%) or loss of revenue (-4.6%) is used (see
Exhibit 4), the marginal Net Operating Contribution of the
change was -$4.15 to -$15.65 a day. That is, the loss in
passengers was slightly greater than the savings in cost.
This compares with a calculated marginal NOC of -$3.00 to
-$15.00.
Note also that the effect of reducing service at East
16th Street westbound in the morning, which was operating at
practical capacity, is also as predicted: the average load per
bus remained the same.
Transfer Volume
The only major transfer volume appears to be at Avenue
N and Utica Avenue, between the B-46 and B-3 lines. However,
no data is really available on transfer volumes.
Unserved Trips and Activities
Table 2 shows the number of trips and modal split of
all zone to zone movements served by the B-3 route, as well
as a set of movements served by the B-41 route and another
set by the confluence of bus and subway routes in zone 312,
for purposes of comparison. The zone numbers are shown on the
map (Appendix, Exhibit 1). Note that other zonal linkages
from zones 293 and 301 exist which are not served by and do
not potentially involve the B-3 route.
Note the excellent modal splits on the B-41 route and
in zone 312. The wide range in the two transfer liniges -shown
for route B-41 is probably due to the fact that the B-2 route,
which serves part of zone 293, goes directly to the main
shopping and entertainment area of zone 295 (and the B-41
line offers free transfers to the B-5 route which slices
through the middle of zone 295); while the B-41 route offers
no transfers to either of the lines serving zone 292, the
Table 2
Zone-to-Zone Trips and Modal Split 3 0
B-3 Avenue U Line 1963
Zone Pair
Movements
No. of Trips No. By Transit Percent By Transit
Served Directly
293-293
293-301
293-312
301-301
301-312
Movements Served By Transfer
293-CBD
293-Downtown Brooklyn
303-312
293-302 & 311
293-303
293-304
293-313 & 321
293-322 & 323
301-313 & 321
301-322 & 323
301-295
301-296
301-303
7,408
2,393
419
1,784
3,801
644
750
663
2,451,
646
1,679
444
2,077
Unserved Volumes Greater Thari 500 With Poor
301-304
301-311
293-272
2,699
978
2,794
5,901
1,845
105
421
960
213
100
0
1,129
218
574
336
81-7
Modal Split
549
210
217
Movements Served by B-41 Directly
293-296
293-271
3,183
1,649
Movements Saved by B-41 Through Transfer
293-295
293-292
2,392
760
Moverents within and adjacent to Zone 312
312-312
312-313
312-321
5,933
3,917
4,013
* Approximately 50% school bus trips
19,741
1,095
871
4,602
812
4437*
436
215
454
267
1/222
40
23
10
33
1/2
1/2
20
21
8
1,650
735
1,533
111
2,833
1,926
2,452
1/2
1/2
Unserved Volumes Greater Than' 500 With Poor
B-8 and B-23 routes.
Zone 312, as can be seen on the map, has half a dozen
bus lines, three of which make 90 degree turns through the
zone, plus two subway lines, for an extremely dense transit
coverage. A 50% modal split for intra-zonal movements is
rare; the usual figure is 10 to 20%.
Analysis of Table 2 is the subject of the choice of
alternatives through the matching of Initial Directive
Criterial with State variables, and is thus covered in the
next phase of this example. The reader can compare the
criteria listed for this variable to the percentages in the
table as preparation for this analysis.
Choice of Alternatives: Application of Control Variables
to Produce New State, Based on Deficiencies
Revealed by nitial Directive
Criteria Applied
to Existing State
Frequency
Tables 3 and 4 show the effects of alternative headways
(for the derivation of these tables see Chapter IV, part II)
on the B-3 Avenue U line for two time periods. The optimum
headway is defined as the one at which NOC is greatest, sub-
ject to other constraints. Note that although the optimum is
at 7 minutes, the criteria with respect to load factors
calls for a 6-minute headway (this is explored further under
Table 3
Net Operating Contribution For Alternative Headways
4:00-6:00 PM B-3 Ave. U (Revised Route, no Ave. N Branch).
Actua l
Head- #
way Vehicles
20
16
15
13
12
11
10
9
8
7 1/
7
6 1/
6
5 1/
5
w/5 SL
w/4 1/2
2
2
2
SL
4
5
5
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
11
12
e 13
14
16
13
14
Trips
6
714
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
16
17
18
20
22
24
12ea.
13ea.
(a) (b)
x1l.24 Veh. Mileage
Mileage x23 1/4 x.2317
67.5
84.5
90
100.5
112.5
123.5
135
146
168.5
180
191
202.5
225
247.5
270
222
240
93
116
116
139 1/2
163
163
186
209
232 1/2
256
256
279
302
325 1/2
372
302
325 14
15 1/2
19 1/2
21
23 1/2
26
28 1/2
31
34
39
41 1/2
44 1/2
47
52
57 1/2
62 1/2
51 14
55 14
Si7c
(d)
(c)Pass Area
Cost 1000 x24.5
108 14 30(
135 14 32
137 39
163 52
189 59
191 14 66
217 73
243 80
271 1/287
297 1/2 90
-300 1/2 93
326 97
354 100
383 104
43414 107
353 14 90
381 96
735
785
955
1270
1442
1615
1785
1958
2125
2205
2280
2370
2450
2548
2630
2205
2346
Rev.
x.20 NOC
147
157
191
254
288
323
357
392
425
441
456
474
490
510
526
441
469
38
22
54
91
99
131
140
15 1
153
143
(155)
148
(136)
127
91
87
88
v/4 SL 15 15ea. 277
JAvg.(g
Load
61
52
60
71-
72
73
74
75
71
69
67
66
61
349 64 413 101 2475 495 82
Table 4
Net Operating Contribution For Alternative Headways
10:00 AM-2:00 PM B-3 Ave. U (Revised Route, no Ave. N Branch)
(a) (b)# xll.24 Veh. Mileage
way Vehicles Trips Mileage x18.4
12
13
13
14
15
16
17
19
20
22
24
27
30
32
34
37
135
146
146
157.5
168.5
180
191
213.5
225
247.5
270
304
338
361
383.5
417
73.5
73.5
92
92
92
92
110.5
110.5
129
129
147.5
166
184
202.5
202.5
221
c(d)
P a s S v c .Pasc)Area
x.2317 Cost 1000 x24.5 x.20 NOC
31
34
34
36.5
39
41.5
44.5
49.5
52
57.5
62.5
70.5
78.5
83.5
89
96.5
104.5
107.5
126
128.5
131
133.5
155
160
181
186.5
210
236.5
262.5
286
291.5
317.5
37
39
42
44
46
48
50
52
55
57
59
61
63
64
65
67
1/2
14
1/2
1A2
1A2
1A2
1A
1/2
343.5 68 1670 334 -9.5
Actual
Head- Rev.
2 0(e)
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
20
9
8
7 V2
7
6 1/2
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
11
12
920
967
1028
1078
1128
1190
1238
1286
1349
1396
1447
1495
1555
1581
1607
1641
184
193.5
205.5
215.5
225.5
238 (1
247.5
257
270
279
289.5
299
311
316
321.5
328
79.5
86
79.5
87
94.5
04.5)
92.
97
89
92.5
79.5
62.5
48.5
30
30
10.5
13 40 450 239.5 104
Notes, Table 3
(a) 3-1/2 hrs. x $4.60 (see Exh. 3) manpower + 1/2 of days depreciation
charge of 14.30 per vehicle (see Exh. 3), or $23.25. 3-1/2 hrs. is
minimum pay for a piece run.
(b) Mileage Cost see Summary chapter 6.
(c) See Chapter 5 p._ : Pass/1000 served 4PM-6PM outbound
141-6.8 (Headway)
(d) Service area as defined earlier (Table 1).
(e) Here are considered alternate vehicles terminating at Coney Island
Avenue or E. 16th St. from Isl.and E. 71
SL Mileage Coney Island Ave. - Isl. & E. 71 7.25 round trip
(f) Formula calibrated on maximum Headway 17-1/2 min. shows 0 pass. @
30 headway. Minimum of 30 Pass/1000 assumed consistent with
existing B-3 and observations used in calibrating equation.
(g) Assuming 1/2 of passengers each direction.
Notes, Table 4
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
4 hours x $4.60 (see ) manpower, or $ 8.40
Mileage cost see p. Chapter 6.
See Chapter 5 p. Pass/1000 served 10:AM-2: PM inbound
= 81-2. 18(Headway)
Service areas as defined earlier
Maximum allowable according to Initial Directive Criterion.
the section on Value Functions).
The optimal headway turns out to be 6 (or 7) minutes
in the rush hour and 15 minutes during the day.
This solves the frequency deficiency on the Bergen
Beach branch in the rush hour, but would only solve it in
midday if the Avenue N branch was eliminated in non-rush
hours. This is discussed in the analysis of Unserved Trips.
If the Avenue N branch was kept, a 20-minute headway on
each branch would be required by the criteria put forward
earlier, resulting in a non-optimal ten-minute headway on
the mainline during the day.
The new schedule (Exhibit 5) based on the optimum
headways and incorporating other changes designed to correct
the Existing State also contains adjustments to obtain
scheduled connections where possible and to avoid "skipped"
connections. For example, the originally scheduled 5:10 AM
from Bergen Beach was moved up to 5:07 AM for a connection
to the subway at East 16th Street.
Load
The scheduled load is a function of the scheduled head-
way (as defined in Chapter IV). Since the optimal rush hour
headway is six minutes, a load of 61 per bus or 140% is
obtained. The schedule (Exhibit 5) goes to 15 minutes a half
hour earlier to raise the 33% load factor from 9:00 to 9:30.
The high load factor from 3:00 to 3:30 is eliminated because
of the start of 10-minute headways at about 12:30 PM (required
to satisfy the actual load criteria, discussed below).
Actual Load
The deficiencies noted in this State variable will be
solved by changes in the scheduled load (see above), in the
scheduled headway in the afternoon (by reducing the maximum
load, if not the variation), and in the actual headway (see
below).
Actual Headway
Of the possible control variables revealed in the
Tranformation functions (see Chapter IV),- a change in the
scheduled headway would not solve the problems in this case;
nor is the load the main factor here. The other two variables,
Running Time and Control, are the relevant variables.
Increased Running Time to satisfy the Actual Running Time
criteria (see below) will eliminate the late departures which
caused some of the deviations (see the discussion of this
earlier in this chapter). Supervision will be necessary at
East 16th Street to space departures from 2:00 to 10:00 PM
in both directions. The one other factor contributing to the
deviation of the actual headway, the abandoned trip, would be
materially lessened in effect by the new scheduled headway
to Bergen Beach. An abandoned trip under the new schedule
would result in a 24-minute headway (as opposed to 70
minutes).
Actual Running Time
A new set of running times is scheduled to correspond
with the mean times shown in Figure 2 (a change in terminal
time would not help the Actual Headway or Load and would be
unrealistic). The supervision scheduled for East 16th Street
will also be of help in regulating the running time.
Work Program
See the new work program, Exhibit 6.
Demand
Calculated demand should come closer to actual demand
with the increases in service to Bergen Beach. Reserve
capacity in the rush hour and better service all day to this
area should encourage a reflection of population growth in
patronage on the line. The optimum headways (see NOC Tables
3 and 4) correct the adverse affect of the recent service
change.
Note that a diversion of some riders from the B-41
route to the B-3 route in the Bergen Beach area would be
expected, and may call for slight reductions in service on the
B-41 route.
Unserved Trips
Analysis of Table 2
Intra-zone trips, zone 293: There are no transfers
from route B-3 to any north-south routes in this zone. The
B-3 and B-78 routes run infrequently or not at all at certain
hours. And, the B-46 route stops at Avenue N, making con-
nections from this line to the B-2, B-3, Pioneer (Mill Basin)
or Green lines (Rockaways) services impossible.
The latter fact, plus the observation that a portion of
the B-3 Avenue N branch riders are transferring to the B-46
route, plus the advantage in maintaining optimum midday
headway by eliminating the Avenue N branch, plus the don-
struction of the shopping center at Avenue U and Flatbush
Avenues, all suggest that the B-46 route be extended to
Avenue U and a terminal-in the new shopping center, and the
Avenue N branch of the B-3 route be abandoned outside of the
rush hours.
This recommendation draws on additional input, derived
from analysis of the State variables concerning operation at
this end of the B-46 route. It was found, in looking at the
B-46 Work Program, that a large number of B-46 route buses
-. ) I)..-
travel between Avenue N and the garage, almost two-thirds of
the distance to Avenue U. Exhibit 7 shows the number of
"pullouts" or runs reporting or reliefing at the garage or
with sufficient swing (lunch) time to cover extended north-
bound trips.31 Note that outside of the rush hour, these
intervals provide a better service than the present B-3
branch, at no manpower cost. The same is true for southbound
trips on the B-46 route.
In addition, it was found that loading at the peak
load point on the B-46 line is about twice as great as at
Church Avenue (see Table and map, Exhibit 8).32 Presently
the bulk of the shortline service is turned further south,
at Kings Highway; in non-rush hours, all vehicles run to
Avenue N. Thus turning alternate vehicles at Church Avenue
through the day would provide the necessary vehicle, man-
power and mileage savings to extend service from Avenue N
to Avenue U at no cost, on a base eight-minute headway.
Because of a few minutes surplus in the running and
terminal time on the B-78 route, it would also be possible
to extend this line to the new shopping center at no extra
manpower cost.
The increased flexibility of travel afforded by the
extension of these two routes, along with certain limited
additional transfer privileges, should raise the number of
intra-zone trips made by transit.
Intra-zone trips, zone 30.1: The reason for the very
low percentage of trips by transit is not immediately apparent,
although the lack of a transfer northbound to the B-68 route
is probably a factor. The good modal split on trips from
zone 301 to zone 313 can only be explained if it is assumed
that a large portion of zone 301 trips focus on the shopping
and entertainment area along Kings Highway; this suggests a
further reason for the low intra-zone modal split here. See
zone 301-295 analysis for a partial solution.
Trips from zone 293 to zones 302, 303, 304, and 311:
The potential new transit trips for a direct service in this
market are 1,520. This is obtained by subtracting the
existing transit trips, 1,594 (see Table 2), from the 50% of
total trips that a direct transit service could expect to
capture (50% of 6,229, or 3,115).
An entirely new line could be run to serve this
corridor, but the least cost method would be to combine
route B-78 (extended as recommended on the previous page)
with route B-36, now terminating at Nostrand Avenue and
Avenue U. Here the analyst must always be aware of the
possible additional rewards accruing from further route
adjustments to serve additional zone linkages served by
route B-78. Note on Table 2 that there is little potential
new demand for service from zone 293 to zones further north
served by route B-78 (it serves primarily as a feeder to the
subway and schools), but a large number of trips with poor
modal split to zone 272 (Carnarsie). This suggests that the
extension of route B-36 overlap route B-78 as far as the
north limits of zone 293, and then turn onto Flatlands
Avenue and proceed east into zone 272 to the Rockaway Park-
way junction of routes B-42, B-17, B-60, B-6 and B-84, also
the terminus of a subway line.
Such a route would provide direct service from
Canarsie to the new King's Plaza Shopping Center, to all of
zone 293, to the Sheepshead Bay, Gravesend and Coney Island
areas; would add a potential of 698 trips from zone 272 to
293 (assuming only 25% via transit, as many Canarsie trips
will still require transfers to the lines at Rockaway Parkway),
or 480 new trips (see Table 2), for a total of 2,000 new
one-way trips a day, or 1,000,000 a year (note that this
does not even consider the market for trips from zone 272
to zones 302 and 303).
The alternative patterns of extending route B-36 (i.e.,
all trips, alternate trips, etc.) are evaluated under the
Value Functions section.
Zone 293 to zones 313, 321, 322, 323: The problem is
not clear here, in light of the good modal splits to these
same zones from 301. Apparently adjustments to the service
along route B-3 would not necessarily solve this lack.
Zone 301 to zones 295, 304 and 311: Each of the
destination zones contains major traffic generators. Zone
295 contains part of the Kings Highway regional shopping and
entertainment center; zone 304 contains Coney Island Municipal
Hospital and Lincoln High School; zone 311 contains large
tracts of new housing (high-rise apartment complexes with,
according to the New York City Planning Commission, 27,000
new residents since 1960),19 the New York Aquarium and Coney
Island boardwalk. The potential for new trips (see Table 2)
is 1,345 one-way trips per day.
A winding route is proposed to serve this market most
effectively. From Kings Highway and Coney Island Avenue it
would proceed east on Kings Highway, south on Ocean Avenue,
west-on Avenue U, south on West 6th Street, east on 86th
Street and Avenue X, and south on Ocean Parkway to Surf
Avenue (see Figure 3).
Evaluation of Alternatives: Cost and Revenue Analysis
Value Functions Applied
The new B-3 schedule: The new schedule, based on the
optimum NOC calculations shown earlier (Tables 3 and 4) and
on other adjustments to satisfy the stipulated criteria,
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requires 11 vehicles, 147-1/2 paid hours of manpower, and
1,143 daily miles (see Exhibits 5 and 6). This compares to
7 vehicles at present, 128-1/2 paid hours of manpower, and
928 daily miles.
The added costs of this schedule (see Exhibit 3 for
the present costs and basis of costing) are thus:
Manpower 19 hours x $4.60 . $ 87.50
Depreciation 4 vehicles x $14.30 X 57.50
. Mileage 215 miles x $0.2317 50.00
$195.00 per day
At 20e/passenger, this would require 975 new passengers
a day, or 244,000 a year: about a 16-1/2% increase.
While no functions were developed in this thesis to
estimate total daily change in revenue, it should be noted
that the NOC Table 3 shows an increase of 665 passengers a
day in the PM rush hour, and that the analysis of origin and
destination data for the Bergen Beach area suggests a large
potential for the B-3 route with improved frequency of
service.
It is also worth considering the added cost of a
schedule with the optimum headway of 7 minutes disregarding
the maximum load restraint (peak load per vehicle of 67).
For this alternative, the added costs over the present
schedule are: 33
Manpower 13-1/2 hours x $4.60 = $ 62.00
Depreciation 3 vehicles x $14.30 : 43.00
Mileage 184 miles x $0.2317 :142.50
$147.50 per day
This would require only 740 new daily passengers.
However, see the Sensitivity Analysis further on.
The B-36 extension to Canarsie: The assumptions and
calculations for this cost analysis are shown in Exhibit 9.
The first alternative, operation of alternate vehicles
through to Canarsie except in the rush hours, when an approxi-
mate 15-minute headway would be operated, shows a daily cost
of $479. At 20( a passenger this would require 2,400 passen-
gers a day. The estimated potential is 4,000. This would
appear to be a highly desirable route, and alternative
service configurations are thus considered to see if better
service can be provided than the 16-minute midday and 24-
minute evening service of alternate vehicle operation.
The second alternative, extending all non-rush hour
and alternate rush hour vehicles through to Canarsie (on a
6- to 8-minute rush hour headway) would be about double the
cost of the first. This would operate at a loss.
The third alternative, 12-minute service in the rush
hour with all vehicles operated through in the non-rush, would
cost $677, requiring 3,400 passengers. This would be the
recommended alternative.
Once this new route (which, it will be observed,
parallels segments of other existing routes for its entire
length) is in operation, the decision as to whether to
operate all or alternate vehicles through to Canarsie in
non-rush hours would depend on the marginal cost of the one
against the other, determined by experiments-! and future
data.
The B-3A route from Kings Highway to Coney Island:
The costs for this route are shown in Exhibit 10. Note that
because of the need for lunch reliefs, the base 20-minute
headway can be reduced to 15 minutes in the rush hours,
since the operator used for lunch reliefs--in effect--creates
the reserve manpower available for the extra run in the
rush hours.
At a 20-minute base headway--which is the maximum
allowed under the criteria for Frequency set forth early in
this chapter--the route will cost $486 per day, requiring
2,420 passengers. The estimated potential is 2,690, thus
making it possible to provide this route with minimum
acceptable service.
Sensitivity Analysis
One important variable to consider in any sensitivity
400
analysis for route B-3 is the effect of population growth.
Under an optimum 7-minute rush hour headway there would be
little or no capacity for additional passengers in the
event of continued population growth on the easte'rn end of
this route. Under a six-minute headway there would be such
capacity available. Since there are still large tracts of
vacant land slowly being gobbled up by development adjacent
to the eastern end of this route; and since it is known that
King's Plaza will be a major traffic generator; it would
seem clear that a six-minute headway would be necessary to
encourage continued growth on this route.
The new schedule for route B-3 also promises to be
less easily disrupted by external influences than the present
schedule. The present operation, with insufficient running
time and no supervision, can be easily upset by perturba-
tions in loads, street traffic, weather, etc. The new
schedule provides additional round trip running time; addi-
tional service at periods .of peak demand to better absorb
unexpected shifts in demand; and supervision at East 16th
Street to maintain the regularity of service in the event
of disruptions.
The new schedule, and the new routes, are no more or
less intended to cope with changes in income, automobile
usage or population shifts than the present schedule.
401
However, a shift in trip volume from the Kings Highway
regional shopping area to the new King's Plaza center could
turn the B-3A route into a loss operation.
Table 5
Summary of IDC, Present and Proposed States,
B-3 Route
State
Variable
Frequency
Speed
Load
Actual Load
Actual Headway
Actual Running
and Terminal
Time
Initial
Directive
Criteria
Present
State
1) Optimal NOC
2) Max. 20 min.
3) Owl 60 min.
4) Scheduled conn.
1) At least Brooklyn
Average
1) Rush 150%
2) Non-rush 100%
3) Max. load over
25% or less of
route
4) All points (exc.
ends) 100% in
rush, and at
least 65% of peak
point load
1) 10% or less over
175% in rush
2) 10% or less over
130% non-rush
1) No double Headwa
2) No Headway over
1.33 Scheduled
3) 3 min. + or -
and no more
then 5% of time
1) Mean = or less
than scheduled
2) 70% less than
or equal; 50%
equal or greater
3) 99% on time
Proposed
State
Not Optimal
30 min. branch
30 miri.
No Conn.
9.0
(Avg. is 7.18)
33 to 195%
25 to 155%
OK
OK
less
Up to 66%
Up to 50%
y Sev. inrush
Several
Several
Mean greater
than scheduled
0-66% daytime
75% early AM
27-100% in rush
Optimal
15 min.
60 min.
Connections
8.0
66 to 140%
30 to 100%
Same
Same
less
(Actual state
Variables
Would have
to be
measured
After changes
designed to
correct them
Are effe cted,
incl. a dispatcher
at E. 16th St.)
Changes in
scheduled
Running Time
Proposed
MENEM mommommommonam
LU'~ d
(Table 5 cont.)
Present
State
Proposed
State
Work Program
Mileage
Demand
Transfer
Unserved
Trips
1) Paid/Worked
= 90%
2) Lunch and
Terminal Time
excess 20%
3) Evaluate long
swings, pieces,
overtime reports
1) Revenue/mile
greater than or
equal to vari-
able cost
1) Calculated
within 25%
of actual
2) Increase with
population
3) Analyze recent
changes
1) 40% right
angle or multi-
route terminus
for through route
2) 20% single
route end-to-end
1) Min. Daily one-
way volume 500
trips required
for new route
2) New route for
unlinked volumes
equal to served
volumes
3) Mode split
25% transfer
50% direct
90% CBD
4) Max. route
spacing .6 miles
5) Direct to door of
major institutions
83 1/2%
30% but not
paid
No swings
1 piece
no late overtime
Rev./mile 99$:
cost/mile 96.67
Up to 140%
difference
Opposite
Marginal NOC
-$3 to - $16
(None)
Possibly
at Ave. N.
Three
such
links
0 to 75%
10 to 40%
80%
Greater in Zone
293 at night
Not to
hospital
No swings
11 piece runs
Increased capacity
and better rush
hour service should
reduce these
disparaties
Corrected by
new schedule
No changes
Ext. B-46 to
Ave. U
Two new routes
One extended
See intra-
zone 293
improvements
New route
New direct route
to hospital
State
Variable
Initial
Directive
Criteria
U-J .1A
Footnotes
1. New York City Transit Authority, Surface Lines Brooklyn
Division Weekday Schedule 0-1 (see Exhibit 2).
2. N.Y.C.T.A., Transit Record, August, 1967.
3. See Chapter II, page 3 , for a discussion of this topic.
4. N.Y.C.T.A., Surface Lines Manhattan Division Weekday
Schedule L-4.
5. The State variables are listed and defined in Chapter
IV.
6. The information on the history of the routes in this
area was provided by "fan" trip brochures of the Elec-
tric Railroader's Association and by the Public Informa-
tion Department of the N.Y.C.T.A.
7. Net Operating Contribution is defined in Chapter IV.
8. Practical capacity is defined for the first hypothesis
in Chapter V.
9. Homogeneous time periods are defined in Chapter V, see
Table 12 in that chapter.
10. The movement data are extracted from the Origin and
Destination survey data tables prepared by the (New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut) Tri-State Transporta-
tion Commission on the basis of a 1% home interview
sample in 1963.
11. The eastern section corresponds to Tri-State's zone 293;
the western section to their zone 301. These zones are
not the same as the sections defined for computing the
service area; hence the proportion of trips is not
similar to the population proportions.
12. Downtown Brooklyn is a major employment and retail shop-
ping center for Brooklynites, about the same size in
terms of retail sales as downtown Boston, according to
the U.S. Retail Census. It is a sort of mini-CBD or
adjunct CBD; Tri-State includes it as part of the New York
CBD. A number of city-wide governmental functions are
located there--including the Transit Authority.
13. These are areas of older housing from which many resi-
dents have moved, especially to the eastern section.
14. From the U.S. Census of Population and Housing. The
population listed here is that of the "service areas
(defined in Chapter V), and divides some of the actual
population over several lines serving the same blocks.
The middle section of route B-3, served by several inter-
secting routes, is not included; nor is the western end,
for the same reason. The Sheepshead and Nostrand hous-
ing, served by other routes (see map), is also not
included.
15. Updating for the eastern section was done by walking
up and down the streets and counting the housing units,
comparing to the number of occupied units listed for
1960, and multiplying the growth by the average number
of persons per unit in 1960.
16. Part or all of Census tracts 670, 686, 696, 700, 710.0,
and 712, 698.
17. Part or all of tracts 392, 394, 396, 398, 400, 408,
410, 414.0, 414.1, and 416.
18. Tracts 628 and 632. Included as a control area.
19. According to estimates of the New Yo-rk City Planning
Commission. The estimates are the output of a regres-
sion model which uses as input changes from 1950-57 and
1957 to 1960, data on new housing units constructed
from 1960 to 1964 and on projected housing units through
1970, and changes in school enrollment from 1960 to
1965.
20. According to a sign posted at the site, where excavation
work is underway. The developers project completion in
early 1970.
21. N.Y.C.T.A. Transit Record, see Chapter VI on maintenance
costs per bus mile.
22. All data on loads and running time were taken from the
most recent N.Y.C.T.A. survey on this route, Monday,
May 6, 1968. See Exhibit 11.
23. On August 9, 1968, the 3:50 PM from Bergen Beach and the
4:10 PM from Avenue N were both observed arriving Flat-
bush Avenue 5 minutes early (the interval from Bergen
Beach was observed at Mill. Avenue at 3:52).
24. All data on the work program are taken from Weekday
schedule 0-1, see Exhibit 2.
25. The computations for the present variable cost are shown
in Exhibit 3, and are based on the cost analysis in
Chapter VI.
26. According to N.Y.C.T.A. statistical reports.
27. The relevant equations are 4:00-6:OOPM: 141-6.8 (Headway)
times the service area/1000; 10:00AM-2:00PM: 81--2.18
(Headway) times the service area/1000. See Chapter V
for presentation of this methodology.
28. B-3 data from above mentioned survey on May 6, 1968
(see footnote 22), except for data at Mill Avenue for
Bergen Beach branch, which are from Sept. 22, 1966. B-41
data from survey May 10, 1968; B-31 survey May 9, 1968.
All surveys by N.Y.C.T.A. personnel.
29. Service areas were computed from the 1960 Block Statis-
tic reports of the U.S. Census Bureau, and updated to
1968 by block-by-block counts of new, housing units in
the Bergen Beach and Mill Basin area. See Chapter V
for a definition of service area.
30. From the Tri-State Transportation Commission tables
(see footnote 10).
31. Culled from New York City Transit Authority Surface
Lines, Brooklyn Division, Weekday Schedule No. M-63.
32. Based on Transit Authority traffic checks, May, 1968.
33. Assuming the elimination of piece runs 11 and 23 (see
Exhibit 6), paying 3 and 2-1/2 hours respectively;
elimination of two round trips from Bergen Beach and one
from Avenue N; and requirement of one less vehicle in
the peak hours.
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EXHIBIT 3
Present Variable Cost 2 5
B-3 Avenue U Route Weekday
r- bus operator . approx. $3.50/hr. average as of 7/1/67
wi (1.135rj) 1.09 + 519 e $4.35/hr. + 519 : $4.60/hr.
250x8
$4.60/hr. x 128% daily pay hours : $590
Maintenance cost Flatbush Depot (higher speeds
but older equipment on B-3 route)
Base shop costs
Fuel costs-older buses in Brooklyn
Injuries and Damages (the B-3 route character
is more like Queens routes; thus this
figure is the median of-Brooklyn and
Queens costs):
a 9.374 mile
6.40C
15.77C. mile
2.70s mile
4.70c mile
Depreciation $14.30/vehicle x 7 vehicles - $100
Manpower costs
Depreciation
$590
100
$690 g 940 miles
Mileage Costs 15.77 + 2.70 4 4.70 : 23.170/mile
Total cost per mile
z 73.5(r/mile
96.674e/mile
H '11?' I
EXHIBIT 4
Effect on Demand of Service Change
Location
Ave.U &
Flatbush
Ave.
Ave.U &
Gerritsen
Ave.
Ave.U & E.
16th St.
Totals
Grand Total
Westbound
Time 9/22/67 5/6/68
6:30-
9:00AM 482
6:30-
9:00AM
6:30-
9:00AM
4:30-
6:30PM
636
857
376
2351
Before 3830
Time
Eastbound
9/22/67 5/6/68
4:30-
381 6:30PM 152
4:30-
658 6:30PM
4:30-
540. 6:30PM
6:30-
412 9:00AM
1991
After 3305
296
473
163
235
453
558 463
1479 1314
-525
Assume 50% duplication in above figures (i.e., each
passenger passes 2 check points), thus 525/2 = -262
Change was in rush hours only, comprising 50% of daily
riders, thus 262/2 : 131
Net effect -131/3830 = -3.4%
2. N.Y.C.T.A. statistics show revenue passengers month of
May, 1968 vs. May, 1967 -3.4% (vs. B-31 line, 4 3.0%)
3. Loss in passengers 5500/month x .20 = $1100/22 days =
$50 day
N.Y.C.T.A. statistics show -4.6% revenue or $1350/22 :
$61.50 day
Savings: 1 piece run @ overtime, 5 hrs. x $4.60 . $23.00
1 vehicle a 14.30
Mileage:-4 trips x 9.22 miles x $0.2317 . 8.55
(This = -3.8% mileage compared to official $45.85
N.Y.C.T.A. figure of -3.7%)
EXHIBIT 4 (continued)
$61.50 - $45.85 = -$15.65/day ) result of service
50.00 - 45.85 = - 4.15/day ) change
Compare to Table 3 NOC data: $-3 to $-15/day
4. Hypothesis I, Chapter V: When a route is operating at
practical capacity,
y . 0.75C A 0.07
where y a % change in passengers
c a % change in capacity
This function applies to situations with pedestrian
alternatives, as it was calibrated on such routes
(Mass. Ave. and No. Station in Boston, Grand River
in Detroit)
Similar situation exists westbound at E. 16th Street
on B-3 route
Old Schedule 7:30-8:30AM 8 vehicles 428 passengers
Load 53-1/2/bus
New Schedule 7:30-8:30AM 6 vehicles 0314 passengers
Load 52-1/2/bus
Calculated y s 0.75 (.33) 4 0.07 = .32
i.e., no change in load per bus
r--,-- - - SAW--UIMJ
Exhibit 5: Proposed
Run Ave.N Berg.Bch.
22
1
22
1
2
3
4
2
5
3
1
6
7
4
8
2
5
9
10
3
1
11
76
8
4
2/9
5
10
3/6
11
7/2
8/4
9
10/3
6
2
4
9
3
6
2
4
9
8
3
6
10
2/12
7:52
8:04
8:18
8:34
8:54
9:14
12:34PM
1:04
12:15AM
12:45
1:15
1:45
2:45
3: 454;45
5:07
5:30
5:50
6:05
6:20
6:31
6:50
7:05
7:18
7:30
7:42
7:54
8:06
8:22
8:40
9: 00
9:20
9:35
9:50
10:05
10:20
10:35
10:50
11:05
11:20
11:35
11:50
12:05PM
12:20
12:40
12:50
1:10
25tn&8bSt
12:45
1:15
1:45
2:15
3:15
4:15
5:15
5:37
6:03
6:25
6:45
6:57
7:07
7:17
7:25
7:32
7:40
7:47
7:54
8:01
8:08
8:14
8:20
8:26
8:32
8:38
8:44
8:52
9:00
9:08
9:18
9:28
9:38
9:48
9:58
10:13
10:28
10:43
10:58
11:13
11:28
11:43
11:58
12:13PM
12:28
12:43
12:58
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
-3 Schedule
(Arr.)Berg.B. (Arr.)Ave.N
1:10
1:40
2:10
2:40
3:40
4:40
5:40
6:02
6:28
6:50
7:10
7:35
7:55
8:10
8:33
8:52
9:10
9:24
9:40
10:00
10:10
10:30
10:45
11:00
11:15
11:30
11:45
12: OON
12:15PM
12:30
12:45
1:00
1:15
1:30
1:43
2:03
2:23
7:23
7:43
7:59
8:14
8:22
G8:34
8:42
G8:52
9:00
9:12
9:28
9:46
10:16
1:49
2:09
6:44
7:02
7:16
7:28
MMMMMEMEMOMMMOMMM
F-~I A~d
Exhibit 5 Cont.
Run Ave. N Berg. Bch. 25th&86St (Arr.)Berg.B. (Arr)Ave.N
4 1:20PM 2:00PM 2:29PM
13 1:34PM 2:10 2:43PM
9 1:40 2:20 2:49
8 1:50 2:30 3:03
14 2:04 2:40 3:09
6/17 2:10 2:50 3:23
10 2:24 3:00 3:29
12 2:30 3:10 3:43
15 2:44 3:20 3:49
13 2:50 3:30 4:03
9/16 3:04 3:40 4:09
8 3:10 3:50 4:23
14 3:24 4:00 4:29
17 3:30 4:10 4:43
10 3:44 4:20 4:49
12 3:50 4:30 5:03
15 4:04 4:40 5:09
13 4:10 4:50 5:23
16 4:24 5:00 5:29
18 G4:32 5:06 5:39
8/19 4:32 5:12 5:41
14 4:42 5:18 5:51
20 G4:50 5:24 5:53
17 4:50 5:30 6:03
10/21 5:00 5:36 6:05
22 G5:08 5:42 6:15
12 5:08 5:48 .6:17
15 5:18 5:54 6:37
23 G5:26 6:00 6:29
13 5:26 6:06 6:39
16 - 5:36 6:12 6:41
19 5:44 6:20 6:53
18 5:46 6:27 6:55
14/20 5:59 5:55F 6:35 7:07
21 6:09 6:45 7:13
17 6:15 6:55 7:27
22 6:25 7:05 7:37
15 6:35 7:15 7:43
13/14 6:45 7:25 7:57
6:59 7:35 8:03
19 7:05 7:45 8:16
20 7:20 8:00 8:30
17/21 7:39 7:35F 8:15 8:45
22 7:50 8:30 9:00
14 8:05 8:45 9:15
19/17 8:20 9:00 9:30
20 8:35 9:15 9:45
21 8:50 9:30 10:00
22/19 9:05 9:45 10:15
14 9:25 10:00 10:30
Exhibit 5 Concl.
Berg. Bch.
9:45
10:05
10:25
10:50
11:15
11:45
25th&86St
10:20
10:40
11:00
11:20
11:45
12:15
(Arr.)Berg.Bch.
10:45
11:05
11:25
11:45
12:10AM
12:40
G = To or from depot.
F = To Flatbush Ave. (Connect w/through bus).
Trips From
73 Bergen
&25th &
35 Avenue
&25th &
To
Beach
86 st
N & Utica
86 St
25th &
Bergen
25th &
Avenue
86 St 820 miles
Beach
86 St
N & Utica323
1143
(+ Run
miles
miles
On/Off)
Run
17
21/22
19
17
22
19
Route
Miles
11.24
9.22
Exhibit 6: Proposed B-3 Work Program for Exhibit 5 Schedule
Run Report (Top line Berg. Bch. or
1 12:25AM PO 12:45
012:35 1:15
2 4:47 PO
G 4:57
5:07
5:37
3 5:10 PO 5:30
0 5:20 6:03
5:30 PO 5:50
G 5:40 6:25
5x 6:00 PO
G 6:10
6 .6:30 PO
G 6:40
7x 6:49 PO
G 6:59
8 7:03 PO
G 7:13
6:20
6:57
6:50
7:25
N
7:02
7:32
N
7:16
7:47
9 7:10 PO 7:30
G 7:20 8:08
N
10 7:27 PO 7:40
G 7:37 8:14
liX 7:34 Po 7:54
G 7:44 8:32
1:45
2:15
6:05
6:45
6:31
7:07
7:05
7:40
N
7:28
8:01
8:06
8:444
N.
8:04
8:38
N
8:18
8:52
8:34G
PI
N
8:54
9:28
2:45
3:15
7:18
7:54
7:42
8:20
8:22
9:00
8:40
9:18
N
9:12
PI
9:20
9:58
Ave. N,
4:15
N
8:34,
9:08
F
9:00 1
9:38
N
9:28
PI
N
9:46
PI
Bottom line 25th & 86)
4:45
5:15
F
5:40 P0
P15:5006:41
9:32 R/7
R/9 F10:22
0:02
R/6
R/8
F10:37
10:35
11:13
R/10
Fl1:07
N
6:44
7:17
11:50
12:28
11:20 1
11:58
10:50 12:05
11:28 12:43
R/3 10:20 11:35 12:50
F10:02 10:58 12:13 1:30
10:22
R/2
F
9:35 10:37
10:13 R/4
F
10:05 11:07
10:43 R/3
N
9:14 10:16 PI
9:48
PO
G12:31
R/2
F9:32
12:34
1:10
9:50 11:05
10:28 11:43
N
PO 1:04
01:01 1:40
1:50
2:30
12:20
12:58
N
2:24
3:00
N
7:52
8:26
8:520
PI
F
1:10 1:18
R/12
N
2:40 1:49
1:20 P1
N
1:20 2:29
2:00 PI
2:10
2:50
3:10
3:50
1:40
2:20
N
3:44
4:20
F
3:14
R/17
4:32
F4:40
N
3:04
F3: 06
N
5:00
F5:02
12X 1:03PM R/2
Clear
9:07
1:36
2:07
2:47
10:04
3:32
10:42
4:58
R/19
3:22
R/16
5:17
R/21
10:34
F1:18
1:50
2:30
3:10
3:50
4:30
5:08
5:48
6:17N
PI
6:35
Exhibit 6 Cont.
Run Report
N
13X 1:21 PO 1:34
G 1:31 2:10
N
14 1:51 PO 2:04
G 2:01 2:40
N
15X 2:31 PO 2:44
G 2:41 3:20
16X 2:48 R/9 F3:06
3:40
17 2:56 R/6
F 3:114
18X 4:22 PO
2:50
3:30
N
3:24
4:00
N
4:04
4:40
N
4:24
5:00
3:30 4:50
4:10 5:30
G4:32
5:06
19 4:22 R/8 F4:40
5:12
5:46
6:27
N.
5:44
6:20
N
20X 4:40 Po G4:50 5:59
5:24 6:'35
N
21X 4:52 R/10 F5:02 6:09
5:36 6:45
22 4:58
23X 5:16 PO
G5:08
5:42
G5:26
6:00
6:25
7:05
N
6:29
PI
4:10
4:50
N
4:42
5:18
N
5:18
5:54
N
5:36
6:12
6:15
6:55
N
6:59
7:35
5:26
6:06
Clear
F
6:45 6:53
R/14
F
5:55 6:03
PI
6:35
7:15
N
6:41
PI
R/13 6:53
7:25
8:05
8:45
7:43
PI
7:13
9:25 10:30 10:55
10:00 10:40GPI
8:01
6:59
F
7:35 7:43
PI
N
8:03
PI
F
7:05 8:20 8:27
7:45 R/17
7:20
8:00
N
7:39
8:15
7:50
8:30,
6:35
9:15
8:50
9:30
9:45
R/19 8:27
9:00
9:45 10:50 11:45 12:10
10:20 11:20 11:55GPI
8:21
R/22 F9:12 10:25
9:45 11:00
11:145 12:40
12:15 12:50GPI
G9:55
PI
10:05 10:12
R/22
9:05 R/21F10:12 11:15 12:15
F9:12R/19 10:40 11:45 12:45
1:15 2:10
1:45 2:20GPI
1: 05AM
10:10PM
10:30
2:35AM
6:47PM
G = time at depot; F = time at Flatbush Ave.& Ave. U; N = time at Utica and Ave.
PO = putout (into service) from depot; PI = putin (out of service) to depot
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EXHIBIT 7
Put-ins or Runs W/Extra Swing Time or Reliefs Reporting
at Depot B-46 Utica Avenue Route Daily
Equivalent or Actual Northbound Interval from Depot
From Every Every
12:5 9AM
1:17AM
1:42AM
2:07AM
4:47AM
To 5:17AM
To 5:27AM
To 5:43AM
To 6:23AM
To 6:55AM
7:05
7:25
7:29
7:37AM
9:41AM
To 10:21
To 11:25
. 11:41AM
To 12:17PM
12:29PM
To 2:33PM
To 2:51PM
6 min.
5
4
2
2 or 4
20 min.
4 or 8
To 3:51PM
To 4:19PM
4:51
5:15
6:35
6:59
7:15
7:23
7:31
7:55
8:03
8:19
8:35
8:59
9:37
9:47
10:01
10:17
10:37
11:07PM
4 or 8 min.
4 or 8 min.
4 or 8 min.
2 or 4
2, 4 or 6
EXHIBIT 8
Selected Loads at Points on B-46 Utica Avenue Route
Northbound
Kings-
Highway
Veh. Pass.
Eastern
Church Ave. Parkway
Veh. Pass. Veh. Pass.
7:00-
7:30AM
7:30-
8:00AM
8:00-
8:30AM
8:30-
9:00AM
10:30-
11:00AM
11:00-
11:30AM
261
390(1)
9
6(3)
8
8
297
143
112
(A): 8
(B) 7
(A)
(B)
(A)
(B)
(C)
(A)
(B)
(C)
8110
418 15
191
377 14
343(2)
441
235
45
242
45
36
164
930
952
20 1160
514
260
127 8 286
46 1313 76
(1) Loads very uneven
(2) Shortline leaving late
(3) 12-minute gap included
(A)
(B)
(C)
2664 76 4102
through from Ave. N
from Kings Highway
from Church Ave.
Time
a
1.
t 
# 
s 
'1>
6D 
42
U
~ 13 
-
-
3. 
~
~k
-
2 
-
c
54C
44
+
-46 
U
T7C 
A
V
E
 
b.t
y 
4 
-
-
422
Exhibit 9
B-36 Extension
Cost and Revenue Analysis
Mileage for extension 1.3 one-way
Assume round trip 45 minutes (terminal time already in
existing schedule), based on existing actual running times
routes B-3, B-78 and B-6.
Assume alternate B-36 extended in base, 15 headway in rush
(16 minute headway base, 24 minutes evening after 8:30PM).
Approximate cost 6:00AM to 2:00PM, 2:00PM to 10:00PM, 3 buses
each period; one lunch relief AM; in PM, lunch relief also
for midnight trips. Thus, 8 men.
Manpower 8 runs x 8 hrs. x $4.60/hr. = $294
Depreciation 3 vehicles x $14.30/day = 43
Mileage 71 trips x 8.6 x 23.17# = 142
(No run/off, passes depot)
Total $479
At 200, need 2400 passengers
Capacity restraint 2000/71 = 282 per trip, OK
(4000 trip potential is round, thus 2000 one-way).
Assume all base service through on new extension (8
minutes mid-day, 12 minutes evening) - essentially double
service, require 4800 passengers. Potential only 4000.
Assume 12 minute headway through in rush hour, all service
through other times. Then 6:00AM to 10:00PM 3 buses each
eight hour period; overlap periods 9:00AM to 4:00PM and
8:00PM to Midnight, 2 more buses each include some lunch
reliefs; plus one additional for lunch reliefs. Thus 11 men.
Manpower 11 runs x 8 hrs. x $4.60/hr. = $405
Depreciation 4 vehicles x $14.30/day = 57
Mileage 108 trips x 8.6 x 23.170 = 215
Total $677
At 20#, need 3400 passengers.
(Cost data from chapter 6)
423
Exhibit 10
B-3A Route, Kings Highway and Coney Island Avenue to
Surf and West 5th St. via Avenue U
Cost and Revenue Analysis
Mileage for route 4.7 one-way
Assume round trip 60 minutes including terminal time
Original premise: 20 minute headway all day 6:OOAM to
12:00 Midnight.
Altered premise: since lunch relief is needed, use extra
run for rush hour service (15 minute headway 7:00 to 9:ooAM,
4:00 to 6:00 PM); go to 30 minute headway last hour (11:00
PM to Midnight) to avoid additional run.
Run Trips
1 3~ :00, 7:00, 8:00, 9:00, 10:00, 11:40, 12:40, 1:40
2 6:20, 7:30, 8:30, 10:20, 11:20, 12:20, 1:20
3 6:40, 7:45, 8:45, 9:40, 10:40, 12:00, 1:00, 2:00
4 7:15, 8:15, 9:20, 11:00, 2:40
5 2:20, 3:20, 4:30, 5:30, 7:20, 8:20, 9:20
6 3:00, 4:00, 5:00, 6:00, 7:00, 8:40, 9:40, 10:40
7 3:40, 4:45, 5:45, 6:40, 7:40, 10:20, 11:30
8 4:15, 5:15, 6:20, 8:00, 9:00, 10:00, 11:00, 12:00
Manpower 8 runs x 8 hrs. x $4.60/hr. = $294
Depreciation 4 vehicles x $14.30/day = 57
Mileage 58 trips x 9.4 (+ Run/off)
x 23.17# = 135
Total- $486
At 20#, need 2420 passengers
Capacity restraint 1345/58 = 23 per trip, OK
(2690 trip potential is round, thus 1345 one-way).
(Cost data from chapter 6)
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has proposed a new method of Schedule
and Route Planning which is:
1. Market oriented, focusing on the sensitivity of
demand.as well as cost to changes in service, ahd on the
potentially profitable demand for new or improved transit
service. Relationships were found to exist between level
of service and t-ransit usage (Chapter V). These relation-
ships were measured, and applied to decisions on level of
service (Chapters VII and VIII) in a manner that enabled
determination of "optimum," or at least better, levels of
service for the stipulated objective (usually maximum
Net Operating Contribution). In some cases, existing
service levels were found to be the same as the calculated
optimum.
2. Based on incremental analysis, making use -of
marginal cost analysis (Chapter VI). The marginal (added)
cost of a service increment was found to vary from route
to route and change to change, depending on a number of
factors; it was always found to be less than the average
accounted cost.
3. Systematic (as defined in Chapter III), drawing
on the discipline of Systems Analysis to make what was
foun.d to be an essentially disorganized, inconsistent art
(Chapter II) into a systematic, consistent science (Chapter
IV) capable of being programmed for the computer.
The principal steps in the proposed method, as
outlined in Chapter IV and illustrated in Chapters VII and
VIII are:
1. Establish the demographic, geographic and exist-
ing movement characteristics of the environment for the
route or routes being analyzed.
2. Establish Initial Directive Criteria which can
be applied to the evaluation of each aspect (variable) of
the State of the system to determine the need for and
direction of change.
3. Analyze the eleven postulated "State of the
System" variables - Scheduled Headway (Frequency), Actual
Headway, Scheduled Running Time and Terminal Time (Speed),
Actual Running Time and Terminal Time, Scheduled Load
(Comfort), Actual Load, Demand, Transfer Volumes, Unserved
Origin-Destination links, Work Program, and Mileage to
determine the existing State.
4. Determine, by means of the Initial Directive
Criteria, the changes required in the State variables.
5. Determine the alternative ways of changing the
State variables by analysis of the Control Variables -
Headway, Running Time, Terminal Time, Route, Vehicles, and
Supervision and Control - and their functi6nal relationships
to the State variables.
6. By using the hypotheses on demand (Chapter V)
and the marginal cost functions (Chapter VI), determine the
lNet Operating Contribution (NOC) resulting from alternative
I-
ME Yff b
changes in the State variables designed to satisfy the
Initial Directive Criteria.
7. Choose the alternative which meets the stipu-
lated objective(s) of the management and/or community,
such as maximum NOC, maximum ridership, strict adherance
to Initial Directive Criteria, etc.
8. Return to steps 1 and 3 to continue the
ongoing cycle.
It is hoped that the new approaches and findings
in this thesis will inspire further efforts along similar
lines in and out of the transit industry. Several fruitful
areas of research are suggested by the weaknesses of the
thesis:
1. The improvement of data collection procedures
in the transit industry to provide both a more comprehen-
sive continuous record of the State variables under varying
conditions and to permit development of more precise cost
and- demand functions. The automatic passenger counting
device being developed (p. 36) should, for example, contri-
bute greatly to improved data collection.
2. The development of more precise cost and demand
functions which would be both more universally applicable
and contain less uncertainty. This in part is dependant
on improvements in data collection procedures; for example,
the refinement of accounting procedur'es to isolate the
effects of speed and type of equipment on operating costs.
3. The adaptation of the method to the computer.
In combination with the progress already made in computer-
izing run-splitting and schedule construction (pp. 36 and
53), the schedule maker would be freed for more creative
analysis and the decision maker would be able to choose
from a much wider range of alternatives.
I-
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